Weekly Briefing, Vol. 43, No. 1 (SL), September 2021
Opposition parties signed an agreement for a post-election Constitutional Arch Coalition (KUL)
Summary
Four opposition parties, namely, Social Democrats, The Left, Marjan Šarec List and Alenka Bratušek Party, united under the name KUL (Constitutional Arch Coalition) signed an agreement to form a coalition after the next parliamentary elections. Seen as a logical next move after one year of coordinated political action, the signed agreement also raises several questions: the feasibility of their cooperation, the relation to existing coalition political parties and the potential inclusion/exclusion of other political parties and civil society initiatives.
Background: KUL coalition initiative and a failed vote of no-confidence
Kul Coalition initiative is formed out of four political parties, Social Democrats, The Left, Marjan Šarec List and Alenka Bratušek Party which were part of the previous government coalition of Marjan Šarec, sworn in in September 2018. Marjan Šarec List (LMŠ), Social Democrats (SD) and Alenka Bratušek Party (SAB), along with Democratic Pensioners’ Party (DeSUS) and Modern Centre Party (SMC) formed a minority government coalition with The Left as a partner party outside the government, agreeing to cooperate with the coalition for several important projects. Effectively a minority government also faced a lot of challenges in coordinating the views of the five coalition partners as well as often different views of the extra-government partner The Left. With several parliamentary representatives of DeSUS and SMC, as well as two party leaders, Zdravko Počivalšek of the Modern Centre PArty and Aleksandra Pivec of Democratic Pensioners’ Party getting closer to the right-wing opposition parties, the Prime Minister Šarec decided to resign in early 2020. The new government by the Slovenian Democrats’ leader Janez Janša was then made out of these two parties joining the right-wing Slovenian Democrats and New Slovenia (NSi), a surprising move compared to their voters having been largely against such an alliance. Following the first months of the government of Janez Janša, which was sworn in in March 2020, the opposition parties, civil society and media started to be very critical of what was seen as antidemocratic policies, especially the authoritative methods of government during the epidemic, strong government measures against public protests, attempts to control the media etc. In early October 2020 a well-known economist Jože P. Damijan, along with a group of public intellectuals published an initiative for what he called a Constitutional Arch Coalition (KUL). Inspired by the Italian post-WWII coalition of all non-fascist political parties in defence of the democratic principles of the constitution, the Damijan’s initiative aimed at uniting the political forces against what he analysed to be an irreversible shift away from the democratic principles Slovenia was established on in 1991 and a gradual establishment of the undemocratic and autocratic political power. The programme of the KUL coalition was based on (1) an efficient response to the Covid-19 crisis, (2) establishing a long-term social security and demographic system, (3) up-to-date infrastructure, (4) R&D, education and culture, (5) green and digital transformation, and (6) technological development and commercialisation of developmental break-through ideas.
Although Jože P. Damijan was initially supported by four opposition parties as the potential Prime Minister Candidate of the KUL coalition, when the parties decided to put forward the vote of no-confidence in the parliament, the returned leader of DeSUS, Karl Erjavec, was chosen to go against Janša as the new potential Prime Minister, mostly in an attempt to win over the votes of DeSUS members of the parliament to the support of KUL. The attempt was not successful and the vote of no confidence on February 2021 failed to gain the support of Modern Centre Party and DeSUS parliamentarians.
The Constitutional Arch agreement
Despite the failed vote of no confidence and against the predictions of its critics that the failure might break the opposition alliance apart, the four parties continued coordinating their efforts without substantial disagreements, joining their efforts especially in the votes of no confidence against the ministers in Janša’s government. Two rather recent developments in the public sphere provoked debates about the configuration and reconfiguration of the political landscape before the upcoming elections. Firstly, the surprising success of the referendum against the proposed Water Act, in which a civil society initiative managed to mobilize a large turnout and an extremely high vote for an environmental issue. Second development is a growing popular protest movement against the prevention measures against the spread of the Covid-19 epidemic, especially against the recovered-vaccinated-tested standard as a prerequisite for shops, institutions, restaurants etc. With these popular mobilisations indicating that a considerable part of the population might feel underrepresented by the current political parties, the balance of powers before the upcoming elections is also becoming much less predictable. The public opinion polls also reflect this unpredictability, with a quarter of all voters undecided and those that would not vote for any of the existing parties around 10%. In this situation of pre-election ambiguity, the decision of the four opposition parties to provide some stability to the potential supporters by formalizing their alliance can be seen as a logical move. Some critics have been questioning the decision of the four parties to promise an after-election coalition instead of a more common format of a pre-election coalition. The decision can however be understood at the backdrop of their common experience with the previous Šarec government, where the painful process of minority coalition construction was one of the factors for its early failure. As determined in the agreement, the four partners will run at the next elections separately, each with their own programme, while agreeing on forming a coalition after the elections in case they win enough support. They also clearly expressed their opposition against the current government and its policies. These decisions were formalized on September 28, when the leaders of the four parties (Tanja Fajon for the Social Democrats, Luka Mesec for The Left, Marjan Šarec for Marjan Šarec List and Alenka Bratušek for Alenka Bratušek Party) signed the agreement on the plateau in front of the Slovenian Parliament building.
The post-election coalition agreement is based on the programme of the Damijan’s 2020 Constitutional Arch Initiative and is formed around ten programme points: (1) more efficient, science-based and consistent anti-epidemic policies, (2) strict adherence to the principle of the division of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches, to the rule of law and the independence of judicial system, (3) strengthening of the independence of media, NGO, civil society and the depolitisation of the national security system, (4) fight for the eradication of poverty, inequality and social exclusion, (5) employment stability and higher added value jobs, predictable business environment with financial stimuli, (6) reintroduction of expert bodies in key state institutions and eradication of corruption on high-levels of politics, (7) investment in quality and accessibility of public healthcare system, public school system and long-term care, (8) stable and increased investment in culture and science, revision of the unnecessary military investments, (9) systemic solutions for full compatibility of Slovenia with the EU Green deal and the digital transformation, (10) reduction of the greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with the Paris Climate Accords.
In several media appearances the four presidents of the KUL coalition partner parties also had to answer the polemical questions on two most critical topics. First was the feasibility of their union, especially in relation to the previous government, where their disagreements were among the reasons for its end. In response, they strongly emphasized other reasons for the unsuccessful end of the Šarec coalition (minority government situation, unreliable support in DeSUS and SMC etc.) and stressed how much these four parties have learned from their past mistakes. The common decision for the coalition to eventually be led by the president of the party that receives the most votes on the upcoming elections can be seen as one step towards this revised cooperation strategy, another being that The Left is explicit about now being a full member of the coalition and not only an outside partner. The second pressing issue is what other parties or political movements the parties are willing to let into their coalition after or before ethe elections. The four leaders were fairly explicit about their reservations against welcoming Janša’s strongest ally, the New Slovenia party. They were also explicit about not supporting the antivaccination factions of the popular protest movement but expressed openness for collaboration with other popular civil society initiatives.
Conclusion
While the upcoming national assembly elections are still months ahead, the consolidation of political positions and alliances has already started the post-election coalition agreed on by the four opposition parties can be seen as a clear step in the direction of providing a solid core and a clearer agenda for the votes against the government. The success of this initiative will greatly depend on other last-minute developments in the political spectrum, especially in the centre, where the possible failure of DeSUS and SMC to attract enough voters will leave a void which might be fille din by newly emerging political movements or by the liberal parties from the left and the right of the spectrum shifting towards the centre. The emerging centre-left KUL coalition might also be seen as a a strategy of providing a stable framework to include the potential newcomers in the political sphere.