Weekly Briefing, Vol. 40, No. 4 (BH), May 2021
Non-papers on Bosnia and Herzegovina: Croatia’s role in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s aspiration to become a European Union member state
Summary
The appearance of the Slovenian “non-paper”, which among other border changes in the Western Balkans discussed breaking-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina, opened many questions. One of those, crucial for Bosnia and Herzegovina, revolves around Croatia’s role in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s aspiration to become a European Union member state. In order to show that Croatia’s role in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Euro-Atlantic integrations is far from being simple or one-dimensional, as Croatian politicians much too often present, in this briefing, we will take a closer look into the context of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political interrelationship.
Introduction
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have an uneven and unequal relationship. Although it is not always visible on the surface, political and social events which occur in one country, resonate in the other sharply. Currently, within the European Union, Croatia is presenting itself as Bosnia and Herzegovina’s “mentor” or a “guide” for its aspirations to become a European Union member state. Due to the long and complex relationship Croatia shares with Bosnia and Herzegovina, in theory, Croatia stands in a position to both help European Union to understand Bosnia and Herzegovina’s issues, and a guide Bosnia and Herzegovina through reforms that need to be implemented prior to being accepted as a part of the European Union. However, due to the the mentioned longevity and complexity of the nature of their relations, which were discussed in more detail in our March external relations and April political briefings this year, in many ways prevent Croatia in fully playing a role of a the “mentor” or a “guide”.
The Slovenian non-paper: Croatia’s position
In April this year, after a so-called “non-paper” entitled “Western Balkans – A Way Forward” leaked out from European Union’s institutions, a diplomatic scandal encircled Bosnia and Herzegovina. The non-paper itself, credited by the Slovenia media to be a work of the Slovenian prime-minister Janez Janša, put forward notions of significant border changes among the “Western Balkan” countries, which in theory would solve many issues that currently prevent those countries from becoming European Union member states. Next to the changes along the border of Serbia and Kosovo, unification of Kosovo with Albania, the annexation of parts of Montenegro and North Macedonia into Serbia, the non-paper also proposed significant changes to the borders Bosnia and Herzegovina. In short, territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which correspond to entity of Republika Srpska and region of Western Herzegovina, would be annexed into Republic of Serbia and Republic of Croatia, respectively.
Following the, more or less similar reactions from the European Union, Croatian politicians discarded the ides presented in the non-paper as either dangerous or nonsensical. Only a few days after the media had spread the news about the non-paper, the Croatian Foreign Minister Gordan Grlić Radman denied any knowledge of the document in question. More so, Grlić Radman emphasized that Croatia recently proposed its own non-paper, content of which is the exact opposite of the controversial one. As Grlić Radman explained, Croatia’s non-paper emphasized the necessity for Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain in the center of the European Union’s attention, recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina’s European Union’s membership as both a priority and an aspiration, and indicated that Bosnia and Herzegovina itself needs membership so that it could achieve a “comprehensive transformation of all society.” Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković all but ignored the Slovenian “non-paper”. Not making any statements regarding its content, Plenković stated for the media that the did not receive the controversial paper in any official or unofficial form, and that he saw the paper only through Slovenian media. Unlike the Prime Minister, the Croatian President Zoran Milanović shared an opinion on the matter. He discarded the idea of a peaceful break-up in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a “frivolous and dangerous topic that it should not even be put on non-paper, no matter who did it”. “Any peaceful break-up, Croatia all the way to the Drina river, Belgrade to the Una river”, Milanović further explained, “is out of the question.” “And in that sense, that paper is a big shit”, Milanović concluded.
Croatia and the shifts in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s internal politics
A public discussion on any kind of a break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Croatia is a delicate topic. One can even say that it has almost become a taboo. Due to the not so distant wartime attempts to put their hands on Western Herzegovina during the 1990s war, Croatian politicians cannot allow themselves to appear that they usher such discussions in front of the European Union. More so because Croatia fights hard to maintain its “European, non-Balkan” image, through which it distances itself from the selective unpleasant history episodes. However, such ideas do exist underneath the surface, as Croatia, sometimes directly or indirectly, participates in the kind of politics that slowly, but steadily pushes Bosnia and Herzegovina towards the direction of the country’s break-up.
The loudest factor of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political instability and disfunction today is not difficult to pinpoint, as it is summed up in the persona of Milorad Dodik, the leader of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata, SNSD) and a Serb representative of the of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s presidency. The goal of his political agenda can be simply described as secession of Republika Srpska form Bosnia and Herzegovina and its subsequent unification with Serbia. Recently, although not so direct, another internal factor is becoming more and more clear. Dragan Čović, the leader of Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica BiH, HDZ BiH) has as of late become more and more bold in his own requests for political redefinition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to Čović, parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, populated by Croats, should get their own entity. Since this idea defies both the Washington and Dayton agreements, and stands in a clear opposition to Bosniak’s understanding of what Bosnia and Herzegovina should be, Čović can’t find no other political support than in Dodik. Not so much because Croats are sympathetic toward goals of the Serbs in any way, or vice versa, but only because in order to reach their goals both Croats and Serbs, need to redefine the same obstacle – the Dayton Agreement and the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Even though Croatia is acting out in front of the European Union authorities as if its politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not moving in this direction, Croatia’s involvement in the matter is difficult not to recognize. The mentioned Croatian non-paper, which referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s road to the European Union, could serve as a good example of this. As soon as it was made public, Zdravka Bušić, National Vice President of the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, HDZ) and the President of the Parliamentary Committee for Croats Abroad, made a statement by which she elaborated that the aim of this non-paper is to encourage Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political actors to compromise on constitutional and election law reform and a series of reform moves. By itself, this statement does seem in accordance to European Union’s wishes. However, the Croatian non-paper belongs to context in which Croatia donates € 25 million to the University of Mostar (May 2006), donates € 5.4 million donation to Mostar hospital for fighting the COVID-19 (April 2020), Zagreb University awarding Dragan Čović with a honorary doctorate for “for his contribution to strengthening bilateral relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, preserving Croatian identity, promoting democratic values and affirming Croatian educational, scientific and cultural heritage,” or lobbies for Dodik’s support in toning down strategic concerns raised within Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding the construction of Pelješac bridge, possible in the first place due to the alignment of his political goals with Čović. Due to all this, the reaction of Bosniak’s media, most of which recognized the Croatian non-paper as a show of “insincere benevolence, paternalism and covert imperialism”, is not that difficult to understand.
Conclusion
The issues discussed in this briefing indicate that it is practically impossible for Croatia to have one-dimensional, clear or consistent policy regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina. Behind Croatia’s support for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s candidacy for European Union’s membership lies a whole set of problems and challenges. Whether the Croatian government recognizes it or not, the political ideas of elevating Western Herzegovina to a status of “entity”, which would probably immediately mean that a new stage of dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina can begin, are existent and unfolding. Therefore, the role of Croatia, when it comes to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s road to the European Union, is not so much of a guide or mentor, as it is that of a crisis manager which is itself partially responsible for the crisis. The main role of Croatia is to maintain the balance between certain political aspiration within itself and within Bosnia and Herzegovina, until Bosnia and Herzegovina eventually joins the European Union. The constitutional changes, which the European Union demands from Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, do stand out as a dangerous factor which might shatter this balance.