Weekly Briefing, Vol. 25, No. 4 (GR), January 2020
Greek foreign policy in 2020
2020 is expected to be significant for Greek foreign policy. As tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean are strained, Greece attempts to empower its position and defend its interests. Greek diplomacy will continue to focus on isolating Turkey in response to the latter’s decision to sign a memorandum of understanding with Libya on the delimitation of their exclusive economic zones. Greece largely counts on its partnership with the US as well as trilateral cooperation schemes, principally with Israel and Cyprus. Amid tensions the Greek public debate flourishes containing several views, including the possibility of the International Court of Justice solving the Greek-Turkish dispute on their continental shelfs and exclusive economic zones. But serious Greek-Turkish disagreements on how to proceed and sign a mutually accepted memorandum for a joint recourse to the Hague cannot generate optimism.
2020 started dynamically for Greek foreign policy. In the first days of the month, the seventh tripartite summit of Greece, Israel and Cyprus took place in Athens. On this occasion, the leaders representing the three countries, Prime Ministers Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Benjamin Netanyahu and President Nikos Anastasiadis signed an agreement for the construction of the East Med pipeline to transport natural gas from the Levantine Basin to Europe. Only a few days after that ceremony of 2 January Mitsotakis travelled to the US and met President Donald Trump. It was the first visit of a Greek Premier to the White House after the one of Alexis Tsipras in 2017. Although on the day of meeting, on 7 January, the American attention was shifted towards developments in Iran following the killing of General Suleimani, Mitsotakis discussed with Trump developments in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The strengthening of the Greek-Israeli-Cypriot partnership is a critical priority for Greek foreign policy. The seventh tripartite meeting was highly important because it followed the signing of the maritime deal between Turkey and Libya. While Greece and Cyprus take the lead in exposing the illegal, unhelpful and escalatory nature of this agreement in the Eastern Mediterranean, Israel also expressed its full support and solidarity. The official position of Israel was thus that this memorandum of understanding was illegal. Subsequently, during the Athens summit, Greece, Israel and Cyprus issued a statement considering ‘the Turkish decision to deploy troops in Libya […] a dangerous threat to regional stability [constituting] a gross violation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011), imposing an arms embargo in Libya’. Of course, all this does not mean – as Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Israel Katz has publicly said that his country – would send battleships to confront Turkey. But even if Israel and Turkey cannot be considered enemies, their differences remain systemic. For example, Israel accuses Turkey of hosting Hamas offices in Istanbul where terror attacks are being planned.
The more Greece, Israel and Cyprus talk to each other, the deeper the content of their synergies becomes. While an alliance is in the making, for it to have a military nature, it is too early to tell. The substantial American support to this potential end will be necessary. Greece is concerned about the impact of Turkish-American relations on the further development of the trilateral scheme. Ankara remains a valuable ally for Ankara and this might lead Washington to refrain from further supporting the trilateral cooperation mechanism. Also, the excellent personal relationship between Presidents Donald Trump and Tayyip Erdogan is a factor that cannot be ignored when a reference to US foreign policy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East is made.
While US intentions in further supporting the trilateral cooperation of Greece, Israel and Cyprus remain unknown, the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 has been certainly welcomed by Athens. The Act, inter alia, stipulates that it is in the policy of the US to support diplomatic efforts with partners and allies to deepen energy security cooperation among the three countries, to promote deepened security cooperation with Cyprus through the removal of the arms embargo on the country and to support robust International Military Education and Training (IMET) programming with Greece and Cyprus. In addition, the Act reflects the interest of Washington in supporting the Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas Forum and in developing a plan to work with businesses seeking to invest in Eastern Mediterranean energy exploration.
With reference to the potential construction of the East Med pipeline, Mitsotakis said that the agreement signed in Athens had an ‘economic, developmental, diplomatic and geostrategic dimension’ and will contribute to peace and stability. The project envisages a 1,300 km offshore pipeline and a 600 km onshore one from Eastern Mediterranean sources to Cyprus, from Cyprus to Crete, from Crete to mainland Greece and from the Peloponnese to Western Greece. Then, the plan is to connect Western Greece to Italy east of Otranto via a 207 km offshore pipeline across the Ionian Sea, the so-called Poseidon. Italy, however, did not participate in the Athens ceremony generating some questions on its commitment to take part. Theoretically, its interest in this project remains valid but its absence is certainly noted.
If constructed the East Med pipeline will pass through a maritime zone Turkey believes it belongs to its continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. It is here where the problem begins. From a Greek perspective, the Turkish-Libyan maritime deal does not entail legal consequences for third parties. Athens endeavors to persuade its allies that it is null and void. From a Turkish perspective though, it is an agreement that respects international law and will drive its future foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ankara believes its position cannot be ignored when energy issues are discussed. At the time of writing, it cannot be concluded how its stance will be formulated should the East Med will be realized. There are analysts believing Greece, Israel and Cyprus will overcome Turkish reactions and others who disagree estimating an international mediation will be required.
For Turkey the best scenario to transport natural gas from the Levantine Basin to Europe will be the construction of a pipeline linking the reservoirs with the Ceyhan port. As long as the Cyprus Question remains unresolved, this option will be theoretical. Whether President Erdogan is prepared to make concessions in order to increase international hopes for a solution to the Cyprus Question is not likely. This is the only way how the afore-mentioned option will gain ground though. Beyond the future transportation of natural gas from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe, Greece is highly concerned about Turkish intentions to proceed to drilling in the area southern of Crete in 2020. Ankara does not exclude deploying research vessels there. In such a case, a Greek-Turkish crisis seems unavoidable.
Against this backdrop, Mitsotakis used his White House visit to share Greek sensitivities with Trump. During their joint statements to the press at the Oval Office he repeatedly tried to present Greece’s positions and to intervene where he could to expose the illegal nature of the Turkish-Libyan maritime deal. The response he received was not the one he had expected. So, while Greek-American relations are flourishing and their military collaboration reaches new heights, it is questionable whether Washington will support Athens in the case of a crisis with Ankara in the Aegean and in the Eastern Mediterranean. The experience of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 is telling. Of course, this does not entail such a crisis is placed in in the interest of Washington. This said, the US will possibly undertake a diplomatic initiative to reduce tensions. As leading Greek newspaper Hi Kathimerini has reported, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Palmer plans to visit Turkey and Greece in February and March respectively.
Conclusion
The key question is whether Greece and Turkey can closely cooperate throughout the year to avert the worse-case scenario of a military accident. In recent weeks Greek media have largely focused on Greek-Turkish relations. Politicians such as former vice-President Evangelos Venizelos and former Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyiannis openly talk about the possibility of a joint Greek-Turkish recourse to the International Court of Justice. For this happen, the two sides need to agree on the steps forwards which will be a difficult and complicated process. Athens believes only the continental shelf/exclusive economic zone issue constitutes a difference. Ankara’s agenda is much richer and includes themes of sovereignty. Athens has reservations on the Court’s jurisdiction on maritime boundary delimitation and Ankara does not automatically recognize its compulsory jurisdiction. These fundamental differences makes it hard for the two sides to proceed towards signing a relevant memorandum that will make the joint recourse to The Hague possible. Whether dialogue continues in good faith, remains to be seen.