Weekly Briefing, Vol. 68. No. 4 (MK) December 2023
Macedonian International Relations in 2023: Dynamics and Geopolitical Alignments
Summary
Macedonia’s journey through 2023 in terms of the country’s international relations followed the trajectory set by the SDSM-DUI government since 2017. At the forefront was the country’s protracted EU accession process, which culminated in December when Macedonia found itself conspicuously absent from the EU Council invitation list, which represented the stalling of its membership progress. Concurrently, Macedonia’s NATO membership further entangled the country in the conflict in Ukraine, evident through various actions, such as the training of Ukrainian soldiers on Macedonian territory. Moreover, the country assumed the presidency of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) during the year. Regrettably, this tenure seemed to closely mirror NATO’s rhetoric and political positions, and the country failed to use it as a platform to promote and advocate for national interests. Macedonia’s stances within the United Nations also suggested a subordination to U.S. imperialism and militarism. In the realm of regional initiatives, Macedonia’s involvement in the Open Balkan Initiative and the Berlin Process continued. In 2023, the country remained passive and disinterested in cooperation with China, both bilaterally but also with the China-CEEC cooperation framework.
The EU Accession Process in 2023
Throughout 2023, Macedonia’s efforts to join the EU continued at their typical slow pace. Conflicting signals emerged from both domestic and EU institutions with regards to the prospects for membership, the timeline, as well as the areas requiring immediate attention.The European Council and the European Commission delivered conflicting messages, fluctuating between stressing the urgency of internal reforms for progress and the requirement to enact constitutional changes, to include a Bulgarian minority in the country’s constitution. This demand became a prerequisite following the adoption of the 2022 French proposal, integrating Bulgaria’s conditions into Macedonia’s negotiation framework with the EU.[1] EU Commission President von der Leyen’s visit to Skopje on October 30th encapsulated the duality in EU’s messaging. She stated, “I am aware of the ongoing work on amending your constitution. The first steps have been taken in your parliament – and that is good news. Now, I hope that all parties will seize this opportunity to move forward. Because there is a true momentum now, all over the European Union and those countries who want to join the European Union, for the enlargement process. So, it is important to seize that moment.”[2] Evidently von der Leyen focused the attention on the constitutional changes. Indeed, the EU Council attributed the non-inclusion of Macedonia in its December agenda and the impasse in its accession trajectory to the required constitutional changes linked to Bulgaria’s conditions.[3] At that same Council meeting, the EU reached a decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova.[4] The decision was reached in spite of Hungary’s veto, by removing PM Viktor Orban from the meeting and proceeding with the vote.[5] This was perceived as a glaring example of double standards in Macedonia, demonstrating that any veto (including Bulgaria’s veto for Macedonia) can be bypassed if the members of the EU are determined. Instead of a creative solution to bypass Bulgaria’s veto, Macedonia remains pressured to revise its constitution to explicitly incorporate some 3,500 Bulgarians in its Constitution, alongside a range of other demands and conditions.[6]
The EU’s emphasis on the constitutional changes has served to divert attention from the country’s internal reform challenges, noted by their own European Commission. The 2023 European Commission Progress Report placed the focus on the internal reform challenges. The Report revealed significant deficiencies despite the government’s pro-EU rhetoric. It highlighted political criteria inadequacies, electoral legislation issues, parliamentary procedure misuse, and insufficient anti-corruption efforts and judiciary transgressions. While the government downplayed these criticisms, opposition voices emphasized the failure to address identified issues, highlighting the stagnant path toward EU membership. Diplomats, former ministers, and EU experts noted substantial gaps between promises and actions.[7]
Internally, both the Government and opposition parties engaged in a blame game. The former pointed fingers at the opposition, citing their refusal to accept the constitutional changes as the primary hurdle to membership. Meanwhile, the opposition accused the Government of neglecting to implement internal reforms as the main obstacle for securing membership. However, both were only partly correct. The real obstacles to membership hardly stemmed from the internal country dynamics, but instead originated from the EU’s assessment regarding the geopolitical benefits of Macedonia’s membership in the Union. As the opening of accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova demonstrated, enlargement decisions more often than not follow a geopolitical logic and EU’s internal considerations rather than a logic focused on the reform processes.[8] As a result, the EU enlargement process often has detrimental consequences for candidate states. This was demonstrated in September when highly damaging amendments to the Criminal Code were passed, paving the way for amnesty and impunity for former public officials caught up in serious criminal cases. Many viewed the abrupt passing of these changes as part of a deal to secure the support needed to pass the constitutional changes required for the EU accession process. The EU has turned a blind eye to this development, and has thus contributed to the permanent erosion of justice, and to the entrenchment of a culture of impunity in the country, thus completely eradicating its reform potential in areas such as the rule of law, which is one of the main reason for joining the Union in the first place.[9]
Throughout 2023, the true barriers seemed more rooted in the EU’s geopolitical calculations than domestic dynamics. This ambiguity regarding accession intentions eroded public support, with support for the EU at an all time low, as observed by the annual survey on perceptions of the EU accession process conducted by the Institute for Democracy.[10] The 2023 survey found that only 60% of the Macedonian population support the country’s perspectives for EU membership, the lowest percentage of support to date. Only 53% of the young population (18-24 years) is supportive of EU membership. The survey also found that 44% of the population thinks that the country’s inability to provide a satisfactory track record of reforms has become the most important reason why the country cannot obtain EU membership. One third of the population is pessimistic and doesn’t believe that the country will ever become a member of the EU.[11]
NATO membership in 2023
2023 is the third year since the country has been a member of NATO. During the three years, its NATO membership has resulted in fiscal implications, increased militarization, and further encroachment on the nation’s sovereignty in its foreign relations. In 2023 the defense budget amounted to 274 million euros, which is 1.85% of the GDP and is higher than the 2022 budget by 24.45%. What is more, the country has set its sights on reaching the 2% of GDP target for defense spending by 2024.[12] These NATO-related expenditures have been an additional source of drain to the budget, thus affecting the overall economic security in the country, and have come at the expense of expenditures in areas of dire need for funding such as public education and public healthcare.[13] NATO membership has also defined the country’s positioning in relation to the war in Ukraine, with the country sending arms to Ukraine, supporting UN resolutions against the Russian Federation and supporting sanctions against Russia. Macedonia has so far donated military and humanitarian equipment to Ukraine on ten occasions. Most recently in November, the Ministry of Defence informed that Ukrainian soldiers had been trained on Macedonian territory: “We offered and already implemented the first training of Ukrainian soldiers who successfully completed their training in the Republic of North Macedonia in facilities, on locations owned by the Army of the Republic of North Macedonia, for which an appropriate decision was made by the Government of the Republic of North Macedonia, and which for security reasons was announced after its completion”, said the minister of defense. She also added that this type of support, through training tailored according to the demands of the Ukrainian side, will continue in the course of 2024 and as long as there is a need for this. “We remain open if there is a need for donation of weapons or any type of armament that we possess, which according to the regulations in our army is not necessary and can be donated. There is no doubt that we will make such a decision”, said the minister.[14]
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg addressed the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia in Skopje on 21 November 2023, marking the first such address since the country joined NATO. “Here, in this Assembly, you are united in denouncing Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,” he said. Following a meeting with Prime Minister Dimitar Kovačevski, the Secretary General added: “NATO can rely on North Macedonia and North Macedonia can rely on NATO. The Alliance guarantees your security. You are covered by NATO’s air policing. Fighter jets from Greece and Italy patrol your skies to keep you safe. This is NATO solidarity in action.” Stoltenberg also stated that “authoritarian states are seeking to undermine our freedom and way of life, including in the Western Balkans”. He said: “Our response must be to work even more closely together in NATO.”[15] This was a renewed signal to the country to avoid cooperation with countries with which NATO has adversarial relations, such as Russia, China and Iran.
A week later Foreign Minister Bujar Osmani participated in a meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Stoltenber noted that the meeting will also address the situation in the Western Balkans, where “we have seen serious violence in northern Kosovo, divisive and secessionist rhetoric in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and malign attempts to sow dissent, including from Russia.” Among other things, during this meeting Stoltenberg added that “Beijing’s actions challenge our security. And we must work together to respond”.[16] Overall, in 2023, the country’s NATO membership has remained a platform for keeping the country within the orbit of US geopolitical control, focused on militarizing the country, and reducing its potential for cooperation with country’s deemed to be geopolitical rivals by the USA such as Russia and China.
OSCE
In 2023, Macedonia assumed the Chairmanship of the OSCE, which marked the country’s inaugural tenure holding the OSCE presidency. Holding the 2023 Chairmanship of the OSCE marked a significant moment for the country, but it didn’t fulfill its intended purpose. Rather than prioritizing the OSCE’s objectives—such as promoting peace and fostering dialogue—the presidency seemed to align closely with NATO’s agenda. The Chairman-in-Office’s actions and statements mirrored NATO’s stance on the Ukraine conflict. Despite assurances to prioritize humanitarian needs and the OSCE’s mission, official visits and rhetoric mainly echoed NATO’s priorities, missing opportunities to advance the OSCE’s primary roles. This was evident not just in rhetoric but also in the official visits made by the Chairman-in-Office. During Minister Osmani’s initial official visit as OSCE Chairman-in-Office to Kyiv, Ukraine, he engaged in discussions with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Speaker of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Ruslan Stefanchuk, and Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. Osmani reiterated unwavering support for Ukraine, stating, “I am present here today to underscore our unwavering backing for Ukraine and to convey a clear message: the Russian aggression against Ukraine lacks justification and is without provocation. As part of our role in the OSCE Chairmanship, we remain committed to extending OSCE’s aid and support during these testing times,” Osmani conveyed.[17] This stance was repeated by the MFA during a NATO meeting in Brussels, where he presented the Program of Macedonia as the Chairman of the OSCE in 2023. “The Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine has shaken the pillars of our security,” Osmani emphasized, adding that Ukraine will remain a top priority and key security issue. “Our priority in all three aspects will be to provide essential support to Ukraine and its people,” he said.[18]
The 30th OSCE Ministerial Council was held at the Boris Trajkovski Sports Center, transformed into an exhibition pavilion for the occasion. Foreign Minister Osmani extended a welcome to the heads of the 50-plus delegations. On November 29th, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken briefly visited Skopje but departed for Israel shortly afterward, missing an encounter with Lavrov, who arrived shortly after Blinken’s departure. The 30th OSCE Ministerial Council, held in Skopje, faced controversy due to Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov’s attendance, shedding light on discord within the organization.[19] This diplomatic turmoil highlighted the OSCE’s uncertain state and raised critical questions about its future and relevance, especially concerning its alignment with NATO’s objectives.
Throughout the Macedonian presidency, the OSCE seemed to serve as an extension of NATO rather than an independent platform for peace-building and dialogue among member states. Despite its inaugural chairmanship, the country missed crucial chances to assert the OSCE’s core values and objectives, clouding its tenure with echoes of NATO’s priorities and further contributing towards the uncertainty about the OSCE’s future trajectory.
UN
The only positive comments which the European Commission had for Macedonia in the 2023 Progress Report centered on its external relations, highlighting that “the country has made good progress by maintaining full alignment with EU common foreign and security policy. By doing so, North Macedonia has shown itself to be a reliable partner, including at international level,” the report found. However, the EU’s approach to various external relations matters has been notably problematic, largely stemming from its alignment with NATO and the USA. Bearing this in mind suggests that the country’s alignment is an indicator of subservience and diminished sovereignty. This was evident in the official speeches given in front of the UN. President Pendarovski delivered an address during the 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly titled: “Sustaining the UN Charter’s Goals and Principles Through Effective Multilateralism: Ensuring Peace and Security in Ukraine.” However, the President missed a crucial opportunity to address critical issues concerning the violations of the UN Charter’s goals and principles, breaches of international law, the right to self-determination, intensified pressures, and attempts at assimilating the Macedonian people and state. These concerns hold immense significance for Macedonian citizens and the state and should be spotlighted on every available platform at the highest international levels, including within the United Nations. Instead of focusing on these pressing matters, the President opted to discuss peace in Ukraine and the green transition. This occurred amidst ongoing challenges where his own state faces dismantlement, enduring threats, pressures, and attempts to negate the Macedonian people’s identity. It revealed a concerning disconnect within the Macedonian political leadership, seemingly detached from the significant issues and problems that weigh most heavily on the Macedonian people.
The alignment with the EU common foreign and security policy was also evident in the country’s voting record within the UN. On October 28th, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, but Macedonia abstained. The resolution, proposed by Jordan, was adopted with 120 votes in favor, 14 against, and 45 abstentions. Macedonia was among the countries that abstained from the resolution, which condemned all acts of violence against Palestinian and Israeli civilians, as well as terrorist and indiscriminate attacks, and also called for unimpeded assistance and protection of civilians.[20] The Prime Minister Dimitar Kovachevski stated that the country abstained from voting on the resolution because the terrorist attack by Hamas had not been mentioned. “The decision to vote on the UN Resolution was not an easy one. We chose to abstain because the resolution addresses humanitarian issues that we agree with and support, but it doesn’t address the terrorist act carried out by Hamas on October 7th,” stated Prime Minister Dimitar Kovachevski on October 30th.[21] This position shifted when another resolution was passed on December 12th, when a large majority supported the call for a humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza as a strong demonstration of global support to end the war between Israel and Hamas. Macedonia was amongst the 153 countries which voted in favor of the resolution.[22]
OPEN BALKAN INITIATIVE
In 2023, Macedonia remained actively engaged in the Open Balkan Initiative, which initially emerged as a response to the political impediments faced by Macedonia and Albania on their paths to European integration. Serving as a regional integration strategy, it brought immediate advantages like smoother border crossings for goods and mutual recognition of certificates, fostering trade and cost reduction. Throughout 2023, the primary focus persisted on facilitating trade and border crossings, forging agreements to recognize authorized economic operators, and collectively promoting the region through events like fairs, marking notable achievements. Macedonia notably participated in the ‘Wine Vision by Open Balkan’ event. However, challenges persisted in implementing these agreements on the ground, evident in the disparities between the written agreements and their practical application, as seen in border crossings and diploma recognition. Despite these challenges, there’s potential for a resurgence of the Open Balkan Initiative, mainly due to the sluggish progress of EU accession in the region. This suggests that the initiative’s importance might be amplified in the near future. Overall, when comparing Open Balkan’s progress to the Berlin Process, it underscores the former’s efficacy and tangible outcomes, contrasting it with the latter, which faces limitations due to EU bureaucratic processes.
Conclusion
In 2023, Macedonia’s international relations mirrored the ongoing foreign policy of the coalition Government established since 2017. Regarding the EU, while affirming a commitment to membership, no tangible strides were taken toward implementing crucial reforms. Instead, the country regrettably veered towards transgressing the rule of law and amplifying corruption. Membership in NATO further entrenched Macedonia in the conflict in Ukraine, evident in the training of Ukrainian soldiers on Macedonian soil. This expansion of NATO influence wasn’t confined solely to the organization itself; the nation, during its chairmanship of the OSCE and within the UN, actively advocated for NATO’s interests. Simultaneously, there was a conspicuous lack of interest in fostering cooperation with China. These actions underscored a subservient stance of the political elites to the West, yet failed to yield any discernible benefits for national interests, human or economic security for the country and its people.
[1] Authoritarian liberalism or how the French proposal was pushed through the Macedonian Parliament in spite of overwhelming opposition, published in July 2022, available at
https://china-cee.eu/2022/08/01/north-macedonia-political-briefing-authoritarian-liberalism-or-how-the-french-proposal-was-pushed-through-the-macedonian-parliament-in-spite-of-overwhelming-opposition/ accessed on 23.12.2023
[2] Statement by President von der Leyen at the joint press conference with Dimitar Kovachevski, Prime Minister of the Republic of North Macedonia, 30.10.2023, available at https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/statement-president-von-der-leyen-joint-press-conference-dimitar-kovachevski-prime-minister-republic-2023-10-30_en, accessed on 01.12.2023
[3] EU ‘Creativity’ Over Ukraine Has Left Macedonians Frustrated, published on 20.12.2023, available at
https://balkaninsight.com/2023/12/20/eu-creativity-over-ukraine-has-left-macedonians-frustrated/ accessed on 23.12.2023
[4] EU greenlights accession talks with Ukraine but Orbán vetoes €50-billion aid package, published on 14.12.2023, available at
https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/12/14/eu-greenlights-accession-talks-with-ukraine-and-moldova accessed on 23.12.2023
[5] Scholz gets Orbán out the room to open Ukraine’s membership talks, published on 15.12.2023, available at
https://www.politico.eu/article/olaf-scholz-gets-viktor-orban-out-the-room-to-approve-ukraine-accession-talks/ accessed on 23.12.2023
[6] EU ‘Creativity’ Over Ukraine Has Left Macedonians Frustrated, published on 20.12.2023, available at
https://balkaninsight.com/2023/12/20/eu-creativity-over-ukraine-has-left-macedonians-frustrated/ accessed on 23.12.2023
[7] 2023 European Commission Report on North Macedonia: Put your reforms where your mouth is!, published on 10.11.2023, available at
https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2023/11/10/2023-european-commission-report-on-north-macedonia-put-your-reforms-where-your-mouth-is/ accessed on 23.12.2023
[8] In late August, the Commission rebutted European Council President Michel’s assertion about the bloc’s readiness to accept new members by 2030, emphasizing a focus on collaboration with candidate countries rather than fixating on a specific date.
[9] North Macedonia external relations briefing: The Status of EU Enlargement Amidst the War in Ukraine:
Challenges and Uncertainties, published in October 2023, available at https://china-cee.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/2023er10_North-Macedonia.pdf accessed on 23.12.2023
[10] The primary data used in this analysis come from a public opinion survey research conducted in November 2023 on a sample of 1000 respondents. This public opinion analysis on the Macedonian process of accession to the European Union conducted in 2023 is a continuation of the research done in 2014, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022, in IDSCS Public Opinion Analysis Paper No. 27/2023, Analysis of public opinion on North Macedonia’s accession to the European Union (2014-2023), published in December 2023, available at https://idscs.org.mk/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/B5-Public-Opinion-Analysis-Paper-No.-27-2023-WEB.pdf accessed on 23.12.2023
[11] IDSCS Public Opinion Analysis Paper No. 27/2023, Analysis of public opinion on North Macedonia’s accession to the European Union (2014-2023), published in December 2023, available at https://idscs.org.mk/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/B5-Public-Opinion-Analysis-Paper-No.-27-2023-WEB.pdf accessed on 23.12.2023
[12] Defense from the Perspective of a Western Balkan Ally: North Macedonia, published on 18.12.2023, available at https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1903 accessed on 23.12.2033
[13] NATO Membership and Its Shadow: Assessing the Impact on Diverse Security Dimensions in
Macedonia, October 2023, available at https://china-cee.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/2023p10_North-Macedonia.pdf accessed on 23.12.2023
[14]Petrovska in the Macedonian Television News: we continue to support Ukraine, the first training of Ukrainian soldiers conducted in North Macedonia, published on 21.11.2023, available at
https://mod.gov.mk/petrovska-in-the-macedonian-television-news-we-continue-to-support-ukraine-the-first-training-of-ukrainian-soldiers-conducted-in-north-macedonia/ accessed on 23.12.2023
[15] NATO Secretary General in Skopje: the Western Balkans is essential to the security of Europe, published on 21.11.2023, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_220288.htm, accessed on 23.12.2023
[16] https://mia.mk/en/story/osmani-attends-meeting-of-nato-foreign-ministers-in-brussels-topics-include-middle-east-ukraine-western-balkans
[17] “OSCE Chairman-in-Office Osmani completes visit to Kyiv, emphasizes continued destructive impact of
Russia’s war on Ukraine’s people”, published on 16.01.2023, available at https://www.osce.org/chairpersonship/536055, accessed on 16.02.2023
[18] Osmani before NATO in the capacity of Chairman of the OSCE, published on 31.01.2023, available
https://www.mfa.gov.mk/en/page/13/post/3269/osmani-pred-nato-vo-svojstvo-na-pretsedavach-so-obse
accessed on 09.03.2023
[19] Russia’s FM Lavrov steals the show at the 30th OSCE Ministerial
Council in Skopje, published in November 2023, available at https://china-cee.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/2023er11_North-Macedonia.pdf accessed on 24.12.2023
[20] Фрчкоски гласаше воздржано за итно примирје во Газа: „Ако власта е за војна, нека оди таму“, published on 28.10.2023, available at https://a1on.mk/macedonia/frchkoski-glasashe-vozdrzhano-za-itno-primirje-vo-gaza-ako-vlasta-e-za-vojna-neka-odi-tamu/, accessed on 24.12.2023
[21] Зошто Македонија гласаше воздржано за резолуцијата за Газа?, published on 30.10.2023, available at
https://www.dw.com/mk/zosto-severna-makedonija-glasase-vozdrzano-za-rezolucijata-na-on-za-gaza/a-67255112, accessed on 24.12.2023
[22] Македонија гласаше во ОН за прекин на огнот во Газа, published on 12.12.2023, available at
https://nezavisen.mk/makedonija-glasashe-vo-on-za-prekin-na-ognot-vo-gaza/, accessed on 24.12.2023