Weekly Briefing, Vol. 66. No. 4 (Sl) October 2023
Before the membership in the UN Security Council – the migration flow, controlled Schengen borders, and the support for the EU integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Summary
In June 2023, Slovenia became a non-permanent member of the United States Security Council for the second time in its history; in October 2023, it became an observer while at the beginning of 2024, the actual membership will commence.
The membership comes in very challenging times for global security which is at the same time an opportunity for Slovenian diplomacy to show its worth to the international community, and a significant set of challenges that Slovenia and its peers will need to overcome.
The following article analyses the Slovenian border situation in regard to the wave of migrations and its foreign policy focus (with a specific orientation on the aid to the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina) in a time of increased global tensions just before the start of the membership in the UN Security Council.
Background: the non-permanent membership United Nations Security Council and Slovenian diplomatic strategy and reputation
In June 2023, Slovenia succeeded in an attempt to become a temporary member of the United Nations Security Council for the years 2024-2025;[1] it was the second time that Slovenia was elected for the rotating membership of the council after it had already achieved that status in 1998.[2]
Since its independence, Slovenia was generally considered a reliable partner and later, a valuable member of Western alliances such as the European Union and NATO, both of which it became a member in 2004.[3]
After joining the European Union, Slovenia largely concentrated on conducting its geopolitical agenda focusing on integration of the countries of the Western Balkans. The rather successful long-term program got a significant boost last year when Bosnia in Herzegovina became a candidate for membership in the European Union which has been a goal of the Slovenian external politics for quite some time.[4]
This year, Slovenian foreign politics and diplomacy at large gained international recognition and prestige as succeeded in achieving a place for Slovenia in the United Nations Security Council after a short but focused and effective campaign.[5] The success of the campaign led by the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs was even more relevant due to the latest global security issues as well as domestic pressures and natural disasters that have taken place in recent times.
Slovenia gained a rotating spot in the UN Security Council defeating Belarus in the voting in June 2023.[6] In October 2023 it became an observer and in 2024 it will become a temporary member of the council.
It appears that Slovenia prepared well for its role as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council; for that end, the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs designated a special mission for the UN Council which is led by Samuel Žbogar, an experienced professional diplomat that was a former Slovenian Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Slovenian ambassador in Washington, EU special representative in Kosovo, head of the EU delegation in North Macedonia and former deputy permanent representative to the UN during Slovenia’s first membership in the United Nations.[7]
As per standardized protocol, Slovenia became the UN Security Council observer on October 1, 2023, and will become a member of the council at the start of 2024. The above-mentioned special mission is set to ensure that the performance of Slovenian diplomacy can be given at the highest realizable capacities during the council membership in important and trying times.[8]
In the past, Slovenia remained largely neutral whenever possible or prudent regarding the actual geopolitical situation; for example, in 2001, Slovenia hosted a historic meeting between American President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin. At the time, the meeting was globally recognized as important, but mostly inconsequential;[9] today, we may look upon such an occasion somewhat differently.
Since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the previously rather indifferent but distrustful and already somewhat strained after the Russian annexation of Crimea, official relations between Slovenia and Russia have become hostile; in 2022, the Russian government placed Slovenia on a “list of unfriendly nations”. [10] Slovenia also backed all the packages of sanctions that the European Union leveled against Russia.[11]
Despite the worsening of the diplomatic and political relations between the two countries, the sheer trade value (if not trade activity as such) between Russia and Slovenia appears to have surprisingly even grown by the end of 2022 and seems to be on a similar trajectory in 2023. It is believed that the increase in value of the trade between Slovenia in Russia despite the trade limitations that Slovenia has placed on such activity[12] can be attributed to higher prices of imported processed petroleum derivatives and the imports of pharmaceutical products.[13]
Since its independence in 1991, Slovenia remained connected with and supportive of the countries of the Western Balkans that became independent after the (difficult) breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and 2000s. The geopolitical orientation on the integration of the Western Balkans has been a traditional focus of Slovenian external politics and has been, among others, integral for the granting of the membership of the European Union to Croatia in 2013 and the status of official candidate for the membership in 2022.[14]
Despite its perceived general tendency towards neutrality and restraint in international relations which includes attempts to foster more active and clear relations with China,[15] Slovenia has been very clearly oriented towards the political West (including Northern America, and Western and Northern Europe) which can be seen in the prioritization of trade partnerships with Western countries and may be seen in inclination to support region-wide declarations and legal actions such as sanctions towards Russia.[16]
While the above-mentioned does not cover the entirety of Slovenian diplomatic views, this is a general picture of the state and agenda of Slovenian foreign policy before the start of the term of a membership of the United Nations Security Council; given the still-ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, the aggravated conflict between Israel and Palestine, and seemingly growing global tension in recent times, the membership of the security council in the next two years might be a particularly demanding task.
The migration crisis and the reinstitution of border control with the neighboring states
While the membership in the UN Security Council sets to present Slovenia with participation in solving new global security challenges, issues due to increased migration traffic that have arisen in the mid-2010s and its consequences for Slovenian and neighboring states will remain important topics of discussion in the near future.
Slovenia became a member of the Schengen Area in late 2007 when the land and sea borders were officially abolished.[17]
Around 2015, a large wave of migrants put immense pressure on the states of the European Union, particularly the transitional ones immediately on one of the main arrival routes (the Central Mediterranean route via Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean route across Turkey and Greece) – one of which has also been Slovenia.[18] The data from November 19, 2015, states that just in the second wave of intense migrations approximately 240.000 migrants entered Slovenia;[19] such statistics carried important weight in decisions from stricter border control and additional limitations for migrants that followed the wave of migrants and refugees entering the states of European Union.
Partly in deference to the opinion of the part of potential voting base and international precedents, and partly due to the difficulties in providing proper assistance and control the centrist government led by Miro Cerar announced the building of a wire fence across the Slovenia-Croatia border.[20] The fence was immediately controversial and both part of the active Slovenian population and the Croatian government called for the removal from the start. Despite protests, the fence slowly continued to broaden under the right-wing 14th Slovenian government from 2020 to 2022.[21]
Soon after the (Center-)left the 15th Slovenian government was inaugurated in June 2022, and the process of removal of the wired fence on the border finally started which has been one of the pre-election goals of the coalition.[22]
In late 2021, a tragic occurrence shocked the Slovenian public when a 10-year-old Turkish girl who was a part of the migration entourage was found dead in the Dragonja river on the Slovenia-Croatia border.[23] The tragic death of a child led to some reflection on the migration policies and the need for a tighter, more coherent, and fairer migration control program but apart from some non-obligatory resolutions between various state officials, nothing lasting has been concluded regarding the issue.
After the global COVID-19 crisis receded in 2022, the issue of illegal migrations and a large number of migrants and refugees concentrated on the borders of the European Union again became a widely discussed topic. In particular, a slight diplomatic contention between Slovenia and neighboring Austria started to develop after Austria kept disregarding Schengen’s open borders and reinstated border control. The latter is active since 2015, and it has been prolonged each time for a period of six months since then. Despite repeated protests and demands for the cancellation of border control from key Slovenian politicians, the Austrian government has so far been adamant in its defense of its need for internal safety reasons.[24]
In October 2023, the Slovenian western neighbor Italy, which is itself riddled with migration pressure, suddenly reinstituted border control on the Italian-Slovenian border.[25] In response, Slovenia restarted controlling borders with Croatia and Hungary.[26]
While the newly reinstated border control and the seeming temporary end of the Schengen open borders regime can be seen as new and excessive measures, they are just one element in the all too individual and asynchronous attempts to control the migrant flow. Since at least 2015, the European Union and its member states tried different means with various successes to mitigate the migration issue. However, there is still no uniform plan to deal with the issue which remains pertinent and challenging and may even intensify in the near future as a result of the current Israel-Palestine conflict.
Regardless of the outcome of the particular migration waves, the latter needs to be seen as a critical humanitarian, social, and security issue that will need to be successfully dealt with as soon as possible – especially given the current level of global tensions; and simply closing controlling or even closing the borders cannot be (full answers) to the question that the migration problematic poses to the states of the European Union. In the Slovenian mandate of membership in the United Nations Security Council, this issue might get quite some attention.
The Slovenian foreign strategy and the relationship and support for the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Since its independence in 1991, Slovenian continued nurturing relations with other states of the former Yugoslavia and providing necessary support framework and concrete solutions to the war-torn countries that came from the ashes of devastating dissolution wars, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Ever since joining the European Union in 2004, one of the main strategic agendas of Slovenian foreign politics has been the support for the recovery and European integration of the countries of the Western Balkans, including Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the last few years, Slovenia has been one of the main supporters of the Bosnian attempt to gain the status of official candidate for membership in the European Union; an initiative that succeeded in 2022.[27]
Of all the former Yugoslavian federal socialist republics, Bosnia and Herzegovina suffered the most damage during the breakup wars and was a scene of one of the last recognized genocides in the 20th century and the last to happen in Europe.[28] During the wars, which largely took the form of a civil war between Republika Srpska with the support of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (future Serbia) on one side and the future federal Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzeg-Bosnia with the support of Croatia (though there was some infighting between those too as well).[29]
Slovenia who successfully concluded its independence bid a few years later, always stood by the side of the federal Bosnia and Herzegovina and was, after Croatia, one of the countries with the largest amount accepted asylum seekers from Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to official data, Slovenia hosted 31,118 Bosnians with temporary refugee status, including around 5,459 school-aged children;[30] due to the sheer amount and immediate accumulation of refugees, the influx profoundly changed the Slovenian demographic structure, with many Bosnians being soon integrated into Slovene society and adding to its richness.
Given the historical connections between Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is no wonder that Slovenia continued to support the processes of recovery and development of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the devastating war. It appears that despite the Slovenian foreign agenda being concerned with the development and integration entirety of Western Balkans, the support with the reconstruction and political integration into global organizations of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a particular focus of Slovenian strategy of conducting foreign policy.
According to the official position of the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Slovenian-Bosnian relations are continually friendly and without open questions whereas cooperation consists in nearly all applicable areas due to geographical proximity, relatedness of language, historical connection, and strong migrations between Slovenian and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Slovenia has been and continues to be considered as one of the most active supporters of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress in Euro-Atlantic integration while it supports and actively advocates its full membership in the EU and NATO.[31] The support was formalized with the Memorandum on Cooperation of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in the field of Euro-Atlantic integration.[32]
The continuous Slovenian support for Bosnia and Herzegovina was partly vindicated on December 15, 2022, when the European Council granted Bosnia and Herzegovina the status of the official EU candidate.[33] However, recent news regarding the Bosnian process of EU integration was less encouraging as the European Commission only recommends the start of accession negotiations when the country comes closer to meeting the conditions for membership. The Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that Bosnia and Herzegovina has recently taken “many positive and legislative steps”, mentioning the rapid composition of the Council of Ministers in January this year, and the authorities in Sarajevo have also made progress in the fight against organized crime and terrorism; the main concerns, however, are related to the adoption of unconstitutional laws by representatives of the authorities of the Republika Srpska. It is worth noting that the problematic relationship and lack of cooperation between two political entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska have been a continuous thorn in the side of Bosnian attempt to make a uniform attempt at development and EU integration. On the other hand, in the same report, the Commission suggested the start of ascension talks with Ukraine and Moldavia.[34] While Slovenia has also been a supporter of the integration of Ukraine and Moldavia, it frequently warned the rest of the European Union that while it is important that the EU follows its geostrategic goals, the Western Balkans should not be left behind.[35]
Conclusion
Membership in the United Nations Security Council presents a historic opportunity for Slovenian politics and diplomacy, especially in such problematic times. While the opportunity came almost unexpectedly – Slovenia originally planned to apply for the membership much later – it comes at a time when there will be a lot of focus on the resolutions of the United Nations and when a lot of trust and prestige can be gained; however, such times also present immense challenge.
While Slovenia is generally regarded as a relatively safe country and is not believed to be in need of concern of the potential armed conflict, the changed situation in Europe and the seemingly growing tensions will likely affect Slovenian society and politics as well; especially after it gained the spot in the UN Security Council.
While Slovenia is somewhat more concerned with the past and the situation in the Western Balkans in comparison to most of its neighbors, its position in the Russo-Ukrainian and Israeli-Palestinian war so far not differ too much from the official disposition of the European Union; and it is yet to be seen how this may reflect on the security situation in Slovenian in the near future.
[1] [1] See “Slovenia has been elected a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council,” Portal GOV.SI, accessed October 30, 2023, https://www.gov.si/en/news/2023-06-06-slovenia-has-been-elected-a-non-permanent-member-of-the-un-security-council/.
[2] Consult e.g. “Year 1998,” 20 Years of Independence of Republic of Slovenia, accessed October 30, 2023, http://www.twenty.si/first-20-years/98/.
[3] [3] See e.g. “Slovenia,” European Union, accessed October 30, 2023, https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/country-profiles/slovenia_en.
[4] Consult “Slovenia succeeds in its initiative to grant candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Portal GOV.SI, accessed October 30, 2023, https://www.gov.si/en/news/2022-12-16-slovenia-succeeds-in-its-initiative-to-grant-candidate-status-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/.
[5] Consult e.g. Among others, see Barbara Kramžar, “Slovenija še drugič članica Varnostnega sveta OZN,” Delo, June 6, 2023, https://www.delo.si/novice/slovenija/bo-slovenija-se-drugic-clanica-varnostnega-sveta-ozn/.
[6] Recall Barbara Kramžar, “Slovenija še drugič članica Varnostnega sveta OZN,” Delo, June 6, 2023, https://www.delo.si/novice/slovenija/bo-slovenija-se-drugic-clanica-varnostnega-sveta-ozn/.
[7] Consult “Vlada imenovala posebno misijo Republike Slovenije za članstvo v Varnostnem svetu OZN,” Portal GOV.SI, accessed October 30, 2023, https://www.gov.si/novice/2023-07-20-vlada-imenovala-posebno-misijo-republike-slovenije-za-clanstvo-v-varnostnem-svetu-ozn/; and M. R., “Samuel Žbogar razrešen, za državno sekretarko imenovana Sanja Štiglic,” N1, September 28, 2023, https://n1info.si/novice/slovenija/seja-vlade-samuela-zbogarja-naj-bi-nasledila-sanja-stiglic/.
[8] See “Vlada imenovala posebno misijo Republike Slovenije za članstvo v Varnostnem svetu OZN,” Portal GOV.SI, accessed October 30, 2023, https://www.gov.si/novice/2023-07-20-vlada-imenovala-posebno-misijo-republike-slovenije-za-clanstvo-v-varnostnem-svetu-ozn/.
[9] Source: Marko Gregorc, “20 let od odmevnega srečanja: Bush in Putin na Brdu pri Kranju,” 24ur.com, June 16, 2021, https://www.24ur.com/novice/slovenija/pred-20-leti-sta-se-v-sloveniji-srecala-bush-mlajsi-in-putin.html.
[10] Sources: Mark Lee, “Here are the nations on Russia’s ‘unfriendly countries’ list,” CTVNews.ca, March 9, 2022, https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/here-are-the-nations-on-russia-s-unfriendly-countries-list-1.5810483.
[11] Among other sources, see STA, “Slovenija podpira dodatne sankcije proti Rusiji,” European Newsroom, July 18, 2022, https://europeannewsroom.com/sl/slovenija-podpira-dodatne-sankcije-proti-rusiji/.
[12] Consider “Ukrepi za omejevanje trgovine zaradi razmer v Ukrajini, “ Portal GOV.SI, accessed October 30, 2023, https://www.gov.si/teme/ukrepi-za-omejevanje-trgovine-zaradi-razmer-v-ukrajini/.
[13] See Marko Milenković, “Slovenija lani močno povečala obseg trgovanja z Rusijo, vzrok predvsem v večji vrednosti blaga,” MMC Radiotelevizije Slovenija, January 14, 2023, https://www.rtvslo.si/gospodarstvo/slovenija-lani-mocno-povecala-obseg-trgovanja-z-rusijo-vzrok-predvsem-v-vecji-vrednosti-blaga/654350.
[14] Among other sources, see “Slovenia succeeds in its initiative to grant candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Portal GOV.SI, accessed October 30, 2023, https://www.gov.si/en/news/2022-12-16-slovenia-succeeds-in-its-initiative-to-grant-candidate-status-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/.
[15] See e.g. “Second Strategic Council for Foreign Affairs discussing China,” Portal GOV.Si, accessed October 30, 2023, https://www.gov.si/en/news/2022-11-16-second-strategic-council-for-foreign-affairs-discussing-china/.
[16] See for example the current economic data at “Slovenia,“ OEC, accessed October 30, 2023, https://oec.world/en/profile/country/svn.
[17] Source: “Slovenia, a New Schengen Member,” Policija.si, accessed October 30, 2023, https://www.policija.si/eng/areas-of-work/state-border-control/slovenia-a-new-schengen-member.
[18] Consult “Irregular Migrant, Refugee Arrivals in Europe Top One Million in 2015: IOM,” International Organization for Migration, accessed October 30, 2023, https://www.iom.int/news/irregular-migrant-refugee-arrivals-europe-top-one-million-2015-iom.
[19] Source: STA, “V Slovenijo doslej vstopilo skoraj 240.000 beguncev in migrantov,” 24ur.com, November 19, 2015, https://www.24ur.com/novice/slovenija/v-dobovi-nekaj-vec-kot-1000-beguncev-in-migrantov.html.
[20] See Š. P., S. P, Pi. K., Delo.si, STA, “V živo: Žičnata ograja bo dolga 80 kilometrov,” Delo, November 11, 2015, https://old.delo.si/novice/slovenija/v-zivo-bodeca-zica-na-slovensko-hrvaski-meji.html.
[21] See e.g. Zeljko Trkanjec, “50 more kilometres of razor wire on the Croatian border,” Euractiv, March 4, 2021, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/50-more-kilometres-of-razor-wire-on-the-croatian-border/.
[22] Consult Lovro Kastelic, “Padli so prvi metri rezilne žice,” Delo, July 15, 2022, https://www.delo.si/novice/slovenija/padli-so-prvi-metri-rezilne-zice/.
[23] See e.g. STA, “Missing Turkish Girl Found Dead in Dragonja River,” Total Slovenia News, December 11, 2021, https://www.total-slovenia-news.com/news/9332-missing-turkish-girl-found-dead-in-dragonja-river?utm_content=cmp-true.
[24] See STA, “Avstrija znova podaljšala nadzor na meji s Slovenijo,” Dnevnik, October 16, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.si/1043034622; and T. K. B., La. Da., “Golob na Dunaju: Podaljševanje nadzora na meji je neupravičeno in neučinkovito,” MMC Radiotelevizije Slovenija, June 13, 2023, https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/golob-na-dunaju-podaljsevanje-nadzora-na-meji-je-neupraviceno-in-neucinkovito/671602. In previous, Austria has also had similarly stricter border crossing rules on a border with Hungary; nowadays, it reinstituted border control on all state borders.
[25] Refer to “Italy reinstates border controls with Slovenia, cites attack risk,” Euractiv, accessed October 30, 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/migration/news/italy-reinstates-border-controls-with-slovenia-cites-attack-risk/.
[26] G. V., “Italija bo nadzor na meji s Slovenijo podaljšala v leto 2024,” MMC Radiotelevizije Slovenija, October 24, 2023, https://www.rtvslo.si/svet/evropa/italija-bo-nadzor-na-meji-s-slovenijo-podaljsala-v-leto-2024/686000.
[27] Among others, see “Odnosi Slovenija – Bosna in Hercegovina,” Portal GOV.SI, accessed October 30, 2023, https://www.gov.si/drzave/bosna-in-hercegovina/odnosi-slovenija-bosna-in-hercegovina/; and “Slovenia succeeds in its initiative to grant candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Portal GOV.SI, accessed May 3, 2023, https://www.gov.si/en/news/2022-12-16-slovenia-succeeds-in-its-initiative-to-grant-candidate-status-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/.
[28] In 1995, a massacre that would later be known as the Srebrenica genocide took place in Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia where members of Republika Srpska army killed around 8000 Bosnian Muslims. While some pro-Serbian authors tried to challenge its genocide status, the perpetrators of the act were duly punished, and it remains the single largest mass murder on European grounds since WW2. See “Srebrenica,” Holocaust Memorial Day Trust, accessed October 30, 2023, https://www.hmd.org.uk/learn-about-the-holocaust-and-genocides/bosnia/srebrenica/.
[29] See “Listing of cases included,” hrw.org, accessed October 30, 2023, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/ij/icty/2.htm,
[30] Source: “Otroci iz Bosne in Hercegovine v begunskih šolah v Republiki Sloveniji,” Zgodovina Slovenije, accessed October 30, 2023, https://www.sistory.si/11686/9511.
[31] For example, Slovenian political leadership recently officially stated that it considers itself a potentially »largest supporter of Bosnian integration into the European Union,” while the Slovenian government reserved EUR 1 million in the budget for technical assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina during its integration in European circles. See STA, U. B., K. K., “Golob: Slovenija za vstop BiH v EU rezervirala dodaten milijon evrov,” 24ur.com, March 13, 2023, https://www.24ur.com/novice/slovenija/golob-na-prvem-uradnem-dvostranskem-obisku-v-tujini.html.
[32] Source: “Odnosi Slovenija – Bosna in Hercegovina,” Portal GOV.SI, accessed October 30, 2023, https://www.gov.si/drzave/bosna-in-hercegovina/odnosi-slovenija-bosna-in-hercegovina/.
[33] Source “Slovenia succeeds in its initiative to grant candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Portal GOV.SI, accessed October 30, 2023, https://www.gov.si/en/news/2022-12-16-slovenia-succeeds-in-its-initiative-to-grant-candidate-status-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/.
[34] Source: G. V., “Bruselj priporoča začetek pogajanj z Ukrajino in Moldavijo, BiH ostal zadaj,” MMC Radiotelevizije Slovenija, https://www.rtvslo.si/evropska-unija/bruselj-priporoca-zacetek-pogajanj-z-ukrajino-in-moldavijo-bih-ostal-zadaj/687436.
[35] See e.g. STA, “Zgodovinsko zasedanje zunanjih ministrov: Slovenija bo Ukrajino podpirala, dokler bo treba,” Dnevnik, October 2, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.si/1043033576.