Weekly Briefing, Vol. 66. No. 4 (MK) October 2023
The Status of EU Enlargement Amidst the War in Ukraine: Challenges and Uncertainties
Summary
Macedonia obtained candidate status for EU membership in 2005. Although the country has been a candidate for EU membership for nearly two decades, full accession remains an ever more distant moving target. The journey toward EU membership has been hindered by a combination of domestic factors, including political and institutional challenges, as well as obstructions from neighboring member states, particularly Bulgaria, and potentially also Greece. Additionally, obstacles from within the EU, such as enlargement fatigue and concerns about the readiness of candidate countries, have slowed the process. In the past year, against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, the issue of enlargement in the Western Balkans has resurfaced on the EU’s agenda. However, the EU institutions, the Council, and the Commission, often seemed to present diverging and even conflicting messages on the issue, leaving many questions unanswered regarding the timeline and conditions for membership and what it would mean not only for Macedonia but also for the broader Western Balkan region.
In 2005, the European Commission recommended Macedonia to obtain candidate status for EU membership after assessing the country’s progress and compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, which are the prerequisites for EU accession. According to the Commission, the decision was influenced by the significant reforms and improvements made by the country, particularly in the areas of political stability, democracy, and the rule of law. The Commission, in its official report, stated, “Macedonia has made notable progress in implementing necessary reforms, strengthening democratic institutions, and respecting the rule of law.”[1] The recommendation highlighted the country’s efforts in addressing issues such as minority rights, freedom of expression, and the resolution of bilateral disputes. These positive developments were seen as indicators of Macedonia’s commitment to aligning itself with EU values and standards. The Commission’s recommendation to grant candidate status was a recognition of the progress the country had made and an important step in its path toward EU membership. As a result, on December 17th, 2005, the Presidency of the European Council in Brussels granted candidate status to Macedonia for European Union membership.[2] Nearly 20 years since then, the country has still not joined the EU. Both internal, bilateral and issues inherent to the EU itself, have presented an obstacle to membership.
In 2009, the European Commission recommended the start of formal accession negotiations with the EU. However, the commencement of these negotiations were delayed for nearly a decade due to a dispute with Greece concerning the country’s official name. Additionally, Bulgaria’s veto in 2012, stemming from disagreements related to the clashing historical narratives of the two countries, further impeded the accession process.[3] Then in October 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron effectively blocked formal EU membership talks for (North) Macedonia and Albania. The blockade for Albania was supported by France, Denmark and the Netherlands, however France alone rejected North Macedonia. The blockade took place despite a recommendation from the European Commission and the European Parliament.[4] Macron attributed the move to the need for the accession process to be reformed. “This is a dispute about vision,” he said. “We should do more to help those countries develop, not just make pledges”.[5] Commission President at the time Jean-Claude Juncker described the move as “a major historic mistake”.[6]
The most recent hurdle to membership came from Bulgaria. In 2020, the country invoked its veto power on starting negotiations with the would-be member.[7] In 2022, the so-called French proposal was passed, which envisioned Bulgaria’s conditions becoming a part of the Macedonian negotiation framework with the EU. Negotiations followed the passing of the proposal and started on 19 July 2022. To make progress, however, the country not only needs to abide by the asymmetric demands included in the French proposal, but it must change its constitution, to cite Bulgarians as one of the country’s ‘constitutive peoples’.[8] In view of the large domestic opposition to the demands of the French proposal (over 80% reject it), the political focus of both the Government and the EU has been on creating the conditions that would enable the passing of these constitutional changes. Specifically, the main objective is to secure the backing of a two-thirds majority in Parliament, a threshold that is currently unattainable due to opposition from two opposition parties, namely, VMRO-DPMNE and Levica.[9]
The EU Accession Process – Catalyst for Reform or Corruption?
The behind-the-scenes efforts to secure the two-thirds majority have cast a dark shadow over the EU and its reform impact on the country. Namely, highly damaging and hugely consequential amendments to the Criminal Code, were passed in early September, which will pave the way for amnesty and impunity for former public officials caught up in serious criminal cases. The EU has turned a blind eye to this development. The amendments include the scrapping of paragraph 5 of article 353 of the Criminal Law, which envisages prison sentences of at least five years for “abuse in office” in public procurements that damaged the budget. Many former state and government officials have faced prosecution under this article in recent years, with numerous cases still in progress, either at the investigation or trial stage. The removal of this provision would result in the termination of active proceedings, and inactive cases would become time-barred.[10] The second amendment is made in article 394, which regulates the crime of “criminal enterprise”. Instead of the previously prescribed maximum sentence of 10 years, the change reduces that to three years.[11] Many viewed the abrupt passing of these changes as part of a deal to secure the support needed to pass the constitutional changes required for the EU accession process. Three opposition ethnic Albanian parties even held a conference alleging that the amendments stem from a deal made with former Prime Minister Gruevski, “so that he and many former officials could avoid prosecution and jail in return for securing his possible help in swaying some opposition MP’s to support a key constitutional change”.[12] If time proves this to be correct, it will prove a paradoxical role for the EU on the domestic institutional order. Namely, it will mean that the EU-accession process will have contributed to the permanent erosion of justice, and to the entrenchment of a culture of impunity in the country, thus completely eradicating its reform potential in areas such as the rule of law, which is one of the main reason for joining the Union in the first place. It will also imply a repetition of a similar situation which occurred in 2018, when impunity was granted to 8 corrupt MPs in exchange for their Parliamentary support for the Prespa Agreement, which paved the way for NATO accession.[13]
The local EU office did express its concern about the amendments to the Criminal Code, which, as stated in their statement, were made hastily and with the misuse of the European fastened parliamentary procedure. They also noted that such changes will directly impact several high-level corruption cases and their expiration.[14] However, this lukewarm statement was the only response by the EU. The moves were not really condemned on a higher level. The changes to the Criminal Code were not even mentioned during EU Commission President Ursula von der Layen’s visit to Skopje on October 30th. This in turn raised the suspicions that the EU is in fact condoning a deal between the Government and political figures from the opposition. Indeed, von der Layen’s visit seemed to focus on the constitutional changes, instead of the other reform-related issues. In a joint press conference with Prime Minister Dimitar Kovacevski in Skopje, during the initial stop of her Balkan tour, von der Leyen “urged all stakeholders to take this opportunity and back the necessary constitutional changes, enabling the commencement of the second phase of negotiations with the EU and the opening of clusters”.[15] Moreover, she outlined key initiatives to strengthen economic ties between (North) Macedonia and the EU, including the €30bn Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, as well as a proposed €6bn package for Western Balkan partners, aimed at supporting both reforms and investments.[16] The emphasis on these initiatives was perceived by many as diverting attention from the actual timeline for membership. Indeed, over the course of 2023, a growing divergence between the European Council and the European Commission became apparent on the issue of a timeline for membership, with the former more keen to focus on a timeline for enlargement, and the latter more skeptical to do so. This clash became apparent in August, during the Bled Strategic Forum.
As part of his address at the Forum European Council President Charles Michel said that he wants Europe to be ready for enlargement by 2030. “Enlargement is no longer a dream,” the Council chief said. “It is time to move forward,” he added.[17] “There is still a lot of work to do. It will be difficult,” Michel said at the forum, adding: “I believe we must be ready — on both sides — by 2030 to enlarge.”[18] This message quickly reverberated across the Macedonian media. “Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs, Bojan Maricikj, characterized the statements as a significant change in EU’s enlargement policy.” Moreover, he stated that for the first time since the previous enlargement, candidate countries have a time frame officially set by an EU official as a possible timeline for the next enlargement.[19] However, the optimism was short-lived. Almost immediately the European Commission issued a statement which contradicted the Council President. “We are not focused on a date, but focused on working very closely with candidate countries to get ready for joining the European Union,” the Commission’s deputy spokesperson Dana Spinant said at a press briefing.[20] She added that Michel had not consulted Commission President Ursula von der Leyen about the content of his enlargement speech at the Bled Strategic Forum.
Further dissonance around the issue of enlargement arose following French President Macron’s statement that the “EU should maybe evolve toward a “multi-speed” union as it considers integrating Ukraine, Moldova and countries in the Western Balkans.”[21] “The risk is to think we can enlarge without reform. I can testify that it is hard enough for Europe to advance on sensitive topics with 27 members. With 32 or 35 members, it won’t be any easier,” he added.[22]
This comment flew in the face of EU enlargement optimism from 2022, when the EU enlargement policy expanded to nine countries (with the addition of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia), including actual and potential candidates following the hasty suggestions to grant Ukraine fast-tracked membership. Indeed, these quick developments in relation to the three new countries juxtaposed the stalemate that the Western Balkan candidates had found themselves in for nearly two decades. It also added to the second of confusion and miscoordination with regards to the EU enlargement process and the future of the EU as a whole. As a result, Macedonian public opinion became largely mistrustful of the promises of integration that have increasingly been perceived as nebulous. A 2023 public opinion survey found a 20 percent decrease in support for membership compared to the previous survey. Approximately 49 percent of respondents believe that the country’s membership in the European Union would be a good thing overall, while 34 percent do not think so. What is more, even 65 percent of citizens perceive the EU’s attitude toward Macedonia as condescending and unfair, while only 17 percent consider it to be fair.[23] Euro-skepticism is likely to increase further in light of the developments around the Criminal Code, and the EU push towards the highly unpopular constitutional changes.
EU enlargement was on the agenda of the October informal summit in Granada, Spain which in addition to enlargement also focused on the 27-member bloc’s disagreements over migration and economic competitiveness. The Granada declaration was issued at the end of the Summit. On the issue of enlargement it stated the following: “Enlargement is a geo-strategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity. It is a driver for improving the economic and social conditions of European citizens, reducing disparities between countries, and must foster the values on which the Union is founded.” Moreover, it added that “looking ahead to the prospect of a further enlarged Union, both the EU and future Member States need to be ready. Aspiring members need to step up their reform efforts, notably in the area of rule of law, in line with the merit-based nature of the accession process and with the assistance of the EU.”, Finally it stated: “In parallel, the Union needs to lay the necessary internal groundwork and reforms. We will set our long-term ambitions and the ways to achieve them. We will address key questions related to our priorities and policies as well as our capacity to act. This will make the EU stronger and will enhance European sovereignty.”[24]
It remains to be seen whether the Declaration will amount to actual moves in relation to enlargement. However, a change in rhetoric seemed to have occurred in the words expressed by von der Leyen during her October 30th visit to Skopje: “Things really changed for the better, because what we see now is a true momentum in the process for enlargement. We want the Western Balkans to join the EU, and for that, you need to get ready, and we need to get ready. And it is very good that now concrete discussions have started in the EU: what do we have to do to get ready, what are the questions that are open, and what are the answers that we have to give? This was not the case in the last mandate of the European Commission, so something substantial changed in this mandate, it is now concrete”, the President of the European Commission said.[25] Similar openness towards enlargement was expressed by von der Leyen in Albania during a joint press conference with Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama. “As you know, enlargement is at the top of our priorities. This is actually where it belongs. Because we want our partners and neighbors to join and make our Union complete. It is also in our own interest because it will give our Union the weight, the clout and the capacity to act. And it will make Europe stronger, bolder and larger in a rapidly changing world,” von der Leyen stated.[26] It is possible however that such a statement was more a result of efforts to dispel Euroscepticism inside Macedonia and Albania, than to express actual commitments that will be met with concrete moves by the European Union. This is especially so in light of the tiered membership structure proposed by Macron. In any case, the above-described changes to the Criminal Code, and the adverse role played by the EU, casts doubt over the long-term impact and the benefits versus pitfalls of EU membership.
Macedonia’s protracted journey towards European Union (EU) membership, which began in 2005, has been marked by a series of setbacks, challenges, and hurdles that have led to a growing sense of frustration and uncertainty. Almost two decades later, full accession remains a distant and elusive goal. Various domestic, bilateral, and EU-related factors have contributed to this stalling of Macedonia’s EU membership aspirations. However, the most recent developments, particularly the changes to the country’s Criminal Code, raise serious concerns about the impact of the EU accession process on Macedonia’s democratic and institutional foundations. The EU’s response to these troubling developments has been lukewarm at best, and the changes to the Criminal Code were not adequately condemned on a higher level. This lack of decisive action or condemnation sends a worrisome message to Macedonian citizens and raises doubts about the EU’s commitment to upholding its core values. In the face of these challenges, public opinion in Macedonia is expectedly and increasingly skeptical of EU membership, with a significant decrease in support. Many citizens perceive the EU’s attitude as condescending and unfair, and the optimism for integration has waned. The recent Granada Declaration, emphasizing the importance of enlargement as a “geo-strategic investment in peace, security, stability, and prosperity,” tries to reinvigorate the optimism for EU membership. However, it remains to be seen whether this statement is just an empty PR tactic, or the basis for concrete actions for the coming period. Whatever the case may be, the long-term impact and benefits of EU membership for Macedonia, as well as the broader Western Balkan region, remain threatened by the current role of the EU, as both a neoliberal actor in terms of economics, and as an arm of NATO and US imperialism in international affairs.
[1]European Council conclusions, 15-16 December 2005, available at https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15914-2005-REV-1/en/pdf, accessed on 02.11.2023
[2] “Timeline of the relations with EU”, Secretariat for European Affairs, available at https://www.sep.gov.mk/en/post/?id=8, accessed on 02.11.2023
[3] “North Macedonia won’t be joining the E.U. anytime soon. Did the E.U. lose its peak leverage?”, published on November 14, 2019, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/11/14/north-macedonia-wont-be-joining-anytime-soon-did-eu-lose-its-peak-leverage/, accessed on 30.10.2023
[4] “EU blocks Albania and North Macedonia membership bids”, published on 18 October 2019, available at
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50100201 accessed on 02.11.2023
[5] Ibid
[6] Ibid
[7] “No Easy Escape For North Macedonia From Bulgaria’s EU Veto”, published on June 22, 2022, available at
https://www.rferl.org/a/macedonia-eu-bulgaria-veto/31910319.html, accessed on 30.10.2023
[8]“Authoritarian liberalism or how the French proposal was pushed through the Macedonian Parliament in spite of overwhelming opposition”, published in July 2022, available at https://china-cee.eu/2022/08/01/north-macedonia-political-briefing-authoritarian-liberalism-or-how-the-french-proposal-was-pushed-through-the-macedonian-parliament-in-spite-of-overwhelming-opposition/ accessed on 02.11.2023
[9] China-CEEC Weekly Briefing, Vol. 64. No. 1 (MK) July 2023, “The plenary session on constitutional amendments has been scheduled for August 18”, published in August 2023, available at https://china-cee.eu/2023/08/02/the-plenary-session-on-constitutional-amendments-has-been-scheduled-for-august-18/ accessed on 30.10.2023
[10] North Macedonia’s President Urged to Block Sudden Criminal Law Changes, published on September 7, 2023, available at
https://balkaninsight.com/2023/09/07/north-macedonias-president-urged-to-block-sudden-criminal-law-changes/ accessed on 30.10.2023
[11] Ibid
[12] Ibid
[13] Gjorgjioska, M. A. (2020). Ethnicity and Nationality in and around the ‘Prespa Agreement’ on the Macedonia Name Issue. European Yearbook of Minority Issues Online, 17(1), 190-211. https://doi.org/10.1163/22116117_01701009
[14] The European Commission is concerned about the changes to the Criminal Code, published on 12.09.2023, available at https://www.slobodnaevropa.mk/a/32589801.html accessed on 30.10.2023
[15] European Commission president says North Macedonia could open first accession cluster this year, published on 30.10.2023, available at https://www.intellinews.com/european-commission-president-says-north-macedonia-could-open-first-accession-cluster-this-year-299065/, accessed on 31.10.2023
[16] Ibid
[17] Charles Michel: Get ready by 2030 to enlarge EU, published on August 28, 2023, available at
https://www.politico.eu/article/european-council-president-charles-michel-eu-enlargement-by-2030/ accessed on 30.10.2023
[18] Ibid
[19] “Maricikj: Michel’s speech is a significant turning point in the EU’s enlargement policy”, published on 29.08.2023, available at https://360stepeni.mk/marichik-govorot-na-sharl-mishel-e-seriozna-presvrtnitsa-vo-politikata-na-eu-kon-proshiruvaneto/ accessed on 30.10.2023
[20] Commission snubs Charles Michel’s 2030 EU enlargement target, published on 29.08.2023, available at
https://www.politico.eu/article/european-commission-snub-charles-michel-2030-enlargement-target/, accessed on 30.10.2023
[21] Macron: EU should consider ‘multi-speed Europe’ to cope with enlargement, published on 28.08.2023, available at
https://www.politico.eu/article/france-president-emmanuel-macron-multi-speed-europe-enlargement-ukraine-moldova-balkans/ accessed on 30.10.2023
[22] Ibid
[23] Euroscepticism and the Western Balkans: Where EU Support Is Rising and Falling, published on 09.03.2023, available at https://macedonian.trtbalkan.com/region/evroskepticizmot-i-zapaden-balkankade-raste-a-kade-opaa-poddrshkata-za-eu-12289062, accessed on 30.10.2023
[24] The Grenada declaration, published on 06.10.2023, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/10/06/granada-declaration/ accessed on 30.10.2023
[25] Von der Leyen: There is a true momentum for enlargement, that was not the case previously, published on 30.10.2023, available at
Von der Leyen: There is a true momentum for enlargement, that was not the case previously
[26] Statement by President von der Leyen at the joint press conference with Albanian Prime Minister Rama, published on 16.10.2023, available at
https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/statement-president-von-der-leyen-joint-press-conference-albanian-prime-minister-rama-2023-10-16_en accessed on 02.11.2023