Weekly Briefing, Vol. 64. No. 3 (CZ) July 2023
Decoupling from Russia: Political Realities & Social Impacts
Summary
The government has announced that one of its priorities, that is, the revision of relations with Russia has been fulfilled. The official state policy on Russia is extremely tough and far from diplomatic normal. The political “decoupling” has impacts at different levels of the life of society. The briefing analyses the revision including the adopted measures and prospective intentions. The revision is put into a broader context of bilateral relations. It turns out that some decisions are based on false assumptions and the individual restrictive measures are motivated ideologically which makes them controversial.
Introduction
The Czech government has approved the first documents to revise security and foreign policy. The new Security Strategy defines threats, risks and countermeasures which are to be applied in relation to Russia, China and other actors who are perceived in terms of an external threat. The incumbent cabinet finished the revision of relations with Moscow when authorising the Report on Revision of Relations with Russia on June 21, elaborated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The same department is also preparing a new version of the Concept of Foreign Policy which will reflect the principles, narratives and conclusions set by the abovementioned documents. Taken together, they will reaffirm the new general line of the Czech political representation launched at the end of 2021.
Longer-term decline in bilateral relations
The Security Strategy is analysed in detail by the July political briefing so the present text pays attention mostly to the revision of relations with Russia and its far-reaching political and social consequences at home. It is worth noting that―unlike the Security Strategy―the Report on Revision of Relations with Russia remains non-public and the content is known only from a concise summary released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and several articles published by pro-government journalists. The revision of relations has been one of the priorities of the liberal cabinet since the very beginning irrespective of the war in Ukraine which broke out only several weeks after President Miloš Zeman appointed this government.
In fact, the sharp deterioration of bilateral relations started much earlier, no later than after the unprecedented statement made by the then Prime Minister Andrej Babiš who accused Moscow of sabotage (“terrorist act”) and the killing of two Czech nationals on the territory of the Czech Republic which was allegedly carried out back in 2014.[1] Despite the consequent anti-Russian campaign were there high-level political and economic actors who continued to advocate cooperation with the Russian partners, first of all, President Zeman and the Communist Party. However, Communists failed to gain any parliamentary seats in late 2021 and Miloš Zeman negated his previous long-term stance vocalising radically anti-Russian opinions in response to the outburst of the conflict in Ukraine.[2] Petr Fiala’s government thus had very favourable conditions for the implementation of a new Russia policy.
The MFA’s statement does not include virtually any concrete measures which have been or are expected to be introduced in this regard (except for the ban on entry to the Czech Republic for the Russians, support for sanctions at the EU level, freezing of assets of the Russian nationals and considerable mitigation of the energy dependency on the Eurasian major power). The lack of information is compensated by comments made by Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Lipavský. However, these are largely controversial and misleading. Accusing Russia of imperialism has already become a commonplace in political discourse in many European countries, especially in the Czech Republic, Poland and the Baltic states, but the minister’s assertion that Russia provoked the “largest and the most devastating military conflict in Europe since 1945” is simply in breach with historical facts irrespective of a particular interpretation of the ongoing war in Ukraine and its roots because it ignores the wars in former Yugoslavia.[3] Such a narrative is to exaggerate and defame the Russian side, deprive Moscow of any legitimacy and create conditions for the continuation of the anti-Russian campaign both at home and abroad.
Tasks and measures
From what is known publicly follows that the Report is divided into strategic assumptions and related measures and tasks. The Eurasian country is depicted as a fundamental threat to the Czech Republic, “democratic world”, freedom and democracy. Interestingly, the government document asserts that Russia will be a source of “serious, immediate threats and risks” at least in the medium term and irrespective of the results of the war in Ukraine (or―as authors put it―“against Ukraine”). The MFA expects that Russia’s alleged “aggressiveness” can be growing and, therefore, sanctions targetting Moscow will remain in force and bilateral relations will not return to the level before February 24, 2022.
These points constitute the background against which concrete tasks are defined. First, Prague declares the preparedness to support Kiev against Russia until the final victory which is defined either in terms of the status quo before 2014 or in other terms set by the Ukrainian side itself. Second, the document highlights the need for close cooperation with NATO and the EU in the protection of the “rules-based international order” and countering Russian influence worldwide. Third, Prague will contribute to the isolation of Russia as well as the establishment of a tribunal for “war crimes” committed by the Russians. Fourth, the Czech side will support the integration of Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries into the EU. Fifth, the Czech state must counter Russia’s hybrid influence, put an end to imports of any commodities from the Eurasian country and improve resilience against Russian influence in any field. Sixth, the state authorities must approach the Russian minority so as to eliminate security risks connected with its presence on the Czech territory. Seventh, Prague will continue to support the opposition in Russia and émigrés in the Czech Republic while minimising any contact between the Czech and Russian sides and any official contacts must be consulted with the MFA in advance.[4] These are basic contours of the revised Russia policy.
What has been done so far?
Since the beginning of 2022, the incumbent government has already taken some steps in this direction. In March 2022 the cabinet decided to leave the International Bank for Economic Co-operation (IBEC) and International Investment Bank (IIB) which are seen as an instrument of the Kremlin’s economic diplomacy. The withdrawal process was concluded by February 2023.[5] In January a national sanction law came into force with the aim to impose sanctions on persons who are not targetted by the EU instruments. There are three individuals recorded in the list at the moment. It is worth noticing that the first affected person was the Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus’ Kirill, the highest representative of the Russian Orthodox Church. The minister of foreign affairs considers it a success of the Czech foreign policy, which is allegedly becoming more and more self-confident.[6] In May, the government annulled legal provisions enabling the Russian embassy to use its property for free. The decision was justified referring to undue use of the property by the Russian side. The provisions come from 1970–1982 and the MFA does not see any reason why the Russian embassy should have so extensive property (59 plots with 42 buildings) at its disposal after the diplomatic staff was reduced by dozens to mere 6 diplomats.[7]
The state authorities are also investigating the Russian Centre of Science and Culture based in Prague which is operated by the Rossotrudnichestvo, a federal government agency which was placed under EU sanctions in mid-2022. Even though the cultural centre has limited its activities considerably, the national authorities are considering the inclusion of the subject in the sanction list which would make further operations impossible. In that case, Prague would join Finland, Germany and Romania.[8] Besides official Russian representatives, political and media attacks are aimed against a part of the Russian minority and Czech subjects and individuals who disapprove of the official anti-Russian policy. The Orthodox Church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia has been repeatedly accused of being an instrument in Kremlin’s hands which is absurd for several reasons. First, the church is autocephalous, that is, organisationally and financially independent of other Orthodox churches. Second, it is multinational, heterogeneous and formed by a wide array of ethnic groups among which a prominent role is played by the Ukrainians.[9] Last but not least, the war in Ukraine and the multilayered campaign supportive of Kiev has led to attempts to revise the rules of standard Czech language motivated by ideological reasons. The political background of this practice becomes evident from the very fact that the new language forms are usually used by the most radical advocates of the war against Russia.[10]
Conclusion
The Czech government has decided to actively support opposition actors both in and from Russia providing them with financial and media support. The ruling representation does not conceal that they would like to attract Russian exiles cultivating them in line with the liberal values and the idea of the fight against “autocracies”.[11] In October 2023 Prague will also host the second summit of the Crimea Platform which was initiated by Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelenskii two years ago. This event is strongly promoted by the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Markéta Pekarová Adamová whose controversial activities in relation to Taiwan are notorious.
[1] Babiš otočil. Výbuch ve Vrběticích nazval teroristickým útokem, omluvil se za výrok o zboží (2021, April 20). Lidovky.cz. https://www.lidovky.cz/domov/babis-vybuch-ve-vrbeticich-nazval-teroristickym-utokem-omluvil-se-za-svuj-predchozi-vyrok.A210420_153302_ln_domov_litsp
[2] Kottová, A. (2022, February 24). Prezident Zeman k útoku na Ukrajinu: Rusko se dopouští zločinu proti míru. Šílence je nutné izolovat. iROZHLAS. https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/milos-zeman-prezident-rusko-ukrajina-valka-invaze-projev_2202241107_ako
[3] Vláda dokončila revizi vztahů s Ruskem (2023, June 21). Ministerstvo zahraničí České republiky. https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/udalosti_a_media/tiskove_zpravy/vlada_pokracuje_v_revizi_vztahu_s_ruskem.html
[4] Břešťan, R. (2023, July 8). Rusko je hrozba pro celý svět. Strategické dokumenty státu si vůči Kremlu neberou servítky. HlídacíPes.org. https://hlidacipes.org/rusko-je-hrozba-pro-cely-svet-strategicke-dokumenty-statu-si-vuci-kremlu-neberou-servitky/
[5] Ukončením členství v postsovětských bankách uzavírá Česko proces, o který diplomacie usilovala několik let (2023, February 1). Ministerstvo zahraničí České republiky. https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/udalosti_a_media/tiskove_zpravy/ukoncenim_clenstvi_v_postsovetskych.html
[6] Beranová, K. (2023, April 26). První jméno na českém sankčním seznamu. Patriarcha Kirill. Novinky.cz. https://www.novinky.cz/clanek/domaci-prvni-jmeno-na-ceskem-sankcnim-seznamu-patriarcha-kirill-40429854
[7] Rusko bude muset platit za pronájem pozemků v Česku. Podle Fialy se vracíme k normálu (2023, May 17). ČT24. https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/domaci/3586871-vlada-vypovedela-smlouvu-s-ruskem-o-bezplatnem-uzivani-pozemku-v-cesku
[8] České úřady prověřují ruské kulturní středisko. Je aktivní na webu i sociálních sítích (2023, July 1). ČT24. https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/domaci/3597543-ceske-urady-proveruji-ruske-kulturni-stredisko-je-aktivni-na-webu-i-socialnich-sitich. Dohnalová, A. (2023, May 15). Ruský dům šíří propagandu, zavřete ho, radí vládě experti. Agenty v něm vidí i BIS. Aktuálně.cz. https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/rusky-dum-v-praze/r~83001c42f00211eda9eeac1f6b220ee8/
[9] Špičky české pravoslavné církve se fotily s Nočními vlky, sklidily za to kritiku (2023, July 4). ČT24. https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/domaci/3598213-spicky-ceske-pravoslavne-cirkve-se-fotily-s-nocnimi-vlky-sklidily-za-kritiku
[10] Kyjev, nebo Kyjiv? Na Ukrajinu, nebo v Ukrajině? Čeština reaguje na politické změny (2022, April 5). ČT24. https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/veda/3466122-kyjev-nebo-kyjiv-na-ukrajinu-nebo-v-ukrajine-cestina-reaguje-na-politicke-zmeny
[11] Program občanská společnost (2022, May 22). Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí. https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/informace_pro_cizince/aktuality/program_obcanska_spolecnost.html
[12] Parlamentní summit Krymské platformy se uskuteční 23. a 24. října v Praze (2023, April 24). Euroskop.cz. https://euroskop.cz/2023/04/24/parlamentni-summit-krymske-platformy-se-uskutecni-23-a-24-rijna-v-praze/