Weekly Briefing, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Sl), September 2021
What the Prime Minister alliances say about Slovenia’s relations with the superpowers
Summary
Although there has been a lot of talk recently about cooperation in Slovenian foreign policy, the country that was once considered a Balkan success story is quite isolated internationally thirty years after its independence. The cooperation of its political leadership is limited to a few neighbouring countries, which allow the ruling party to realise its political interests and existence. The strong ties with the sovereignists, especially the ever closer friendship with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, also led to unexpected decisions when Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša preferred to attend the Demography Summit in Budapest instead of the elite UN General Assembly in New York.
Slovenia’s foreign policy is increasingly locally oriented
Slovenia, which until recently was known for its commitment to multilateralism and thus earned a good reputation despite its small size, is increasingly forging political alliances with some leaders, such as the Hungarian Prime Minister or the Serbian President, who do not support multilateralism or democratic values and the rule of law. In the past, Slovenia has distinguished itself in the international community by chairing the UN Commission on Human Rights, and the weakening of its standing was most evident on the issue of Palestinian rights. Last fall, for the first time in its diplomatic history, Slovenia voted against a WHO resolution on the basis of which the international community could provide medicines and vaccines to Palestinians in the occupied territories. Rather than aligning itself with major players, Slovenia has recently chosen local alliances of political sympathizers.
This political shift has recently manifested itself in at least three events that have received international attention. First, at the beginning of the fall, Slovenia organized, as it does every year, Bled Strategic Forum. While a record number of heads of state and government attended the event, the prime minister’s Eastern European allies and leaders from the southeastern region, while invited guests from Western Europe declined to attend. While for fifteen years, the Slovenian government did not know what to do with one of Slovenia’s biggest foreign policy events, the current government started using the Bled Forum as a political event entirely dedicated to its interests and foreign policy orientation, which is becoming increasingly narrow and local.
During the Slovenian Presidency to the Council of the European Union one would expect the Forum to be attended by many distinguished and important European guests. It would also be normal for the president of Brussels Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and a large entourage of European Commissioners to pay a short, symbolic visit. The absence of these guests is a clear indication of Slovenia’s uncertain status in the EU.
Prime Minister Janez Janša also interrupted Slovenian foreign policy practice when, at the end of September, as holding the presidency of the Council of the EU, he decided not to attend the 76th UN General Assembly. He sent the President of the Republic Borut Pahor to New York in his place. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister preferred to attend the demographic summit in Budapest. Prime Minister Janša’s decision to give preference to Budapest over New York was strongly criticized by domestic international relations experts, who believe that the current government is not pursuing foreign policy in order to pursue the national, but primarily its domestic interest. As the head of the EU Council Presidency, his absence from the UN summit has put not only Slovenia in an awkward position, but also the EU, which is also eager to consolidate its identity in the UN corridors.
Lukewarm relations even with the superpowers
Since the last US elections, Slovene-American relations have not really been able to establish themselves. Many things have not been completely forgotten in America. Starting with the Prime Minister premature congratulations to Trump on his election victory, while at the same time President-elect Biden was berated as the weakest president in American history. Nor has the United States forgotten the awarding of the Slovenian President State Medal to US Senator Paul Gosar, a far-right and anti-Semitic politician who actively supported and promoted the overthrow of the constitutional order and democracy in the United States in connection with the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol Building.
However, all these initial debacles had no particular impact on the speed of the appointment of the new U.S. ambassador to Slovenia. Six months after his inauguration, Biden will send his supporter and donor Jamie L. Harpootlian to Slovenia. This would leave the US without an ambassador in Slovenia for about a year. Like her predecessor in the Trump administration, Lynda Blanchard, Harpootlian is a politically appointed ambassador, which can be interpreted as an American message to Slovenia that the United States does not count on Slovenia as a country with which it wants to develop sophisticated diplomatic relations.
During Ambassador Blanchard Slovenian-American relations have occasionally intensified. Last August, when the two countries signed a statement against China on the security of 5G networks, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also visited Slovenia. This was followed by a return visit by Foreign Minister late last year, during the change of power in the US, during which the two countries engaged in a strategic dialogue.
In all likelihood, the new ambassador enjoys the confidence of President Biden and is one of the prominent members of Democratic Party, so some experts also see a potential political continuity in Slovenian-American relations.
Meanwhile, the strategy towards China still remains rather unclear. After almost a decade of cooperation within the framework of 17+1, Slovenia still does not have clearly formulated positions and priorities in the said cooperation, nor does it know exactly what it wants from China. Although Slovenia does not stand out from most other countries in this regard, some other countries, such as the comparatively large Slovakia, at least have a clearly defined strategy towards China. This indecisiveness was ultimately reflected in the unexplained absence of Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša from the summit of the Chinese 17 + 1 initiative in February 2021. The practice in Slovenian foreign policy so far has been that the summits of Central and Eastern Europe and China, the so-called Forum 17 +1, are attended by Prime Ministers. This year, the government of Janez Janša stopped this practice without explanation. At the virtual summit Slovenia was represented by the Deputy Prime Minister.
Slovenia was not the only country that did not send its prime minister to the meeting. In addition to Slovenian Prime Minister, the Bulgarian, Romanian and Baltic prime ministers were also absent this year. What most of these countries have in common is that they have signed a bilateral statement with the United States on 5G network security, the geopolitical goal of which is to prevent Chinese telecommunications giants from penetrating the European market.
Slovenia has also recently become involved in the diplomatic dispute between Lithuania and China. China protested sharply in August when Lithuania approved the opening of a Taiwan office in Vilnius. It withdrew its ambassador to Vilnius and demanded that Lithuania withdraws its ambassador from Beijing. Janša publicly called China’s decision to withdraw its ambassador from Lithuania over the Taiwan dispute unacceptable and announced that the decision would affect EU-China relations. In response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry criticized Slovenian Prime Minister for calling on European Union leaders to support Lithuania and resist Chinese pressure.
A little more political proximity of Slovenia is seen towards Russian President Vladimir Putin. For example, the Slovenian government endorses the vaccine Russian Sputnik V, and the non-paper on territorial divisions in the Western Balkans, which is associated with Slovenia, was written in line with Russian interests in the region. Over the past year, the prime minister has made no criticism of the Russian president’s actions, even when much of the EU was appalled by the Russian authorities’ treatment of the first face of the Russian opposition Alexei Navalny.
The Slovenian Prime Minister is increasingly linked to the Kremlin through its ties with European sovereigntists, especially Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Matteo Salvini.
Strengthening the sovereignist movement in the EU is also strongly in Russia’s interest, as the sovereignists are causing a rift in European politics and weakening the EU as a whole.
Conclusions
Despite Slovenia’s relatively small weight in the world, the current government’s foreign policy decisions have shown international policymakers that the country is veering into increasingly autocratic waters, weakening its geopolitical visibility and making it appear as a problem in the region rather than a solution. Since the initial debacle with the new U.S. president, Slovenian-American relations have not fully normalized, but no major upheavals are expected given that Slovenia is a longtime ally of the United States and its foreign policy role is rather weak. The steps made by the Prime Minister in relation to China are a bit more jarring at the moment. From his absence at the 17 + 1 summit to Janša’s public criticism of China’s decisions related to the dispute with Lithuania over Taiwan. An interesting paradox also arises here, as neighbouring Hungary, with which Slovenian Prime Minister has a particularly close relationship, is greatly expanding its relations with China. Only with Russia are relations stable, and it seems that Slovenia’s membership in the Visegrad Group is bringing the country ever closer to the Kremlin, politically and otherwise.