Weekly Briefing, Vol. 40, No. 4 (HU), May 2021
A Foreign Policy of Vetoes? The Limitations of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy
The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (hereafter CFSP) was born in the early 1990s with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. The CFSP was immediately put to the test by the first Iraq war in 1991, when cooperation between France, the United Kingdom and Germany to make the decision of either joining or refusing to participate in the war failed completely. Another test was the disintegration of Yugoslavia between 1990 and 1992, where the CFSP failed because it could not unite the EU members in the case of Yugoslavia and could not provide a political framework that would have allowed common steps and actions. Hungary’s recent veto(s) are proof that the CFSP is a failed political framework and therefore has serious limitations.
Introduction
In recent months, Hungary has vetoed the adoption of joint declarations in the EU Council on several occasions, triggering a heated debate among politicians and analysts on whether majority voting should be introduced in foreign policy matters. The main argument of those seeking to change the CFSP is that the EU is unable to exert leverage if it does not speak with one voice on certain issues. The briefing looks at the three cases in which Hungary vetoed and one in which the EU action received Hungary’s support, and then tries to draw overarching conclusions from the four cases.
Case 1: Hong Kong
The scheduled European Council meeting was held on March 25 and 26, 2021. According to Reuters, Hungary blocked the adoption of an EU Council statement criticizing China over its new security law in Hong Kong. Reuters quoted an unnamed diplomat as saying that Hungary argued that the EU already has too many problems with China.[1]
It must be clear that the case did not start here, but earlier, when both the EU and China imposed sanctions over Western allegations of human rights violations in Xinjiang. In the former, Hungary did not veto the sanctions. As we have argued before, the Hungarian foreign policy approach is fundamentally different from Western European and American foreign policy strategies that seek to impose their political and economic system on other societies; the shorthand would be “democracy export”. It is another question whether this policy is good or not, what is more important to us is that in this case imposing this policy seems to be a very futile attempt. Suffice it to think of other failed “democracy export” projects of American foreign policy (Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan) that have failed to change these countries with backward economies and weak central power. If the U.S. was unsuccessful in these countries, why do we think it could achieve the goal of Western-style democratization in the case of China?
The pragmatic approach of Hungarian foreign policy is very clear in this case, it looks mainly at Hungarian economic interests when blocking this statement. The Hungarian foreign minister said a few days before the EU Council meeting in March that the sanctions were “pointless” and “particularly senseless” which also suggests that the EU basically lacks the hard power to enforce its interests in a geopolitical conflict of interests between the EU and China. (It may be added that the EU has no geopolitical interests in the Asia-Pacific region. If one wanted to find a country that would have such a conflict with China, one could cite France as a country facing its dwindling influence in Africa, where China has become the main trading partner and investor of many African countries).
Case 2: EU’s Africa-Pacific Trade and Development Deal
The EU’s Africa-Pacific Trade and Development Deal was blocked by Hungary on May 20, 2021. Because the treaty (also called Post-Cotonou) would allow some forms of legal migration from African and Asian countries, Hungary vehemently opposed these elements of the agreement. The Hungarian foreign minister made the reason for the Hungarian rejection very clear when he said in Brussels: “There is no need for fresh migration waves, especially now …”[2]
At the core of the rejection, we have a vision of society that is quite different from the French, German and British models of mixed societies with multiple cultures. We argue that both choices can be appropriate if they are built on democratic principles, i.e., the support of the majority is behind each choice. In Hungary, the majority of society does not seem to support broad-based migration and the transformation of the single-culture society into a multicultural society, which is the reason why it seems to be a rational choice not to support migration.
Case 3: Israel- and Palestine Ceasefire
Hungary blocked a statement by the EU Council on May 18, 2021. The statement would have called for a ceasefire in the conflict that had just erupted between Israel and the Palestinians. Hungarian Foreign Minister Szijjártó told the AFP news agency: “I have a general problem with the European statements on Israel (…) They are not of much help, especially in the current circumstances, when the tensions are so high …”[3] What is the intention behind this statement? Why is it not good for Hungary to make a declaration calling for a truce? The statement simply puts the spotlight on two features of the EU’s CFSP: a foreign policy without hard power is useless and the inability to impose European interests by military means calls into question all common European declarations and positions. The second feature is that the leverage of the EU’s CFSP comes only from the economic power of the EU. This kind of leverage is able to influence actors, but not able to tip the balance in tense situations like this one.
The case led to a high-level debate because Mr. Laschet, the CDU/CSU candidate for German chancellor, said that these kinds of vetoes are why the EU should use majority voting in European Union’s foreign policy. The Hungarian prime minister reacted to this proposal when he said: “Today, a common foreign policy decision can only be made unanimously, while Laschet prefers the will of the majority to be imposed upon the minority in the future. All of this in the name of Europeanism…”[4]
In this case we can also see a different concept of the European Union, the Hungarian one is about a Europe of nation states and in this concept each member state would keep its right to have an independent foreign policy, which is the core element of sovereignty. The concept presented by Laschet is about an EU in which where minority voices can be subdued. In our opinion, the creation of a CFSP based on majority voting would lead to the dominance of the major powers in the EU.
Case 4: Belorussia
The last case involves an incident in which we can see that Hungary supported the common sanctions and did not veto them, even though observers suggested before the EU Council meeting that Hungary was likely to veto the decisions. This week, a Belarusian fighter jet forced a Ryanair flight to land in order to arrest an anti-government journalist on board. The European Union condemned the action and imposed sanctions on the country. The EU banned Belarusian airlines from entering EU airspace and demanded the journalist’s release. Hungary supported the actions and the Hungarian Foreign Minister declared the move of Belorussia to be “unacceptable, especially since the airliner in question was travelling between two European Union countries”.[5] The case clearly shows that a CFSP decision by the EU that has leverage and can influence the situation (see Israel-Palestine ceasefire) receives Hungary’s support, especially if it does not contradict Hungary’s interests (see the Hong Kong case) and does not imply long-term commitments (see Africa-Pacific Trade and Development Deal).
Summary
Based on the above-presented cases, we can understand the logic of the Hungarian vetoes in the CFSP of the EU. The principles can be summarized as follows:
- EU decisions ( actions, statements ) receive Hungarian support if they do not contradict Hungary’s – mostly economic – interests.
- EU decisions ( actions, statements ) receive Hungarian support if they do not interfere with the way Hungary organizes its society in the light of its historical experience.
- EU decisions ( actions, statements ) receive Hungarian support if they do not impose long-term obligations on the country and do not force it into a dependent relation.
- EU decisions ( actions, statements ) are supported by Hungarians if they have a significant leverage effect.
These decisions seem to be motivated by the overarching goal of putting Hungary in a balanced position between West and East. The Hungarian foreign minister argued a few months ago that Hungary does not want to be among the losers in the emerging conflict between the West and the East.
[1] John Chalmers, Robin Emmott (2021). Hungary blocks EU statement criticising China over Hong Kong, diplomats say. Retrieved from:
[2] Reuters (2021): Hungary to Block EU’s Africa-Pacific Trade and Development Deal. Retrieved from: https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-05-20/hungary-to-block-eus-africa-pacific-trade-and-development-deal#:~:text=BUDAPEST%2FBRUSSELS%20(Reuters)%20-,foreign%20minister%20said%20on%20Thursday
[3] Euronews (2021): Hungary only nation against EU call for Israel-Hamas ceasefire. Retrieved from: https://www.euronews.com/2021/05/18/eu-fms-due-to-discuss-political-solutions-to-end-israel-gaza-conflict-as-violence-surges-o
[4] Viktor Orban (2021): Hungary has vetoed the European Union’s joint statement regarding missile attacks on Israel. Retrieved from: https://miniszterelnok.hu/samizdat-no-8/
[5] Tamás Vaski (2021): Hungary Supports Belarus’ Ban from EU Airspace Over Ryanair Hijacking. Retrieved from:
https://hungarytoday.hu/hungary-belarus-ban-european-union/