Weekly Briefing, Vol. 19. No. 4 (MK) June 2019
Uncertainties Regarding the Start of Macedonia’s EU Accession Negotiations
Introduction
One of the two key strategic objectives of the government of the Republic of North Macedonia (hereinafter Macedonia) is the accession to the European Union (EU) (the other one is the accession to NATO, which will be discussed in another paper). Macedonia is formally an EU candidate country since 2005, but it has not yet started the official accession negotiations (unlike, for example, Serbia and Montenegro had both started their accession negotiations in 2014 and 2012 respectively). Thus, the next important milestone in its bid to join the EU is the start of the official accession negotiations. The negotiations can be opened only with a decision by the EU Council, a collective political body comprised by the heads of governments of the EU member states, where individual countries can block certain decisions. In the last two years, Macedonia has had the support of the EU Commission and in particular of the Directorate General (DG) for Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR), which have reiterated the positive assessment of Macedonia’s efforts to align itself and adopt reforms required by the EU; at the same time, the majority of the governments of the EU member states have had a favorable view of the government in Skopje and supported it in front of the EU Council its quest for the opening of the negotiations; however, some member states have objected to the potential opening of the accession talks, which has prevented the EU Council to reach a decision to open the accession talks. In particular, France and the Netherlands have been considered the most vocal opponents of enlargement; their objection has prevented the EU Council to open the accession negotiations with Macedonia and Albania in June 2018. In June 2019, the EU Council had once again discussed the proposal for opening the accession negotiations with Macedonia – and once again decided to postpone the decision due to lack of consensus; France has been widely believed to be the most vocal opponent to the decision. In this paper, we discuss the circumstances in which these developments took place, and look at their consequences – at the national and the EU level.
Context
Ever since its inception, the EU has been strategically oriented towards gradual enlargement to include most of the countries on the European continent. The first enlargement took place in 1973 (when the Union was called European Communities), and included Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland. The second round of enlargement took place in the 1980s, and included the post-authoritarian Mediterranean countries – Greece (1981), and Portugal and Spain (1986). The third round took place in 1995, as three neutral, non-NATO countries – Austria, Finland and Sweden – joined the Union. The fourth round of enlargement took place in 2004 and included eight post-socialist countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and two Mediterranean island countries (Malta and Cyprus), followed by two more post-socialist countries (Romania and Bulgaria) in 2007. The fifth round – the enlargement towards the Western Balkans – is still in progress. So far, only Croatia has joined the Union (in 2013), while the rest of the Balkan countries, including Macedonia, are in the process of accession.
With the exception of Croatia, the Western Balkans round of accession, nevertheless, unveils much slower than originally anticipated. This has been to a great extent a result of the reluctance among European leaders to admit new member states in the Union. Tropes such as “enlargement fatigue” in the aftermath of the 2004 and 2007 round dominated the discourse, the main argument being that some of the newer EU member states have been admitted without the due scrutiny, to the detriment of the rest of the EU and in particular, the core EU countries. The multiple crises that the EU has gone through in the past decade have also contributed to the change of heart among influential actors with regards to the question of enlargement. The watershed event has been the European sovereign debt crisis in which Greece had a central role, which did not only reveal serious vulnerabilities of the European project, but also reinforced the North-South and West-East divisions, gave fuel to anti-migrant sentiments and bolstered nationalism. The central argument by the more moderate opponents of the enlargement (or as rather opponents of enlargement in the near future) is that the EU has too many internal issues (such as Brexit) and thus it can not simultaneously expand and consolidate.
In the recent years, therefore, a growing number of actors in Europe – and in particular, in the core countries, has framed the enlargement towards the Balkans as a step in the wrong direction. Aside from the general “enlargement fatigue” argumentation and legitimate concerns about the state of reforms in the region, negative biases towards the Balkan region and the population of the Balkan countries have also played a role in the process (i.e. in some societies citizens from the Balkan countries have been often seen unfavorably, as migrants who take away the jobs and the welfare of the locals, trouble-makers, and in general, “others” who do not conform to the local culture). Importantly, however, the governments of the newer EU members (in particular the Central East and Southeast European countries), as well as a number of other actors in both the EU administration as well as in the Western European countries, have countered these tendencies and worked towards restoring the enlargement agenda; some of them, such as the Head of the EU External Action Service (EEAS), Federica Mogherini, have argued that the Balkan enlargement of the Union is another step towards the unification of Europe. The federal government of Germany under Chancellor Angela Merkel has also played a pivotal role in restoring the Balkan enlargement agenda in recent years, not the least through initiating the Berlin Process in 2014, which aims to complement the EU enlargement agenda.
While the discussion of the EU accession prospects of Macedonia and the Balkans have been a topic of (sometimes contentious) debates, it is worthwhile to mention that even the most enthusiastic supporters of the Balkan enlargement estimate that it would take at least several years, if not another decade until this endeavor comes to fruition. Thus, in the policy debates on Macedonia’s EU bid no one really talks about the date of the definite accession; instead, actors have focused on the act of the opening of the accession talks and have assigned to it a high symbolic value. Macedonian policymakers have often talked about “the date” of the start of the negotiations (often simply called “the date”), and argued that it is of crucial importance that “Macedonia receives the date” as soon as possible. In 2018, even though Macedonia was not granted the start of the accession negotiations, the official formulation of the EU that “the date” may be awarded soon – this in itself was a cause for celebratory talk of the SDSM-DUI government. In 2019, thus, the talk of “the date” has once again dominated the political debates.
The awarding of “the date” for the start of the accession negotiations, of course, does not mean automatic admittance of the Balkan countries in the EU. The example of Turkey (which started the accession negotiations in 2005) shows that accession negotiations can themselves drag on for decades and then stall; while the example of Iceland (which started the negotiations in 2010 but in 2013 withdrew the application to join the Union) shows that a country despite opening the accession negotiations can reverse its strategic orientation and not join the EU. For the EU, the negotiations are a prerequisite stage of hard work, through which the candidate country works on aligning its policy and legislative framework to the standards of the EU (in terms of adoption, implementation and enforcing), a process which is rigorously monitored, scrutinized and assessed by the EU and the member states. Once all negotiation stages (based on the different chapters of the Community Acquis) are concluded, and once all parties (that is the EU administration and the governments of the member states) are satisfied with the progress of the candidate country and have no further remarks, the country can become a full member of the Union. The start of the negotiations is also important because it unlocks further opportunities of the candidate country to benefit from the EU structural funds through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). For the Macedonian government, a start of the negotiations would also mean a boost of their legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate, as it would be framed as a great recognition of their efforts to restore Macedonia’s EU trajectory.
Coping with the Delays
Macedonia’s bid to join the EU has went through numerous ups and downs. After the ethnic conflict in 2001, Macedonia embarked on a period of intense reforms, and became an EU candidate country in 2005. It was initially expected that Macedonia will become a member state in a few years time after that. The first recommendation that Macedonia starts the accession negotiations was issued by the European Commission in 2009; at that point, the major obstacle for starting the accession talks was the objection by Greece regarding the name of the country. Greece had voiced its opposition; in the years afterward, Athens has also gained the support of other EU member states in making the solution of the name issue a special political condition for Macedonia’s EU accession (in addition to the Copenhagen criteria). The European Commission has since 2009 consistently reiterated its recommendation, with some modifications: in particular, during the years of the protracted political crisis 2015-2017 which put the reform agenda in jeopardy, the Commission issued a conditional recommendation, as the solution of the domestic issues now became another condition for unlocking the EU accession process. The SDSM-led government since 2017 has devoted itself on solving the name issue with Greece (and gaining the support of official Athens), and on meeting the conditions set by the EU. The adoption and implementation of the Prespa Agreement, given its high political costs, was seen as a great testament to the government’s commitment to the EU accession process. One particular challenging circumstance, however, is that in recent years, EU officials have considered the candidacy of Macedonia together with the one of Albania; as Albania is currently going through a serious political crisis, it has been also argued that the delays in terms of Macedonia’s accession are a collateral of Albania’s failures.
Thus, after having changed the name of the country, and after having had some successes in terms of implementing reforms (which has been deemed sufficient by the European Commission), not having opened the accession negotiations yet is seen as a heartbreaking and disillusioning moment for Macedonia. A number of enthusiasts have argued that the delays in 2018 and 2019 paint a rather realist image of European politics, but also reveals a certain level of disregard for the interests and needs of the Balkan countries as well. Many actors – including Macedonia’s Prime Minister Zoran Zaev, have argued that the longer the start of the accession negotiations is delayed, the greater are the risks for destabilization of the country (their logic is that the disillusionment with the EU may lead to new political crises, as the EU accession is considered as one of the few unifying narratives in the country). The predicament of the opposition of Western European actors towards the process of enlargement is certainly a novel challenge for Macedonia’s government and pro-EU actors in the country, as for the first time it is not about “us” but it is about “them” (the EU). Moreover, with the change of attitude inside the EU, there is now a limit of what Macedonia’s government can do to advance the EU accession process. The other predicament, the one of being put in the same group with Albania, is also a challenging circumstance; not only Macedonia’s fate is now tied with its neighbor, but any attempt at decoupling may have ripple effects within the country as well – as ethnic Albanian political elites have all supported the coupling of the countries together in the EU accession process, and prefer to walk the European road together with their ethnic-kin state.
After the latest delay in the EU accession process, there have been three types of responses. First, the government and its supporters have remained highly optimistic and once again have tried to forge a triumphant narrative. They argued that the EU Council has acknowledged the great successes that Macedonia has made, and expressed their firm belief that the start of the accession negotiations (the awarding of “the date”) is imminent in the Fall-Winter 2019. Second, the opposition around VMRO-DPMNE and other nominally pro-European actors have criticized the government for pursuing an inefficient diplomatic strategy in winning allies in the EU, and asked for responsibility for, what is in their eyes, a dismal outcome. Third, some actors (perhaps the smallest group of them all) have become more critical towards the EU, and argued that in response to what they see as an unfavorable treatment by the EU what is needed is a deep rethinking of Macedonia’s trajectory and strategy.
In the meantime, the constellation in the EU is changing. After the elections in May 2019, there is a new EU Parliament. A new EU Commission is being formed. In July 2019, Greece will have a new government led by a Party that has been critical of the Prespa Agreement. The political crisis in Albania is escalating. Even Bulgaria, a traditional supporter of Macedonia, has started to create tensions over unsettled historical and symbolic issues. As Macedonian policymakers look towards the Fall 2019 awaiting “the date” for starting the accession negotiations, the perspective for Macedonia’s EU accession remains uncertain as ever.