Weekly Briefing, Vol. 19, No. 4 (BH), June 2019
BIH- dependent, polyvocal and not very professional diplomacy
Introduction
Studies of international relations often focus on the great powers in shaping the international order and determining strategic choices of small powers in area of foreign policy. As IR realists seem to argue, there seems not much left for small powers in terms of their basic geopolitical strategic choices but to – in descending order – balance the influence of a stronger actor, join with other smaller powers in building an alternative geopolitical framework for the same purpose; engaging dominant actor into its own strategic agenda in exchange for loyalty and support on international arena; buck-passing or giving up the responsibility for shaping the framework of institutionalized international cooperation in order to preserve continuity of its own strategic interests; lastly, appeasement or relenting to the demands of stronger power either by active approach (pursuing economic, elite, party or other particular interests) or passive (without any clear interest).
Similar approaches are relevant to consider when analyzing ways in which the countries in the Western Balkans (mostly consisted of a small powers) endeavor to, on the one hand, increase their autonomy against dominant power (the EU, the US) and project power and influence to other, neighboring countries. In structural terms, geopolitical system of the Western Balkans is rather dynamic one considering a frequent changes in geopolitical potentials between the regional small powers and frequently a tendency of some of the countries to “punch above their weight” when engaging or even balancing big powers is at stake. As a result, Serbia is known to “play two pianos” when the ultimate commitment for the EU integration vis-à-vis strong friendship with Russia is concerned, Montenegro successfully coopted EU-Russia strategic confrontation in the WB region to steer away the influence of the regional hegemon (Serbia), Kosovo shows very resourceful resilience in switching the ultimate loyalty from the US to the EU, North Macedonia only recently enjoys in honeymoon with the EU after removing a Russian friendly government; Albania was relatively successful in building strategic alliances (Kosovo) and was proactive in forging regional geopolitical framework.
In contrast, foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina is clearly without abilities to balance, engage or bind any other powers, characterized by passive and unassuming approach to international relations and almost non-existent strategic capacity. Most of the time BIH foreign policy dwells in passive appeasement to European conditionality, American dominance and Russian, Turkish or other regional influences. There are generally at least three reasons for this: First, BIH has very challenging conditions to conduct a single common foreign policy. Second, due to foreign tutorship BIH exerts limited independence in foreign policy and, as a result, third, has divested from building diplomatic capacity able to pursue state interests and lacks professionalism for in depth participation on international fora. These features of BIH foreign policy are long-standing and from time to time come into limelight, just as it was a case in the last couple of months.
Polyvocal diplomacy
The fact that BIH has not very developed or coherent common – let alone single – foreign policy is not much surprising considering how weak BIH`s central institutions and fragile inter-ethnic cooperation is. BIH is potpourri of independent sub-state and partisan foreign policies that due ethnic key power sharing mechanism occasionally have institutional support of the state and as such pretend to be a state policy. Typical examples include HDZ or HNS policy towards Croatia, SDA`s policy toward Muslim world, RS or SNSD policy towards Serbia or Russia, etc. Common trait in these singular FPs is pursuance of interests that are to a certain extent discordant to a common foreign policy and arbitrary way they sometimes do ‘hat switching’ with state foreign policy. As a result, BIH can have many actors acting on the behalf of the state but merely pretending to represent BIH state interests. A recent example of this was given during diplomatic tours of the former RS President and current Serb MOP (member of the Presidency) Milorad Dodik.
In the last few months, Milorad Dodik paid a visit to several European countries in state capacity as a member of Presidency, in attempt to primarily strengthen external relations of the Republika Srpska, or even, according to some media, to gain international support for his secession agenda. There are several reasons to justify this opinion, but most stark is the fact that he did not inform or consult the other two MOP members about his diplomatic endeavors. In April, when Dodik met with the Pope in Vatican, Bosniak MOP Dzaferovic and Croat MOP Komsic are said to find out about the trip from newspapers. Dodik and Francis I reportedly talked about ethnic reconciliation in BIH, migration and population crisis BIH is facing especially of the Christians. It was pointed out that due to a vacuum left after Croats ‘lost’ their MOP, Dodik was found to be the best interlocutor of the problems Catholics are dealing in BIH, and despite what Croat parties may hold against it, he was described as assuming “representative role for all Bosnian Christians” in Rome.
In his subsequent visit to Austria and Hungary partisan and sub-state reasons were even more pronounced. In May, he met with Austrian Vice Chancellor Strache to reconfirm the partnership between FPA and SNSN on the European Right and relatively cheaply got support from Austria (military neutral, non-NATO country) for “official military neutrality of BIH”. This diplomatic success didn’t last long, because the Austrian government stepped down shortly after the wiretapping scandal. However, already in mid-June, Dodik headed BIH business delegation to Hungary and met Orban. After the talks, the Hungarian Prime Minister stressed Hungary’s respect for the sovereignty and unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but “the respect for the identity of the Republika Srpska” and announced an action plan Hungarian government will draft concerning cultural and educational cooperation with RS.
Last week`s visit to Belarus was also perceived as a hat switching visit. He talked with his Belarusian counterparts about the cooperation in mining, car-building and forestry all directly involving the economic benefits for the Republika Srpska, “and only occasionally mentioning Bosnia and Herzegovina”. During his visit to Belarus, he also met with the President of Moldova and the Chairman of the pro-Russian Socialist Party, I. Dodon, which ignited concerns on his attempts to establish contacts with Transnistria, and even to seek successful secession model that this unrecognized but de facto independent territory can provide.
Dependent and under-capacitated FP
Only clear and relatively coherent goal of the BIH foreign policy is the EU integration, but formation and development of this goal is to a great extent dependent on the international community which, according to the Dayton Agreement, closely monitors and guides BIH foreign policy. Most of the analysts would criticize the lack of the independent decision making in BIH foreign policy, however it is also widely considered that without foreign guidance and the role of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the Peace Implementation Commission (PIC) continuity of a sole FP goal would be also under question mark. In addition, the embassies of EU member states, the EU delegation in Sarajevo and the US embassy play significant unofficial role in the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s foreign policy, especially in matters concerning the Euro-Atlantic integration.
With one clear strategic goal and continuous tutorship by the international community the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in its foreign policy development and formation is extremely limited. One of direct outcomes is that BIH has never developed ability and motivation to pursue foreign policy independently, nor attached importance to professionalization and development of its own diplomatic network or experience and knowledge in international affairs. Passivity and dependence are the main reasons why BIH diplomatic service, foreign policy decision-makers and officials in charge of pursuing foreign relations are usually party-installed without much diplomatic experience and knowledge. Being a diplomat in BIH is not much more than it is cynically regarded in media as an honorary sinecure for the retiring party members and “gaffes” in foreign policy are common occurrence. Recently, media reported, for example, that the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina on June 17 “strongly condemned Yemen`s missile attacks on civilian targets in Saudi Arabia”. This statement proves how little the Presidency, the highest body in charge of foreign policy in the country, knows about international affairs outside Europe. It is very likely that this statement was suggested in some quid pro quo scheme by “a diplomatic official of a certain friendly country”, but it also indicates how cheaply the integrity in international relations is valued.
List of diplomatic gaffes or occasions when BIH foreign policy sacrificed integrity and coherence to reach joint decision is probably longer, but the opposite – when particular sub-state foreign policy is done at expense of common FP – is much more common phenomenon. A few days after condemning Yemen, BIH Rijaset (Bosnian Islamic Committee), a head organization of Bosniak Muslims, perceived very close to SDA ideology, issued a recommendation to conduct dzenaza for recently deceased former Egyptian President and leader of Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed Mursi. Extremist tendencies are not only characteristics of SDA foreign policy, SNSD and RS is also known to espouse closer relations with pro-Russian regimes, unnecessary drag BIH into diplomatic war between Serbia and Kosovo on international arena, just like Croat parties are known to frequently defend Croatian state interests in BIH (Peljesac bridge as one of examples). Therefore, given the negative impact these sub-state foreign policies have on inter-ethnic, inter-party relations and formation of common foreign policy in general, limited independence of BIH foreign policy for a time being seems only viable solution.