

WORKING PAPER

The Evolution of Chinese Cultural Diplomacy and its impact on the BiH perception of the Belt and Road Initiative and China CEE Cooperation

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Abstract

Since the introduction of the China – CEE ‘17+1’ framework of cooperation in 2012 and the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, China became “hot topic”, not just in the region of the Western Balkans, but in the broader European framework as well. Because majority of analyses are focused on economic and security studies, they lack the historical, ideational and social context in understanding Chinese policy of reforms and opening up. Facing this kind of challenges, official Beijing readopts the Confucius thoughts and Zhongyong dialectics as a part of broader concept/framework of the cultural diplomacy. On the other side, through cultural diplomacy official Beijing is trying to democratize the structure of the Global Governance Club and to present itself as a benevolent and responsible stakeholder. This paper would like to present the influence of cultural diplomacy on the BiH perception of the Belt and Road Initiatives and China – CEE ‘17+1’ framework of cooperation. The structure of the paper will be organized in three parts. The first part will be dedicated to the evolution of cultural diplomacy in Chinese foreign policy since the founding of the People’s Republic of China on the October 1st in 1949. The second part of the paper will analyze the cultural diplomatic activities of China in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). It will focus on the activities and projects implemented by the Confucius institutes and educational institutions and exchange. The third part of the paper will be dedicated to explaining whether Chinese campaigns in BiH were successful. That success will be measured by the occurred changes in the perception of China and its initiatives within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Key words: cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, peaceful development, *zhongyong*, Confucius institutes, think tank, soft power, Chinese dream, harmonious symbiosis, ‘17+1’

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Introduction

No one disputes any longer the fact that People's Republic of China (hereafter China) holds one of the leading positions in global leadership. However, there emerged some very "heated" debates about how will China react to the obvious shifting of the power from West to East in the future. On the one hand, there is a position that China, through its widening global influence, shall create such a security system and economic order that would be supportive to renewal of the "Central Empire".

On the other hand, Chinese politicologists and experts promote a different discourse, the one based on the so-called *background knowledge*, or, in a free interpretation, the necessary knowledge about history, culture and philosophy of a country, which they see as essential for studying China. In that sense, *Zhongyong* dialectics is mentioned as key component of the additional knowledge.²Qin Yaqing³ in his article explained the concept of Continuity through changes and added that Hegel's dichotomy structure is in fact perfect for realistic approach in explaining the western point of view on China as possible challenger of hegemonistic policy of power the USA has been conducting since the end of Cold war. This theoretician introduces "additional knowledge" as necessary for further research and understanding of Chinese international politics and middle road (*zhongyong*) as basic dialectics that could be applied onto Chinese internal and external affairs. In a certain way, this and other similar attempts offer different view and understanding of international relations that are based on Western traditions and values. In this paper we will discuss the perception of Chinese ambitious plans like Belt and Road and "17+1" format of cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hence, we will research whether BiH sees Chinese positioning in the region as an act of force, or as Chinese desire to establish balance and harmonic relations among countries on the New Silk Road, by applying new and specific approach to international relations.

With the rise of Chinese economic and military power, Chinese government tries to present its intentions as friendly and to convince all in doubt that China has no intention to become a hegemon. In that process, China is largely relying on tools that fall under the definition of a soft power concept.⁴ We count there the concept of Peaceful development, promotion of Chinese language and culture through Confucius institutes and think-tank activities, which, from different angle, but with the same goal, present Chinese vision of international order and its position in it. With their synergetic acting, the official Beijing is

²Qin Yaqing, Continuity through Change: Background Knowledge and China's International Strategy, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2014, str.285-314, available from: <http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org>.

³Ibid,p.286

⁴Zhao Yinnan, Chinese dream is Xi vision, China Daily, published 18.03.2013., available from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013npc/2013-03/18/content_16315025.htm, accessed 20.08.2017.

trying to show that Chinese positioning in the global leadership is not a threat, but it offers a wider spectrum of developmental possibilities for countries worldwide.

The aim of this paper is to answer whether Chinese public diplomacy (cultural diplomacy specifically) and associated activities have a positive impact on BiH perception of the Belt and Road initiative and Cooperation mechanism 17+1. Speaking of the image of China and the impact on the BiH, we are interested to see to what extent is that image based on Chinese soft power and whether that power lies in Chinese culture and its values, or, it is after all the “hard” power, i.e. economic power that is interesting not only to Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also to numerous other developing economies, that is, countries of the “Third world”.

Since the Chinese initiative Belt and Road, with regional mechanism of cooperation 17+1 as its part, is one of the most serious alternatives to existing global order, dealing with Chinese public diplomacy and soft power is imposed as a necessity when analyzing and considering Chinese intentions. The question is whether Chinese public diplomacy, oriented towards the worldwide public with the aim to change the image of China as a threat, produces soft power through the offered content (culture, values and policies). By geographical narrowing of our research subject, we will investigate whether the work of Confucius Institutes, their education component in particular, produces the “cultural soft power” in BiH. Along with that, we will research how the BiH perceives Chinese “soft power based on culture.”

The first part of this paper is dedicated to the analysis of soft power, and it will present the theoretical framework of the paper. The second part will present the content of soft power that China projects towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. Third part of the paper shall deal with the concept of Confucius Institutes and present the work and significance in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since the author participated in many high-level events in the period starting from 2015, she got⁵ a unique position to study “up close” the Chinese soft power and cultural diplomacy.

Part I

Soft power and public diplomacy

The concept of soft power, since the coining of the phrase in 1990, has been used by the western analysts in the academic world to describe certain aspects of states’ foreign policy. Thus, this concept is applied in analysis of Chinese foreign policy as well. When Joseph Nye

⁵The author participated in the application process and negotiations about opening a Confucius Institute at University of Banja Luka, in meetings between RS Government and province of Tiengin, conference of 17+1 think-tanks held in Bled and 4 global conferences of Confucius institutes, in Xian, Chengdu, Changsha and Krakow.

defined three resources of soft power: culture, political values and foreign policy, the Chinese academic circles recognized the significance of soft power for “branding” of China and creating an image of a country that does not represent a threat, but rather a responsible and technologically advanced partner in global processes.

When we analyze power within the framework of present time politics, it is important to bear in mind that the nature of power changes, and the soft power becomes more and more relevant. The concept of Joseph Nye was a preliminary step in further research of perceiving the Chinese soft power. There we understand both the Chinese soft power and the Chinese perception of soft power. American politicologist, Joseph Nye, first deals with the term “power”, a concept that is - according to him – similar to “love”, it is easier to “experience it” rather than “define or measure it”.⁶ The power is the ability “to make others do what otherwise they would not do”.⁷ Nye defines power also as “the ability to achieve goals” or “ability to do something and control the others⁸”. Nye relies on definitions of his predecessors, Robert A. Dall, Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Klaus Knorr and Ray Klaine, and claims that, in line with behavioral definition of power, it is necessary to know the preferences of others if one wants to measure the power in view of altered behavior. ⁹ We especially emphasize the part in which Nye describes “changing source of power” as a process in abandoning the traditional stress on military power and approaching measuring the international power based on factors such as geography, population, raw resources.¹⁰ Introducing the idea of soft power in relation to hard power he stressed that “making other countries to change may be called a directive or a command method of applied power”. In that, the command power is based on incentives (the carrot) or threats (the stick).¹¹ Nye also defined the resources of soft power in view of ideology, culture and institutions. In that sense, these resources represent soft power in relation to resources of command power such as military and economic force.¹² Hence, according to him, the power is composed of hard and soft aspect, while the universalism of a country’s culture and its ability to establish a set of certain rules and institutions that run international activities are the key sources of power.¹³ Over the years Nye continued to develop his theory and, generally, the power itself is seen as something less tangible and less forced. In the changed

⁶J.S. Nye (1990 a) Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books, pp25

⁷ J.S. Nye (1990 b) “Soft Power” Foreign Policy, 80, Autumn, pp.153-171 (Cтp 154)

⁸J.S. Nye (1990 a) Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books, pp25,26

⁹ Ibid p.26

¹⁰Ibid o.29

¹¹Ibid p.31

¹²Ibid p.32

¹³Ibid p.33

world, means of power such as economy and military have become less efficient compared to “a more attractive way” that a country may use to make others do what it wants.¹⁴

Nye also explained the relation between soft power and public diplomacy by differentiating the two types of power. The first type is power that is measured in behavior results, while the other type is power measured in resources. In international politics the resources of soft power of a state derive from its system of value and dominant cultural pattern.¹⁵

Nye defines public diplomacy as an instrument the governments use to mobilize resources in order to communicate and attract the attention of other states, and not exclusively their governments. Milos Solaja wrote that public diplomacy is used to remove effects that might have negative impact to the image of a state, and thus to its position in international community.¹⁶ Therefore, the purpose of public diplomacy is creating a positive image to make a state policy more transparent and business practices more attractive. This is particularly important for China, since it is in no way isolated and closed country anymore. However, it is very important to make a difference between public diplomacy and propaganda campaign. From that standpoint, public diplomacy should represent a “link” between real picture and desired image. For the time being, China is solving this task gradually, but in many segments insufficiently. If a product of a public diplomacy is attractive to public of another country, then we can consider that resources of that diplomacy produce soft power. In academic discourse there are a lot of discord regarding perception of soft power and public diplomacy, but general understanding is that the two concepts are not synonyms and they relate to different (though connected) communication activities.¹⁷ In the same context, public diplomacy according to Hartig is “an act of communication with foreign public and thus an instrument that enables or projects soft power of a state”,¹⁸ while the soft power is a product or an attraction deriving from public diplomacy.

¹⁴J.S. Nye (1990 b) “Soft Power” Foreign Policy, 80, Autumn, p. 166

¹⁵Public Diplomacy and Soft Power, Joseph S Nye Jr., The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, vol 616. Public Diplomacy in a Changing World (March, 2008), pp.94-109

¹⁶Milos Solaja, Medjunarodnoi odnosi sa javnoscu kao osnova imidza drzave , PR u ulozi diplomatije, Globe Edit, 2019, p21

¹⁷Falk Hartig, Chinese Public Diplomacy, prema Rawnsley Gary, Diplomacy and Propaganda, in Issues and Studeies 36(3) 1-25, Taiwan, 2000.

¹⁸Falk Hartig, Chinese Public Diplomacy, The Rise of the Confucius Institutes, Routlage, New York, 2016. p,49

Chinese concept of soft power – “cultural soft power”, or the Chinese view of soft power (*Wenhua ruanshili* 文化软实力)

Since the last decade of the previous century, there is a rising interest for the concept of soft power among the Chinese academic milieu. The analysts ask what exactly is the soft power and what is it in relation to “hard power” and how is it being used in realization of foreign politics. With economic growth and development, which caused China to be the creator of new and a reformer of existing international institutions, this issue is dealt with not only by Chinese academic community but also the representatives of the authorities. Since China is guided by principles of scientific development, the authorities’ decisions certainly contain premises found by the scientific community. In that sense, the White book on national defense of 2005 first presented the “peaceful growth” (*heping jueqi* 和平绝气), which turns into “peaceful development” (*heping fazhan* 和平发展) that sounds less aggressive, and the creation of “harmonized world - 和谐世界” Traditional Chinese value, “harmony”, may be used for resolving conflicts, cultural clashes, or as a harmony between nature and mankind, when we speak about solving global problems in environmental protection.¹⁹ These concepts are in the service of presenting China as reliable economic partner and a country that is not a threat, hence acknowledging China as a legitimate superpower in international arena. Fang Chanping explains that China tries to mitigate the *China Threat Theory* with its soft power, acquire understanding of the international community and active support for peaceful development.²⁰ Chengxin Pan, who deals with methods of analyzing China foreign policy, claims that merely observing China does not explain China in international relations, but merely presents China as “threat” or “chance”. Therefore, his approach is opposite to positivistic tradition that says that for studying China it is enough to observe facts, measurable and subjected to testing, without full understanding of Chinese reality.²¹ In that sense we take under consideration the aforementioned epistemic debates and Chinese theories in international relations that advocate deeper knowledge on Chinese culture, history and values as precondition for understanding the soft power based on culture, a Chinese concept of understanding a soft power. Deng Yong explained reasons why same theoretical parameters and postulates cannot be applied in studying a ruling force (USA) and a rising force (China). The reasons he gave were differences in status

¹⁹Mingjiang “Soft Power Discourse” u ‘The Limits of China Soft Power in Europe, Ingrid d’Hooghe, Netherland’s Institute of International Relations, Clingendael

²⁰Fang Changping, *Zhong-mei ruan shi li bijiao jiqi dui Zhongguo de qi shi*, A comparison of US and Chinese Soft Power and insight for China, *World Economics and Politics*, no.7:21-27

²¹ Chengxin Pan, *Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representation of China’s Rise* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2012)

between the two countries, different resources and goals of soft power.²² The official mentioning of the term soft power by Chinese authorities was in the speech of former Secretary General of the Communist Party, Hu Jintao, in the report after the 17th congress of Chinese communist party. He mentioned cultural soft power as priority of Chinese foreign policy. In the beginning, academic papers on this topic focused on understanding Joseph Nye, but the discussion continued to shaping this concept so that it would be in accord with Chinese perception of international community. The founder of Tsinghua School, professor Yan Xuetong, stated that globalization itself no longer relate to a fight for a country, resources or markets, but more to creating rules, establishing norms or customs.²³ China, therefore, got into this process of establishing rules, norms and theories and presenting a new concept of soft power (based on culture). We can conclude that China emphasizes its traditional culture, philosophy, medicine, architecture, martial arts and all that bears specific message on diversity and different background of knowledge and understanding, which represents also the content of its public diplomacy and soft power. Chinese academicians claim that Chinese power, tradition and harmony are enrooted in Confucianism and other Chinese thoughts and schools, and as such they provide “an alternative to self-aware system of values of the West”.²⁴ Soft power is analyzed in the domestic and international context and it is visible from words of the then president, Hu Jintao, who said that soft power is not only a component of national comprehensive power but also an important source of national cohesion.²⁵

On a concrete example of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, we will try to present the perception of China in BiH and a projection of desired image based on Chinese culture and traditional values that are promoted through Confucius institutes.

Part II

Soft Power as Addition to the Economic Cooperation between PR China and BiH

Previous researches done on the topic of the European view of China, start from the premise that European perception is under the influence of Chinese economic and political increasing power. China represents both an opportunity and challenge for Europe in economic and political sense. China represents big export market, destination for investment and production, cheap labour but also a competition at the export market and in the race for

²²Deng Yong, *The New Hard Realities: Soft Power and China in Transition*, in Li Minjiang (ed.) *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics*, Lanham, MD:Lexington Books, pp.63-64

²³Yan Xuetong quoted in the book Mark Leonard, *What does China think* (New York: Public Affairs 2008). page 94

²⁴Ibid, pp 428

²⁵Report from the 17th CPC Congress session part 7, 15.10.2007.

resources. However there is no unique European perception of China which indicates numerous internal challenges faced by Europe. So far there was only one survey of BiH perception of Chinese economy done by the Chinese Academy of Social Science and the Centre for Cooperation between China and CEE. The survey represents the household survey in 16 CEE countries in 2018. Fifty nine of adult population in CEED countries evaluated Chinese economic development in the last two years as very fast, and six percent as slow. BiH respondents estimated Chinese development on the range of -100 and +100 in the last two years (+27) which is significantly lower than average score in other central and Eastern European countries.²⁶ Unlike Poland, Serbia and Albania whose respondents were the most informed on cooperation between China and CEE, respondents from BiH generally showed the least informed on this cooperation. This paper used the case study, specifically focused on one mechanism of public diplomacy, Confucius institutes, to try to measure perception and soft power and cultural diplomacy.

Cooperation between Bosnia and Herzegovina and China intensified with the establishment of Cooperation Mechanism 17+1 and Belt and Road Initiative. Since 2012 the new dialogue platform was created amongst China and then, 16 CEE countries, out of which eleven were from EU and other five from Balkan region. Since its establishment, the initiative progressed in strengthening of dialogue and cooperation. One of the biggest challenges was cautious and more assertive stance of EU when it comes to cooperation especially with countries of Western Balkan. Despite this assumed interest, rather than bolstering the EU membership prospects of the countries of the Western Balkans, China's BRI is considered by EU to be detrimental to this process. The BRI, according to some reports "hampers Western Balkan-EU integration in three primary ways: trapping countries into debt (so-called "debt trap diplomacy"), lowering environmental standards, and perpetuating corruption."²⁷

Investments in Bosnia and Herzegovina fit the pattern in the region being orientated predominantly on infrastructure and energy. Reasons for that is the necessity of Balkan countries to improve infrastructure and use the energy resources available which concurrently offer an opportunity for Chinese side to realize certain impact in the region. China aims to develop the infrastructure and distributive network in this part of the world which would be useful for further development and progress to the EU market where Balkan countries have

²⁶Chen Xin, How the CEE citizens view China's Development, based on household survey, China CEE Institute, Budapest, 2018

²⁷ Austin Doehler, "How China Challenges the EU in the Western Balkans - Will the EU ultimately cede the Western Balkans to Beijing's influence?" Diplomat, published on 25 September 2019, available from: <https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/how-china-challenges-the-eu-in-the-western-balkans/>, accessed on 1 October 2019

crucial role.²⁸ In accordance with these objectives, China intensifies activities in the area of public diplomacy. Since China does not have strong links with BiH like with Serbia for example, it aims to explain its ambitions in this part of the world. Through the active public diplomacy, not propaganda, China strives to confront negative writing of certain media and reports on China as the “threat” to Western Balkan and its path to European Union membership.

Partnership relations which China established with Bosnia and Herzegovina are part of the wider strategy of foreign policy (*zouchuqu*), as the platform. The Strategy of global presence is in the service of creating economic cooperation and realization of greater political support.²⁹ The first Chinese Ambassador Wen Xigui came to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1997 and the first Ambassador of BiH to China Svetislav Mudrenovic was appointed in 1998. So far there were no official visits of Chinese Prime Minister and President to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of BiH Zlatko Lagumdžija in 2003 paid a visit to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China Tang Jiahuan and signed “Agreement of Cultural Cooperation”, “Executive Plan of Cultural Cooperation 2002-2004”. Regardless of these agreements, this period was not marked by more significant cooperation. BiH Ambassador stressed first the need for bilateral cooperation to be organized by entities or cities. Chinese Ambassador gave similar statement and added that the cooperation will depend on local leaders and relations established between business people.³⁰ This indicated the need for extended knowledge in Asian studies and understanding of language and culture of China, which would add to furthering cooperation and which BiH significantly lacked.

The first bigger project of mutual cooperation was the power plant Stanari. This was the first project financed from the separate credit line amounting to 13 billion US dollars intended for CEE countries. The number of projects realized with Bosnia and Herzegovina is modest when compared to other CEE countries and one of the reasons stated is the lack of coordinated approach by BiH authorities. Former President of the BiH Ministers’ Council Vjekoslav Bevanda met with the Chinese Prime Minister in 2010 in Beijing and Bosnia and Herzegovina was offered assistance amounting to 1.09 million BAM and BiH promised to remove administrative obstacles slowing down mutual cooperation.³¹ Warsaw meeting held in 2012 in

²⁸Ljiljana Stevic, Milos Grujic, Bosna i Hercegovina na Novom putu svile: Strategija, stanje, perspective i pozicioniranje u skladu sa novom kineskom strategijom UDK 327:339,94(497.6)(510), DOI10.7251/POL1408405S, Politeia, broj 10, decembar 2015

²⁹Ibid

³⁰Nezavisne novine. Dongchun Feng. Nova šansa za saradnju NR Kine i BiH. 1.7.2013. <http://www.nezavisne.com/index/kolumne/Nova-sansa-za-saradnju-Kine-i-BiH-198530.html> . (31.3.2015.)

³¹Savjet ministara Bosne i Hercegovine. *Predsjedavajući VM BiH razgovarao sa premijerom Kine* ,7. 5. 2010. http://www.vijeceministara.gov.ba/saopstenja/saopstenja_predsjedavajuceg/default.aspx?id=10460&langTag=sr-SP-Cyrl . (31.3.2015.)

the format 16+1 was one of the most important for the relations of the two countries when Chinese side expressed the hope that BiH will participate in the future conference on development of transport network. BiH, on the other hand, expressed the hope that China will continue to invest in the infrastructure and energy development sector.³²

Srečko Latal, researcher for Prague Institute of Security conducted one of the rare analyses on impact of Russia, Turkey and China to Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to this report, Chinese presence is focused on expanding business opportunities in BiH and there is no significant interference in the internal issues of BiH. When compared to the impact of Turkey and Russia, Chinese companies and officials are open for cooperation with local stakeholders regardless of their religious confession, political beliefs or ethnicity. According to this author, Chinese presence is seen as the positive one, thanks to the infrastructural projects promoted by the local leaders. However, he states the challenges i.e. Chinese loans conditions, non-transparency and corruption in Chinese projects.³³ We claim that the number of Chinese cultural events has been significantly increasing since 2015 when the official Chinese diplomatic channels, Chinese Embassy to BiH, more intensively organizes public events, the first think tank Belt and Road has been organized under initiative of the Chinese Embassy and the first Confucius Institute was also open in Sarajevo that year and two years later in Banja Luka. These events correspond to the Chinese more active role in public diplomacy in the region. We hereby claim that CIs opened in Bosnia and Herzegovina will serve as instigator of academic research and cultural and language activities which are necessary in order to improve cooperation and understanding between these two countries. The lack of previous academic research and knowledge of language lead to the lack of information and understanding for the Chinese initiatives, i.e. '17+1' and the Belt and Road, which was also shown in the previously mentioned survey conducted by the China-CEE Institute.³⁴

Confucius Institute Sarajevo (Sarajevo CI) is organizing public courses of Chinese language but according to the home director, the biggest interest and attraction for the public are all activities related to health i.e. taiji or Traditional Chinese Medicine. Kong Fu is the activity which is traditionally popular in Sarajevo and has its history in pop culture from 80ies when Bruce Lee was very popular in former Yugoslavia.³⁵ Sarajevo University does not have department of Sinology hence courses are not intended for students of Chinese language who

³²Večernji list. *Bevanda pozvao Kineze na ulaganja u Bosnu i Hercegovinu* 26.4.2012., <http://www.vecernji.ba/bevanda-pozvao-kineze-na-ulaganja-u-bosnu-i-hercegovinu-402887> (22.4. 2015.)

³³Ibid

³⁴ Chen Xin, How the CEE citizens view China's Development, based on household survey, China CEE Institute, Budapest, 2018

³⁵Interview with Home Director of CI Sarajevo

need additional practice like in some countries. University introduced Chinese language as an optional course along with the Japanese at the Faculty of Philosophy which is working on introduction of Chinese as a major in near future. Chinese language is offered as a course for the primary and secondary school as well as Business Chinese course. They also have HSK Test Centre and are organizing workshops of Chinese traditional culture i.e. paper cutting, calligraphy and taiji. Like in most of other European CIs have students interested in business relations or want to improve their careers adding Chinese language to their portfolio, however there is also interest in Chinese traditional culture. Sarajevo CI is working on academic exchange however some academic exchanges are organized directly via Chinese Embassy in BiH. Besides Summer Camp organized by CI, they organized academic exchange and visits with their partner university in Lanzhou, where besides meeting with university representatives, they had official meetings with the city officials.³⁶ This also confirms our thesis on CIs as important hubs for public diplomacy and networking. The challenges of this CI, based on interview conducted in 2018 with the Chinese director were predominantly organizational and reflect the issues faced by most of CIs mainly when it comes to the adjusting CIs with the University legal and financial systems. We can highlight dedication of Lanzhou University which allocates its staff on longer period to try to develop Chinese studies further at the Sarajevo University thus creating the base for further cooperation.

Confucius Institute Banja Luka University pursuant to its mission stated on the website, aim to introduce Chinese language and culture program for children of primary, high school and kindergarten age, students and all those interested in learning Chinese language or wanting to find out more about Chinese culture and customs. Besides language learning, the Institute has in its offer different courses and education, familiarization with Chinese ethics and doing business in China, Chinese calligraphy, traditional Chinese painting, tea ceremony, Taiji and kongfu. The difference between the two institutes is that Banjaluka CI is specific for organizing lectures covering different aspects of Chinese history, culture, economic development, and contemporary life in China. CI organized more than 10 different lectures during the two years' time. Traditional Chinese medicine lecture was the most attended and it was the first TCM lecture organized at the Faculty of Medicine in the region.³⁷ Each lecture was followed by TV interview on the topic to enhance the publicity of the theme. One lecture was held in the Grammar School and was related to the cultural and symbolic similarities between the two

³⁶Interview

³⁷Akupunktura nije isto sto i kineska medicina, published.1.3.2020. available from : <https://www.ki.unibl.org/post/%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%83%D0>

cultures in order to make Chinese culture more accessible to the secondary school students.³⁸ Grammar school also had opportunity to participate in the first karaoke organized in that school enabling them to learn about Chinese pop culture. This all had great impact on the increased interest for Chinese language and this school will open Confucius Classroom this year. T

The event which is usually the most popular in the Banja Luka city is the Chinese New Year celebration which is traditionally organized in the city center and attended by most of the officials from various Ministries and city of Banja Luka.³⁹ Hartig states the cases of CI in Germany where cultural events are usually more attended when compared to the language courses and he found the reason in that courses were not free unlike the cultural events.⁴⁰ That is not the case in Banja Luka CI because language courses were free too at the beginning for all, and now University students have still right to the courses that are free of charge. During the course of two years since the opening of the CI Banja Luka, Chinese language was introduced as the optional course at the Faculty of Philology and Academy of Art. The Sinology department is in the preparation process and should be finalized in 2021. Chinese language is taught by CI in two primary schools, one kindergarten, two secondary schools in Banja Luka and three in Doboј and there are 6 groups attending courses at the Institute. The CI published two books, translation of Mrguda by Petar Kocic to Chinese language and The First Contacts of Serbs with China, on the prominent historians who visited or wrote about China in history. The institute is authorized to run HSK tests (Chinese National Standard Testing System).⁴¹ Besides these activities CI in Banja Luka was the coordinator of numerous academic exchanges and official visits from and to both sides.

Since the activities conducted by the Confucius institutes do not include only attendants but wider public too, with the aim to accomplish international understanding and cooperation, we claim that those are of great importance for BiH and represent the precondition of future successful cooperation. Based on the participation on the three global conferences in China (Xian, Chengdu and Changsha) and European CI conferences held in Sofia and Krakow and training workshops in Xiamen and Paris, the author claims that those activities also contributed to better cooperation with China and overall international cooperation in the area of education. Based on the reports from CI Banja Luka from December 2017, there were ten visits in total organized in both directions. These visits included also high officials from Hanban management

³⁸Srpsko kineske konstalacije, published: 1 April 2018, available from :

<https://www.ki.unibl.org/post/%D0%BE%D0%B4%D1%80%D0%B6%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE>

³⁹Kineska nova godina proslavljena, objavljeno: 27.01.2020 available from :

<https://www.ki.unibl.org/post/%D0%д> приступљно: 27.02.2020.

⁴⁰ Falk Hartig, Chinese Public Diplomacy, The Rise of the Confucius Institute, Routlage, London, 2016, стр. 149

⁴¹Конфуцијев институт Универзитета у Бањој Луци, доступно на: <https://www.ki.unibl.org/?lang=en>

team and officials from Tianjin government.⁴² This adds additional to the CI mission. When we compare the official data on cooperation with China prior to this period, we conclude that academic cooperation intensified and in some cases like in Banja Luka there were no previous cooperation with China. The way Chinese authors see the role of CIs is “proactive way of changing Chinese image” and “response to the Western culture domination».⁴³ Such approach is dominantly based on the promotion of Chinese traditional culture, however the selection of activities depend on the individual Confucius institutes. Chinese contemporary films days and pop culture promotion is one way how CI Banja Luka is trying to meet both images of China and present the modern and technologically advanced China.⁴⁴

Part III

What are Confucius Institutes?

Joshua Kurlatizick considers the Chinese diplomatic strategy as consisting of two parts: 1) cultural promotion and 2) encompassing diplomacy.⁴⁵

As previously explained, under the culture term, China presumes all from film, to sports and language to paper cutting. The key narrative description for China is “Confucius” hence it is important to understand the basics of Confucius thought.⁴⁶

The image and international status have great impact on the strategic planning and selection of geocconomic and geopolitical elements in Chinese foreign policy. Introduction of “real China” to the world as well as peaceful intentions for its objective has creating favorable conditions for undisturbed economic development of China. We shall now tackle Confucius Institutes and their role in the public diplomacy. We shall also mention here papers of those authors who analyzed Confucius institutes and their thesis that CIs do not represent soft power of China because the product of Chinese public diplomacy as such is not attractive enough for the developed democracies. The claim CIs contain ideas of undemocratic and authoritative

⁴²Годишњи извјештај за Ханбан мај 2019. године, Конфуцијев институт Универзитет у Бањој Луци

⁴³Falk Hartig према Liu Wenya, “Kongzi xueyuan: hanyu he zhongguo jiaoyu guojihua de xin jucuo (New measures for the internacionalization of Chinese language and Chinese educateion) in Jiaoyu Yanjiu, 2007, 50-52

⁴⁴CI Report for 2019, Confucius Institute Banja Luka University, available from www.ki.unibl.org

⁴⁵Joshua Kuraltizick, Charm Offensive- How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World, Yale University Press 2007, pp 61

⁴⁶Confucionism developed in the period of Warring States, it was forbidden during the Qin Dynasty and during Han dynasty it became rulling ideology and remained the basis of all forms of Chinese public life until 20th century. The main focus are Five Classics (Book of Change, Book of Poems, Book of History, Spring and Automns anals, Book of Rituals). Strengthening of Confucionism develops parallel to the pro-secularization of social and cultural life in China wiehn Song Dynasty replaced Tang Dynasty and the state became more centralized introducing the state exame as the key for public service..

political systems and it is considered as propaganda.⁴⁷⁴⁸ We shall explain the formal structure of this mechanism of Chinese foreign policy which aims to tell the story of China from its own angle. Chinese Language International Council or HANBAN operates within Ministry of Education. HANBAN consists of representatives of 12 state ministries and commissions i.e. General Office of the State Council, Ministry of Education, Ministry of finance, Overseas cooperation Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State development and reform commission, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Culture, Stated Administration of Film and Television, State Journalism Service, State Council for Information and State Language Board.⁴⁹

The model of work is very specific and it differs Confucius institutes from other cultural institutes i.e. British Council, Goethe Institute, Cervantes because Confucius Institutes rely on local institutions for cooperation.⁵⁰ Namely, Confucius Institutes are being established in cooperation with the domestic partner universities according to the principle that each university may select Partner University in China and they apply together to Hanban for CI opening. The reason for initiating the Confucius Institute in 2004 is not officially known and stated. However, Hartig states two possible reasons, one as we stated the strengthening of identity and rebirth of Confucianism and the second it related to the increasing financial power of China.⁵¹ He sees both aspects as worth considering but not as the reason for initiating the overall process. Besides this, he states the 16th CPC National Congress when Hu Jintao became the President of PR China as one of the reasons. He then stated Confucianism as the source of tradition and he reintroduced the idea of harmony and harmonious society.⁵²

The name itself indicates the importance of tradition and Chinese values in forming identity and image. Despite the fact that Confucianism was not popular several decades ago, especially during the Cultural Revolution 1966-1976 when it was considered as an obstacle to progress, nowadays, the name of Confucius, *Kongzi*, represents the symbol of united and harmonious Chinese society.

Revival and rebirth of Confucianism in the contemporary Chinese society is the phenomena provoking many discussions. It reappears as the attempt to overcome challenges inside China as well as in the interaction with its neighbors. Revive of Confusions is also seen

⁴⁷ Ann Marie Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship* (New York: Roman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008)

⁴⁸ James F Paradise, *China and International Harmony, the role of Confucius Institutes in bolstering Beijing Soft Power*, *Asisan Survey*, 4(49), (2009), pp 647-669

⁴⁹ CI Headquarters, available from : http://english.hanban.org/node_7716.htm, accessed: 1.2.2013.

⁵⁰ *British Council* was established in 1934 and has offices in 110 countries around the world, *Goethe Institute* was established in 1951 and has 140 institutes and 10 branches in 93 countries. *Cervantes* in Spain was established in 1991 and has institutes in 93 countries. The oldest is actually, *Alliance Francaise* established in 1883. With more than 1000 offices in 135 countries.

⁵¹ Falk Hartig, *Chinese Public Diplomacy, The Rise of the Confucius Institute*, Routledge, London, 2016, p.100

⁵² *Ibid*, p.100

as the symbol of Chinese nation meeting the globalization. Therefore the name of Confucius institutes is linked to the image China attempts to project of China traditional country with the continuity of over 4000 years where traditional values are deeply rooted. Confucius institutes are not researching Confucianism, nor are they involved in the research of its philosophy and ethics. The focus is on the language and culture promotion, mainly traditional Chinese culture which has for its aim to introduce China from the Chinese view of point not only overtly present Western view on China.

Confucius institutes are organizing classes of Chinese language in accordance with the plan and program developed by the HANBAN, which is adjusted to the European Referential Framework for Foreign Languages. Besides Chinese language courses, each CI is organizing activities that promote Chinese ancient culture and tradition, lectures from various field and celebrations marking important dates in Chinese history. Falk Hartig states that the most important feature of CIs is actually the structure of this organization which presumes cooperation and joint work with local universities. That fact alone according to him has multiple implications not only to individual institutes and its partners but in general to the Chinese way of conducting public diplomacy.⁵³ Hartig thereby sees use of culture and language in the public diplomacy with participation and financing of foreign partners as the unique way of financing Chinese public diplomacy. This approach is adjusted to the principles of Chinese economic development and Chinese Opening up from 1978.

On concrete examples of hereby presented two Confucius institutes in Bosnia and Herzegovina we shall show the realization of these objectives and activities and in what way it impacted the view of BiH citizens. As we mentioned, many authors see this work as propaganda. Plamen Toncev who wrote the report for Friedreh Ebert Stiftung analyzed soft power and Confucius Institutes as the “tools of soft power” in the region of Southeast Europe and China is seen as without strategy, but organizing different activities focused on the bilateral cooperation.⁵⁴ These assumptions require further explanation and wider context.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has two Confucius Institutes, established with Sarajevo University and Banja Luka University and one CI classroom established in the Banja Luka Grammar School. As in other cases around the world, CIs tend to be established with better ranked high school institutions hence Sarajevo and Banja Luka as the first and second ranked universities in BiH. Confucius Institute Sarajevo was opened in April 2015 and the event did

⁵³Falk Hartig, *Chinese Public Diplomacy, The Rise of the Confucius Institute*, Routledge, London, 2016

⁵⁴Plamen Tonchev, *China's Soft Power in Southeast Europe*, Friedreh Ebert Stiftung, Sarajevo, 2020

not have big media promotion.⁵⁵ Partners in establishing this CI were University of Sarajevo and Northwest University, Lanzhou. The CI was opened within the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies Sarajevo which represents a sort of a hub for different projects and belongs to the Rector's Office. The opening of this CI matches more intensified cooperation with BiH, especially within the 17+1 Mechanism of Cooperation and Belt and Road Initiative as well as marking twenty years since establishing formal relations between the two countries. The opening was attended by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Amir Kapetovanovic, and the Rector of the Chinese partner University from Lanzhou Mr. Liu Zhongkui. He stated that "the Confucius Institute shall represent the platform to promote Chinese language and culture in BiH as well as strengthening of relations between the two countries".⁵⁶ Sarajevo University Rector Muharem Avdispahic, PhD, whilst addressing the guests, stressed that previously the center for Interdisciplinary Studies was recognizable for programs i.e. European studies, public policies, human rights, religious and gender studies, and that Confucius Institute will introduce new dialogue dimension. "Confucius Institute will successfully fulfill its task: strong contribution to better understanding of Chinese language and culture with the help of partner university and will represent a window for better understanding of BiH in China; it will also open other aspects of successful cooperation between Bosnia and Herzegovina and People's Republic of China"⁵⁷ Since the beginning of its opening Confucius Institute is considered as an additional step to strengthening of bilateral relations between the two countries and the initiative was supported and instigated by the PR China Embassy in Sarajevo. This statement is supported by the research conducted by the German researcher Hartig who analyzed German CIs, stating that out of eight CIs in Germany, five were established on Chinese initiative.⁵⁸ Sarajevo University did not have the tradition of sinology studies in the past and Chinese language was not taught at the any level of education. Sinologists from Sarajevo similar to Banja Luka, did not have the opportunity to continue and work in developing this area further, hence they left for Belgrade where demand for Chinese professors and translators was bigger. In order to better support the work of CI Sarajevo, home director was elected from the post of the Head of the Rector's Office and along with Chinese director, they jointly began with work. At the beginning the interest from the people was not that⁵⁹ and University of Sarajevo itself encountered difficulties in understanding of the HANBAN system of work and developing unique mechanisms in order to

⁵⁵Vijesti.ba, Published on the 2nd of April 2015. available from : <https://vijesti.ba/clanak/265961/u-sarajevu-otvoren-konfucijev-institut>, accessed: 1st .May 2015

⁵⁶Falk Hartig, Chinese Public Diplomacy, The Rise of the Confucius Institute, Routledge, London, 2016,

⁵⁷Ibid

⁵⁸Falk Hartig, Chinese Public Diplomacy, The Rise of the Confucius Institute, Routledge, London, 2016, p.144

⁵⁹Based on the Interview (Interview SA-D1)

overcome issues such as contracts for professors and volunteers from China requiring special D visa for their work.

Confucius Institute Banja Luka University was established on the initiative of the Banja Luka University and Republican Ruska entity government. The process itself lasted close to three years. The author of this paper and her colleagues sinologists worked together on the application process, lobbying at the University management team in order to support the project. The project itself and CI establishing is the part of the PhD thesis of the author who wanted to prove the thesis those bilateral relations will improve with language and cultural studies enhancement. Following the approval of HANBAN, Banja Luka University was allocated the same partner as Sarajevo University, however the former Rector preferred Tianjin University of Technology and Education with whom they established previous cooperation.⁶⁰ December 2017 saw official signing of the contract with Hanban, and few months earlier, the contract was signed between Tianjin University of Technology and Education and Banja Luka University. Former Deputy Prime Minister of PR China Mrs. Liu Yendong awarded the plate of CI to the Rector of Banja Luka University Radoslav Gajanin at the 12th Global Conference of Confucius Institutes before 2000 delegates from all over the world.⁶¹

The official opening ceremony was held on 21st January 2018. The Opening ceremony was attended by the President of Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik, Prime minister Zeljka Cvijanovic, Minister of Foreign Affairs of BiH Igor Crnadak, Deputy Mayor of Tianjin City Zhao Haishan and Ambassador of PR China Madam Chen Bo.⁶² Majority of Ministers from the RS Government attended this ceremony as well as the Mayor of Banja Luka and more than 300 of local guests. The opening itself was the biggest event that year and clearly showed great support from the local government to the cooperation with China.⁶³

Controversies linked to the CIs and often mentioned in the papers by various Western authors refer to lectures on Taiwan, Tibet or Falun gong sect. It is often referred to as problematic topics that CI's avoid to tackle. Based on interview with the director of CI Sarajevo and personal experience, there was no interference in organization of lecture topics in CIs in BiH. However no such lectures were planned to be organized due to the lack of academic interest in this topic. In CIs in other countries of Central and Eastern European countries, the

⁶⁰ Author participated in the process and is familiar with all details of the opening and establishing of the CI

⁶¹ Univerzitet u Banjoj Luci: Osnovan Konfucijev institute, published: 12 December 2017, available from <http://mojabanjaluka.info/infograda/clanak/51134/univerzitet-u-banjoj-luci-osnovan-konfucijev-institut-foto>, accessed on 13 December 2017

⁶² Otvoren Konfucijev institut u Banjaluci, published on the 28th of January 2018, available from <http://ba.n1info.com/Vijesti/a238885/FOTO-Otvoren-Konfucijev-institut-u-Banjaluci.html>, accessed on the 28th of January 2018

⁶³ Interview – BL--I2

lack of interest in paper cutting or Chinese traditional dance, were also mentioned as the main challenges in CI activities promoted by HANBAN as the part of Chinese traditional culture. Young people are more interested in the contemporary art and modern China.⁶⁴ Some of activities that are popular in other CIs in the Central and Eastern Europe are Chinese cousin, Tea ceremony, calligraphy and Taiji as well as lectures on various aspects of Chinese Culture. These experiences match the interest of Banja Luka University CI students whilst as we previously mentioned, CI Sarajevo found that Chinese traditional medicine and Taiji were the most attractive activities for their students.

In order to evaluate the Confucius institutes and their role in foreign policy of China, we shall thus tackle three objectives of Confucius Institutes: language promotion, culture promotion and public diplomacy role in the foreign policy.

Case study was performed by introducing structural configuration of institutes which has multiple implications not only to individual institutes and partners but generally to Chinese implementation of public diplomacy. Political system which CI in some way is representing also has some implications to the work of CI and its functioning as the instrument of Chinese public diplomacy. We aim to link previous chapters using the example of BiH and put it in the wider context of Chinese foreign policy that is using CIs for introduction of certain image China wants to project. The structure itself indicates uniqueness of organization of association with local institutions and provision of financing partly by the host countries. So as to understand CI better, we emphasize different method of establishing institutes in Sarajevo on the initiative of the Chinese side and in case of Banja Luka, on insisting of local side. This shows Hanban is not forcing or imposing CIs but has proactive attitude and make decision in accordance with needs and requests. The most important feature of CIs in BiH is the promotion and work of local staff and local stakeholders on the promotion of Chinese culture and in case of Banja Luka CI, active promotion of Serbian culture in China too. The overall trend in the world,⁶⁵ is that domestic universities are investing more efforts in the CI work than Hanban which face the increasing number of CIs as the obstacle to successful management. The real challenge as observed by the author is the lack of local staff in Sarajevo CI which could help in more successful daily operations in cooperation with the home university, and are more familiar with local public, situation thus developing programs more adjusted to local liking and expectations. Banja Luka CI has the advantage because it is one of the rare CI in the region with the biggest number of local staff. The opening of CIs is increasing the credibility of universities and enables

⁶⁴ Slobodník, G. P. (2017). *The Role of the Confucius Institutes, Non-Governmental Organizations and Other Stakeholders in the Presentation of China in Central Europe*. Bratislava: China CEEC Think Tanks Network.

⁶⁵ Falk Hartig, *Chinese Public Diplomacy, The Rise of the Confucius Institute*, Routledge, London, 2016, p.167

them to better network in the international network of universities. The global conference of CIs is the event that gathers rectors and leaders of universities around the world as well as CI directors. Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have similar project and in current circumstances it is hard to imagine that similar joint effort and work however the work of CIs is the at the same time the closest way of promotion of interest and soft power of BiH via the same institutes. CI belongs to the home universities and it is equally important to work on the promotion of its language and interests in China. So far both CIs are promotion joint cooperation between the countries and participate in networking and connecting various education and non-educations stakeholders from both sides. Another advantage is also potential of intercultural communication, exchange of opinion and experiences through joint work and efforts which leads again to better results for both universities and countries. Chinese partners and delegations who visited BiH, may acquire new knowledge and experience as well as different view on the country which was practically unknown to them. Through the daily contact and work with colleagues in the institute and University, they are able to get wider picture on the situation. Another opportunity for both universities is to establish Sinology studies both in Sarajevo and Banjaluka thus enabling new generation better insight in the Chinese language and culture, which will lead to establishing of future experts and eventually better cooperation between the countries. The official Hanban stance is that it helps local institutions of higher education in establishing study programs and institutes for learning Chinese language. In case of Banja Luka, we have the confirmation of this approach because the Institute as we stated already was initiated from the local side with the support of local government. The number of students studying Chinese at institutes increases as well as the number of students passing HSK tests (official internationally recognized test for Chinese language). Total number of students who registered for testing both in Sarajevo and Banja Luka was 80. This also represents good basis for future study programs of Chinese language. Also students at CI have different motives for studying Chinese. Except of those interested in Chinese culture or wanting to improve their career options, there is also a group choosing Chinese out of curiosity or wanting to have fun with different language. The last group is not stable, they are usually not willing to pay for courses and this group does not help providing sustainability of CIs. On the other hand we can see that students of CI are very active and open public with the power not only to consume cultural content but to use the content in accordance with their needs and wishes. If we look at the introduction of Chinese language as the major at the both Universities, we may confirm that both CIs in BiH fulfilled in a relative short period one of the main objectives by introducing Chinese language as the major at the Faculties of Philosophy in Sarajevo and Faculty of Philology in Banja Luka. Another issue left to be

resolved is sustainability a relying on local resources and professors for continuity. This issue can be resolved by continued investment in training and development of local professors of Chinese language. When we talk about Chinese culture, based on survey conducted amongst Banja Luka CI students, traditional Chinese dance, calligraphy and Taiji are well accepted and there is a deep understanding for these aspects of Chinese culture. Parallel to this, we also introduced modern China to the students because we are of opinion that modern elements and impact on globalization on China are equally important in understanding China and getting the whole picture on Chinese role in the world today. Banja Luka University does not have scientific researches based on China or the tradition of Asian studies, hence this type of academic initiative comes from the Confucius Institute. In November 2012, HANBAN announced the study program of Confucius China Research Program aiming to provide support to the researchers and to create new generation of sinologists or experts in Chinese studies.⁶⁶ Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have many academic papers on the topic of China and we hope this will improve in future with the impetus given from the two CIs and the new generation of sinologists that will be educated at the Universities of Sarajevo and Banja Luka.

Conclusion

The afore-mentioned activities related to the first two objectives such as language and culture promotion are successfully fulfilled by both CIs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Whether CIs serve and have a role in the Chinese public diplomacy by promoting the image of China as the traditional values country can also be confirmed. Besides the official reference to the “harmonious world” and harmony promotion in the HANBAN mission we refer here to the various officials’ visit and the CI role seen as the diplomatic branches. As a confirmation to this statement we state high officials’ visit to CIs, deputy governor of Tianjin to CI Banja Luka. Belgrade CI participated at the banquet organized in honor of the President Xi Jinping for example.⁶⁷ Unlike authors who state that the problem of “real China” perception and “politically correct China” which represents the issue for the public in Western countries, we may conclude that such issue does not exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina where China is not dominantly viewed as authoritative political system but as friendly country which does not interfere BiH internal affairs, additional opportunity for better international positioning (Republika Srpska) and source of projects and new funds (BiH Federation). Unlike propaganda, public diplomacy does

⁶⁶Ibid, p. 183

⁶⁷ Xiamen University, the Souther Base of HANBAN, Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Serbia Confucius Institute in Belgrade performs at welcome banqu, published at 23.06.2016., available from <http://ocia.xmu.edu.cn/en/news/hanban/2016-09-06/65.html>, accessed on 21 May 2018

not presume one-sided message transferring and Confucius institutes are example of that since their structure of joint venture indicates participation and cooperation of both universities and both countries. In the conclusion we shall emphasize that overall organization of Confucius Institutes as public diplomacy tools is useful for both sides. China gets the opportunity to promote not only language and culture but to tell its side of the story and introduce its vision which refers to Chinese development but global order too. Institutes in Bosnia and Herzegovina have a chance to introduce the language which was not available at the main two Universities, academic development in the sense of new research programs and promotion and networking of universities within the network of cooperation of Central and Eastern Europe and wider as well as more successful internationalization for both universities. When compared to the research in the Western countries the impact is not the same, and quoting Hartig who states that China is the one that have advantages because it uses local resources to develop its ideas and realize its interest⁶⁸, we oppose by showing mutual interest for both or three parties participating in the process. Basedes, this case study, exposure to language and culture of the bigger number of CI students showed itself as efficient in expanding the knowledge and understanding of China and acquiring more realistic picture of China and its system of values. This Case study is narrowly focused on BiH only and it requires more comparison with other countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as other countries. The paper was written under special circumstances during Corona virus which additionally may impact perception of the people in BiH. So far based on the random interviews China is still perceived as the country that will help Bosnia and Herzegovina by following the example of Serbia which received significant medical assistance from China. Additional value to the topic would be added by the comparative approach since the public in different countries with CIs also have different perception of China and its public diplomacy and soft power.

⁶⁸Ibid, p. 188

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