

WORKING PAPER

The media reporting on China's development in Lithuania: the typology of China's sentiment analysis

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Abstract

The article aims to understand the forms and the patterns, according to which the reporting in media and in publicly-presented personal accounts on China in general and on China's economic development in particular takes place in Europe. The focus has been narrowed on the case of the Lithuanian media reporting and the personal accounts which directly or indirectly address the phenomenon of China's economic growth. Three data sources were used for collecting the data for this analysis: firstly, the repository of the printed media publications included in the national text corpus of the contemporary Lithuanian language (covering the period from ca. 2005 to 2010), secondly, the online media archive of the news and the broadcasts of the Lithuanian national television and radio (covering the period since ca. 2012), and, thirdly, the user-generated content on the Facebook social network which is publicly available through the search function on Facebook.

The methodology used for the analysis of the data is based on the interdisciplinary approach combining insights from the philosophy of language and the post-colonial theory with the methods of textual analysis, including a sentiment analysis. In this study the application of the concept of the language-game by Ludwig Wittgenstein was applied to develop the typology of the language practices related to the coverage of China and China's development that could be applicable case-free. The analysis has showed that all three types of China-describing practices in media (the positive, the neutral and the negative one) are corresponding to the notion of "Orientalism", - the term introduced by Edward Said to describe the formative perception of the Western world which sees the rest of the world as being static and underdeveloped. This entrenched thinking persists even in the cases such as China when the country comes to motion and starts developing very rapidly.

The sentiment analysis of the media texts has helped to establish a working typology of the pre-defined language practices used when communicating about China. It is shown that when the positive sentiments are evoked the language-game rule used portrays China as a passive agent mainly responding to the outside actions of the Western world. In such cases China's development is often described as a result of the outside influences rather than the result and/or a confluence of its internal economic, social and/or political factors.

In the neutral stories the language-game rule used presents China as an object with no or a limited agency (a semi-active agent of a kind). In such cases China's development is presented as a sum of factors which could be of both internal and external nature yet which are in line with the factors governing the Western world. Thus, China is portrayed as a world's consumer and a citizen of the global economic order which trades, plans, produces and has aspirations to improve its lot by becoming a more disciplined partner in the global trade.

In the negative stories the language-game rule adopted describes China as the Other which is threatening the existing world order whether directly or indirectly, that is by allying with the perceived Others posing a similar or even greater real and/or perceived threat to the existing global order. In such cases China's development is described as a result of the internal forces. A negative China is portrayed as the pro-active (not a passive) actor pursuing a somewhat hidden agenda. The texts that convey the negative sentiments usually use direct negations and the negative connotations to strengthen the sentiment of adversity.

When comparing media reports with the personal accounts from China a noticeable difference is detected. The analysis has shown that the accounts on China's development given by the people who came into direct contact with the country integrate their specific personal experiences sharing the insights from China without ideological predispositions which defy the binary opposition purported by the logic of "Orientalism", which hinders to regard China's economic development in similar terms as the development of any other country.

Introduction

The rapid economic development of China since the 1990s which at its peak times (during the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s) saw the GDP growth reaching more than 14 per cent coupled with the investments in the infrastructure especially after the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 (reportedly more than 10 trillion USD was invested between 2009 and 2016) generated a great wealth of media coverage globally (1), (2).

Concomitantly, this led to the increased interest from both the media organizations and the academics to analyse the media coverage of China in order to make sense of what was happening and how. In 2013 Daniel Griffiths, a senior journalist at the BBC World Service and a former China correspondent, carried out the content analysis of how China was represented on the online sites of the New York Times, BBC News and the Economics. In his brief research paper entitled "The international media coverage of China: Too narrow an agenda" Griffiths, after having had surveyed the China coverage over the unidentified period of two weeks in the autumn of 2013, reported that "China is an increasingly important player in global affairs but there is very little research on how it is presented in the international media. This matters because even in today's increasingly interconnected world the media can often influence our perceptions of other countries." (3)

He noted that despite the overall interest in the topic of the world's perception of China there was a lack of scholarly analysis. The existing studies have covered only a limited source base (for example, Zengjun Peng looked at the coverage of China in the US media, specifically, in the New York Times and Los Angeles Times, (4)) or covered the limited time period (for example, Alexander Liss analysed the images of China in the US printed media during the period 2000- 2002, (5)). Even when it came to the analysis carried out at a more abstract level which would allow to draw the conclusions from the particular empirical material, the focus of such analyses was not so much on the content of the media coverage but on the internal political context examining the "framing" of such coverage in a certain pre-defined way. A typical example of such approach is Li Zhang's "The Rise of China: media

perception and implications for international politics” (6) which, although is based on a longitudinal study which examined the nature of Chinese media coverage and explored how the image of a rising China was reported in three transnational newspapers in Europe, aimed to answer, first of all, the question related to the impact of the analysed media reports. Zhang’s research question was formulated as following: “Has the image of China as a rising power had any impact on the country's soft power?”. In this case the analysis was geared towards explaining the media reporting on the basis of the specific context (in this case, the factor of the impact on soft power) rather the content of the media reports.

Thus, in 2013 Griffiths, though to a limited extent, attempted to at least outline some of the key issues which further research could potentially illuminate as related to the typology of the media reception of China on the basis of the content analysis. He emphasized that the current coverage of China is dominated by just five themes suggesting a narrow news agenda, namely, the economy, politics, foreign affairs and national security, human rights and the environment. According to his analysis, these five areas accounted for 107 stories or 83% of all China coverage during the two weeks when he analysed the coverage in the main UK economic news outlets. Of these five areas just two areas - politics and economics – accounted for more than half of all stories covered. Griffiths noted that each area was framed by a specific narrative, around which the media coverage was concentrated. He gave an example that nearly half of all political coverage involved stories about the case of corruption among high-ranking officials, while three quarters of all environment stories concerned the issues of pollution. Interestingly enough, the areas such as society and social change, culture, or science and technology where no single narrative could be easily adopted received a minimal coverage. More importantly, Griffiths noted that “current China news agenda appears to be fairly narrow and is perhaps missing important narratives that might also help to explain the enormous transformation currently underway in China” (6). His analyses indicated the direction for further research.

A more detailed analysis of China’s coverage by the global media outlets was done only in 2017 by Guoming Yu and Mengyu Wang from Beijing Normal University and Renmin University respectively (8). Contrary to the previous analyses which were quite limited in terms of the data used and the research scope, the Chinese researchers focused on the content analysis of 18 English-language media reports (altogether 1088 articles which appeared during the period of between 1 January 2004 and 31 December 2014 were included in the analysis). The text analysis was complemented with in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted with nine foreign news correspondents based in Beijing who represented the key media organizations from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Japan, Malaysia and Brazil. However, their study had major limitations: the researchers focused on the analysing the media reporting on the capital city Beijing, which, though could be regarded by a way of approximation of China at large might not fully correspond to the reporting on the whole of country. However, their analysis yielded some important insights. It has shown that when it comes to the reporting on a particular city a more granular approach is observed and a wider variety of topics and themes come into play in media reporting. During the analysed ten-year period (2004-2014) 30 per cent of the coverage

of Beijing was dedicated to societal issues, 23 per cent to ecology, almost 20 per cent to sports and culture, 14 per cent to politics and only 10 per cent to economics. This showed that there is a difference between the reporting on China as a whole from the global perspective done by the global media organizations (which have some sort of representation in the country) and the reporting done on China from the perspective of a city such as the reporting from and on Beijing.

The key to this difference has been captured by Yu and Wang in the interviews with the Beijing-based foreign correspondents who explained that they took a very personal role in their reporting from China and saw their function more as go-betweens and mediators rather than just reporters in a narrow sense of this term; “they tended to see themselves as an interpreter or explainer. They believed their audience had little understanding of China and were steeped in stereotypes” (9).

The research scope and methodology

The presented article aims to follow up on the latest research on the perception of China and picks up the open question indicated by all previous researchers, which see the lack of a more systematic and structured approach as the main deficiency in trying to uncover the meaning and the relevance of media coverage on China. Thus, the aim of this article is to develop and present a conceptual framework for the analysis of the media stories and personal accounts about China’s (with the main focus on its economic development) and to test it on the clearly defined analytical case – the reports reflecting China’s economic development as they appeared on the internet portal www.lrt.lt of the national radio and television of Lithuania (which is viewed daily on average by 30 per cent of all viewers in the country, around 800 thousand people out of 2,6 million TV viewers in Lithuania, according to the latest TV audience survey reports (10)) over the last 10 years. The preparation of the conceptual framework was done using the results from the survey of the printed media reports mentioning China or different aspects of China’s development as included in the official repository of the Corpus of Contemporary Lithuanian Language Text database, an electronic resource which has been developed since 1992 to serve as the primary resource for philological, statistical, sociological or other enquiries related to the use of language units. The conclusions drawn from the analysis of the media reports have been juxtaposed with the personal accounts of several opinion leaders (i.e., the individuals with high-approval rates in social domain as measured by the number of followers and the likes received/generated for their posts or messages) which appeared on Facebook, the most popular social media network in Lithuania (more than one third of inhabitants of Lithuania are users of Facebook; in 2018 the number of Facebook users in Lithuania was 1,05 million (11), making it as important media channel as the broadcasts of the national television and radio.

The method proposed for this analysis is based on the fundamental principle that language is not neutral and it is through the use of language that a person formulates, puts across and understands the meaning of text. The main contribution to the understanding of how language acquires a certain meaning which is transmitted through speech acts was done by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) who dedicated his philosophical enquiries to the fields of logic, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. In his posthumously published work entitled “Philosophical Investigations” (prepared for publication in 1946, published in 1953), Wittgenstein proposed to view language and its building units not as a constant with a pre-defined meaning as codified in the grammars and the lexicons but as a result of a perceived action which indicates a change related to a particular unit of language. In other words, his idea was that the words we use are

the result of actions we take rather than vice versa. Wittgenstein suggested thinking of language as a multiplicity of language-games within which parts of language develop and function. The notion of the language-game as the key element in the use of language is described in sections 2, 19 and 23 of his *Philosophical Investigations*. In Section 2 of the tract he describes a thought experiment which though yet does not explicitly explain the concept of the language-game yet implicitly indicates the essence of a language practice he would call a language-game. Here is what Wittgenstein writes in this passage:

Let us imagine a language ...The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones; there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar", "slab", "beam". A calls them out; - B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. (12)

In Section 19 Wittgenstein ponders deeper into this phenomenon:

It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle. Or a language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering yes and no. And innumerable others. And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. Because if you shout "Slab!"; you really mean: "Bring me a slab";.

But how do you do this: how do you mean that while you say "Slab!";? Do you say the unshortened sentence to yourself? And why should I translate the call "Slab!"; into a different expression in order to say what someone means by it? And if they mean the same thing---why should I not say: "When he says "Slab!";?"

Again, if you can mean "Bring me the slab";, why should you not be able to mean "Slab!";? But when I call "Slab!"; then what I want is that he should bring me a slab! Certainly, but does "wanting this"; consist in thinking in some form or other a different sentence from the one you utter? (13)

He concludes in Section 23 providing us with a variety of examples of language-games in a form of the list of examples to give us a sense of "the multiplicity of language-games" and their applicability for textual analysis:

*Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements –
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) –
Reporting an event –
Speculating about an event –
Forming and testing a hypothesis –
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams –
Making up a story; and reading it –
Play-acting –
Singing catches –
Guessing riddles –
Making a joke; telling it –
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic –
Translating from one language into another –
Asking, thinking, cursing, greeting, praying." (14)*

To summarize, the language-game is a speech act which is a rule-guided language practice. According to Wittgenstein, in order to examine language practices we can approach them in the same way we would do in the case of an unknown game whose rules we want to learn. Watching any game

for the first time one would conclude that the actions performed by the participants are not random, that not all moves are equally possible in all circumstances, that not all moves are equivalent, and so on. Gradually we would come to understand the value of the game elements, the purpose of the game, and other elements.

In his concluding treatise entitled “On Certainty” (*Über Gewissheit*, in German), which was composed from the notes of the author taken two years before his death and published only in 1969-1975, Wittgenstein argued for any rule-guided way of attributing meaning to events (15). Thus, if one can identify the rule-based attribution of meaning to the texts on a certain topic, one would be able to better apprehend the existing limitations set by those rules and, perhaps, to learn how to overcome them.

Thus, when applying the concept of the language-game to the analysis of the international media coverage of a larger unknown entity such as China or an equally unknown and complex phenomenon China’s economic development, one should look beyond the words and their frequency in the text but search for the set of rules which guide the language practices in this particular case.

Hence, in order to apply this approach the analysis of the texts referring to China’s economic development will focus on the understanding on the rules which imply actions in those texts. This will be done by analysing the actions to which the references to China’s development in the media texts are made. A working typology of rule-based language-games which shape the media reporting will be presented and validated as a result.

The data and the data analysis

Three sets of data have been analysed for the purposes of this article. The first set of data was collected by querying the online repository “The Corpus of Contemporary Lithuanian Language” (*Dabartinės lietuvių kalbos tekstynas*, in Lithuanian) hosted by the Centre of Computational Linguistics at Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas and available for public access (17). The search conditions included the query for the word “Kinija” (China, in English) in 100 sources under the category “Publicistika” (literary Publicism in English, or, more precisely, Non-fiction). This query generated 400 textual fragments from the printed media covering (with few exceptions) the period from 2005 to 2008, the period corresponding to the period when the text corpus was put together. This dataset helped to identify the media coverage of China’s development in the period which saw the first wave of economic growth in China (prior to the global financial crisis in 2008-2009). Each textual fragment contained an extract from an article in which a specific reference to China’s development was made. The analysis of the extracts enabled to identify the “rule”, according to which China was used in a particular language-game, to use Wittgenstein’s term. A rule for each extract was defined on the basis of the verb which was used directly or implicitly to describe the phenomenon of China’s development in each observed media coverage instance. From the analysis of 400 textual extracts it was possible to identify 224 verbs which have been classified using the sentiment analysis approach. The classification helped to establish the polarity of a given extract according to the assessment of the verb as being positive, negative, or neutral. A table providing the example of such classification is provided below.

Table 1: The example of the sentiment analysis of the analysed fragments

A fragment of text as generated from the text corpus searched	A Verb manually extracted from the analysed textual fragment	Type of Sentiment classified
“In June EU and China agreed to limit the import of textiles...” (the entry dated 4 June, 2005)	Agreed	Positive
“China is planning to increase its Gold Reserves...” (the entry dated 19 August, 2005)	Planning	Neutral
“European Commission is complaining that China is hindering the trade...”	Hindering	Negative

The sentiment analysis has showed that a largely neutral sentiment dominated the media coverage of China’s development in the Lithuanian printed media during the period 2005-2008. The distribution of the sentiment is presented in Table 2. The frequency percentage is calculated by dividing the number of the categorized extracts from the overall number of the extracted fragments which contained a verb or another figure of speech which enabled to conduct the sentiment analysis (the total number of the analysed fragments was 224 out of the overall 400 fragment extracted from the text corpus).

Table 2: The distribution of the frequency of different types of sentiment observed in the analysed fragments

Type of Sentiment	Examples of verbs linked with the identified type of sentiment	Frequency
Positive	Agreed, making an effort, invests, is of interest, recognizes, start realizing, wants, will establish, will collaborate, signed, supported	11,1%
Neutral	Can become, can sell, consumes, decided, developing, has, imports, informed, involved, is not against, is ready, plans, offers, regards, produces, remains, sleeping, trades, will announce, will become, would like	61,6%
Negative	Behaves not nice, cancelled, demands, deteriorated, does not take into consideration, did not sign, hinders, is against, is a threat, limited, occupies, overwhelmed, plans to bloc, strictly protests, will make use of, will not agree, will not adhere to, will not import, will not recognize.	27,3%

The above analysis helped to identify that the language-games regarding the media coverage of China’s developed are based on three different types sentiment that individual

reports carry with them: namely, the positive sentiment, the neutral sentiment and the negative sentiment.

When the positive sentiment is invoked, the rule is used to portray China as an entity which is a passive actor responding to the initiatives from outside. Interestingly enough, in such cases China’s development is seen as a result of the outside influences rather than the result of its internal economic, social or even political factors. In other words, the positive things which happen with China are always portrayed either directly or indirectly as the result of the influences of the outside world.

When the neutral sentiment is invoked, the rule is used to present China as an entity with no or limited agency (a semi-active actor). In such cases China’s development is a sum of factors which could be of both internal and external nature. Thus, China is portrayed as a world’s consumer and a citizen of the global economic order which trades, plans, produces, announces and has some aspirations to become even better trade and producing country globally.

When the negative sentiment is invoked, the rule is used to describe China as the opposing actor, “the Other”, which is threatening the existing world order. In such cases China’s development is seen as a result of the internal forces. Hence, a negative China is always portrayed as the pro-active actor with a somewhat hidden agenda and this sentiment is expressed through the use of the negative verbs and the negative connotations.

The working typology of the media coverage of China and China’s development is summarized in Table 3.

Table 3: The typology of presenting China and China’s development in the Western media

Type of Sentiment	China’s representation	Perceived Drivers of China’s development	China’s implied relation to the Western world
Positive	Passive agent	External factors	Responsive to the impulses from the Western world
Neutral	Agent with a limited agency	A mixture of external and internal factors	Developing in line with the Western world
Negative	Pro-active agent	Internal factors	Pursuing a somewhat hidden agenda towards the Western world

Such a clear-cut sentiment based rule regarding the media reporting on China and China’s development can be explained by analysing the underlying mental frameworks which have governed the perception of “the Orient” from the position of the colonizing (mostly,

Western) powers. In 1978 Edward W. Said in his path-breaking book entitled “Orientalism” (which has become since the foundation text in the field of post-colonial culture studies) introduced the term Orientalism as the overarching mode of representation of the societies and peoples who inhabit the former colonial or formerly semi-dependent parts of the global world system. He argued that “the Western scholarship of the Eastern World” which he referred to as Orientalism was inextricably tied to the imperialist societies (namely, the societies which inherited the former empires) who produced it, which, as he argued, makes much of Orientalism inherently political and servile to power (17).

Interestingly enough, China scholars presumed that Orientalism had not affected the China field of study and consequently this concept was regarded as being irrelevant for the development of the sinology studies (18).

Although the relation between Orientalism and the perception of China is still debated and it remains outside the remit of this article to go deeper into the possible interplays between the two, yet there are indications that the impact of Orientalism could be more profound than was considered until then. This realization comes from the analyse of the media coverage of China’s development which shows the rigid structures shaping the media stories which tend to follow the logic of Orientalism – that a non-Western country has to be static and underdeveloped by default unless it is impacted by the Western world as the shaper and the main influencer.

In order to test the hypothesis that the description of China is based on three types of the language practices each portraying China in a pre-defined way as summarized in Table 3, the second step in the analysis of the media coverage in Lithuania was taken analysing the news and the broadcast coverage on China’s development as they appeared on the news portal of the national television and radio. The time scope was defined to reflect the period when Lithuania became engaged with China in a more systematic way as part of the 16+1 initiative since 2012. The content for analysis was made available through the search function of the Lithuania’s television and radio media archive “Mediateka”. The query “Kinija (China)” with the filter limiting the search for the news items categorized as economics news generated 729 entries covering the period from 2012 to 2018 (19). In order to narrow down the search only the items which appeared during the period between 1 January 2018 and 1 October 2018 were considered: altogether 137 news entries were analysed which were published on the news portal of the Lithuanian national television and radio www.lrt.lt.

The same typology has been applied which yielded the results (Table 4).

Table 4: The distribution of the sentiment of the news coverage in 2018 comparing to the analysis of the coverage in 2005-2010

Type of Sentiment	Number of Items	Frequency	Frequency as observed for the period 2005-2010 (as listed in Table 1	Change
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			above)	
Positive	25	18,25%	11,1%	+7,15%
Neutral	98	72,53%	61,6%	+9,93%
Negative	14	10,22%	27,3%	-17,08%

The analysis of the news coverage by the Lithuania national television and radio during the period from January to October 2018 has showed that the majority of the coverage is following the neutral approach. The neutrality comes from the fact that in most of such reports Lithuania acts as an observer to China's standoff with the United States (which, in many cases of media stories, is personified by using the name of President Donald Trump rather than the name of the country) over the trade tariffs without taking any position.

This confirms the proposed typology where in the neutral cases China is presented as a semi-active actor which is acting due the mixture of the internal and external factors; in such cases the actors being Trump and the free trade policies. The positive stories, as the typology suggests, describe China as being a collaborating partner of the global economic order while the negative ones are touching upon China's threats to that order.

The comparison with the frequency of each type of sentiment involved in the media reports from the previously analysed period (2005-2010) shows that the national television and radio being more sensitive to the official policies of the country (especially as concerning the foreign affairs) tends to take a more neutral positive and outwardly negative sentiments are less frequent than the positive ones. The latter are enforced by the coverage of the news related to the official exchanges and visits accomplished by the government officials from both sides, as reported by the news agencies. However, even in the case of the official media coverage the proposed typology, which, as this paper argues, conforms to the logic of Orientalism, indicates a similar pattern in defining the sentiments in the reports covering China and China's economic development.

In order to understand if such typology is valid for the personal accounts of the individuals, including the opinion leaders, which deal with China and China's development on a more personal level and who came into a direct experience with China's economic development, the search of the user-generated content on Facebook has been done using the same query conditions as was the case for the printed media and the online media repositories. The query of the Facebook posts was done with the keyword "Kinija (China)" (20). The query yielded 154 posts. Most of the post were related to the tourist experiences and were not direct linked to or reflecting upon China's economic development. Only four opinions were directly related to the commenting on the observed phenomenon of China's economic growth. Those came from four persons of stature, some of which are important opinion leaders or public opinion influencers.

The analysed texts on China's development were publicly posted on Facebook (20) by the Minister of Economy Virginijus Sinkevičius (who visited China on several occasions in

2018), by the then Vice-Mayor of the city of Alytus Tautvydas Tamulevičius (who also spent some time in China in 2018), the influential economist, the Head Economist of Swedbankas in Lithuania, Nerijus Mačiulis (who was on a visit to China) and the business person Kęstutis Černeckas, CEO of a number of companies (who briefly shared his impressions upon returning from the visit to China).

None of their opinions could fit the proposed typology for analysing the media coverage of China's development. Their texts contained no clear biases and were formed by personal impressions. Hence, the critical analysis of each of their opinion piece was done in order to identify the positives and the negatives that they identified in reflecting upon their experience of China's economic development. The summary of the analysis is presented in Table 5.

Table 5: The analysis of the Facebook post of the opinion leaders or opinion shapers on Facebook

Author of the Facebook post, the date of the post	Positive aspects noted	Neutral or negative aspects noted
Virginijus Sinkevičius, 8 June, 2018	The most important and most growing market Huge potential Increase of Lithuania's exports High demand for Lithuanian goods Appreciation for Lithuanian amber Opportunity to bring investments	None
Tautvydas Tamulevičius, 25 June, 2018	The greatness of the country and the market More opportunities for us Success cases from other 16+1 countries	None
Nerijus Mačiulis, 8 June, 2018	Impressive growth and economic change Entrepreneurship and business savviness Feeling that we are lagging behind China in some areas, for example, in application of mobile payments and the smartphone-driven communication culture Free economic zones	Surveillance in public places in the country are acknowledged in neutral terms as contributing to public safety
Kęstutis Černeckas, 6 November 2017	Feeling that we are lagging behind China in some areas Appreciation of the rapid change and the speed of economic growth	None

The analysis of the opinions publicly expressed by the important opinion leaders and opinion influencers have showed that the logic of their texts does not correspond to the pre-conceived notion of "Orientalism" as shaping the media coverage. There is a need to further

explore this issue by analysing the influence that a personal encounter with China makes on the sentiments as expressed in the texts and analyse impact of the media institutions in purporting the dominant patterns in presenting China's development in certain ways.

Conclusions

The main conclusion of the conducted analysis of the media coverage of China using the case of Lithuania (which has had limited contacts and exposure to China throughout the history and the contemporary period) is that the media coverage of China's development is schematic and tends to position the country as being the Other to the global economic order as defined by the Western powers. This position is partially mitigated through the bilateral relations, as exemplified in the case of the most recent coverage of China-related news items in the Lithuania television and radio). But a complete different picture emerges from observing the social media (such as Facebook) where a popular voice does not fit the pre-defined schemes, especially where it comes to the personal accounts of China witnessed by the people came into contact with China. Hence, a more detailed analyses is needed to identify the patterns of the reception of China in the social networks.

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20) A query was done using a personal account on Facebook via <http://www.facebook.com>

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