Shifts in the China–US Power Balance and the Structural Rebalancing of Asia-Pacific Value Chains

China Watch Vol. 6, No. 39, September 2026

 

Shifts in the China–US Power Balance and the Structural Rebalancing of Asia-Pacific Value Chains

Cheng Xinxuan and Song Changyu

 

 

The global political landscape, international order, and distribution of power are being profoundly reshaped. As a pivotal variable in the contemporary international system, the dynamics of the China–US relationship significantly influence the evolution of both global and regional orders. The Asia-Pacific region stands as one of the most economically dynamic areas of the present century. Characterized by diversity, large scale, and stable growth, it is crucial to China’s pursuit of high-standard opening-up and its “dual circulation” development strategy. Since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), China has gradually moved from the periphery to the core of global industrial chains, becoming a crucial link connecting developed and developing nations. However, since the United States imposed additional tariffs on China in 2018, trade friction between the two nations has intensified. Through measures such as tariffs, export controls, and investment reviews, the United States has intervened in the cross-border allocation of certain key industrial chains, thereby placing Asia-Pacific value chains under new restructuring pressure. At the same time, regional economic cooperation continues to deepen, with the Asia-Pacific region exhibiting distinct characteristics: a coexistence of competition and cooperation, and an intertwining of fragmentation and integration.

Compared with existing research, the marginal contribution of this paper lies primarily in three areas. First, it integrates the shifting China–US power balance with the rebalancing of value chain structures in the Asia-Pacific into a unified analytical framework; on a foundation combining historical evolution with contemporary restructuring, it examines the logic behind adjustments to the regional division of labor. Second, it systematically reveals the respective levels of integration, influence, and interdependence of China and the United States within Asia-Pacific value chains;

Third, it proposes a structural assessment of “localized competitive parallelism alongside holistic, intertwined synergy,” arguing that while regional value chains are diverging in key technological fields, they continue to exhibit the characteristics of a dynamically balanced network under the constraints of large-scale demand, cost-based checks and balances, and institutionalized regional cooperation.

 

  1. How the structure of Asia-Pacific value chains has evolved

Asia-Pacific value chains have not evolved along a linear process of substitution driven by a single nation; rather, their restructuring process has been gradually shaped through the combined influences of continuously expanding global production networks, deepening regional institutional cooperation, and shifting power dynamics among major powers. Their restructuring has manifested in different historical stages as changes in the dominant forces, organizational modes, and embedding structures in the regional division of labor, and in the new regional landscape and rebalanced order that has emerged. To this end, this paper examines the historical evolution of the Asia-Pacific value chain division-of-labor system, tracing its progression from the “flying-geese” pattern led by Japan to the formation of regional production networks driven by US final demand, followed by the expansion of these networks fueled by China’s deep integration, and finally the restructuring and adjustment phase following the 2008 global financial crisis. Additionally, the paper analyzes the emerging landscape and characteristics of Asia-Pacific value chains shaped by the interplay of shifting power dynamics between China and the US, technological diffusion, institutional adjustments, and the reorganization of factors of production.

 

(1) The evolution of the division of labor in Asia-Pacific value chains

The first stage, spanning from the 1960s to the mid-1980s, was characterized by a Japan-led division of labor following the “flying geese” pattern. Acting as the “lead goose” and leveraging its advantages in technology, capital, and industrial policy, Japan gradually relocated labor-intensive manufacturing processes to Asia’s “Four Little Dragons” and other emerging economies, and subsequently expanded this shift to developing economies like those in ASEAN. Latecomer economies integrated into regional value chains through processing, manufacturing, and labor-intensive activities, leading to continuously deepening regional production linkages and interdependence. Overall, Asia-Pacific value chains during this period were centered on Japan; driven by cost and technological disparities, it diffused across the region in a tiered manner, creating a multi-layered division of labor extending from the core to the periphery.

The second stage, spanning from the mid-to-late 1980s through the late 1990s, was characterized by the formation of regional production networks driven by US final demand. As Japan’s economy entered a downturn and the comparative advantages of other Asian economies shifted, Japan’s role as a functional hub within regional value chains gradually diminished. Meanwhile, the outsourcing of production by multinational corporations and the expansion of global supply chains steadily strengthened the US role in driving the Asia-Pacific division of labor. US enterprises primarily controlled high-value-added segments such as overall architectural design, product R&D, and brand operations; economies like Japan and South Korea handled the production of key components; and other Asia-Pacific economies engaged in processing, manufacturing, and final assembly—thereby forming a regional production network driven by final demand from the United States. On one hand, this system strengthened intra-regional trade in intermediate goods and production linkages; on the other, it led Asia-Pacific economies to largely orient their functional roles and structural configurations around the US market.

The third stage, spanning from the early 2000s to the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis, was characterized by China’s deep integration into the global economy and the expansion of regional production networks. Following its WTO accession, China rapidly integrated into global production networks by leveraging its advantages in labor supply, industrial support systems, and infrastructure, and it gradually emerged as a key manufacturing hub and supply node within Asia-Pacific value chains. While economies such as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore supplied capital goods, critical components, and technology-intensive intermediate goods, China undertook the functions of final processing, assembly, and export organization. As manufacturing scaled up and industrial systems became increasingly sophisticated, China gradually evolved from a mere processing hub into a central node within regional production networks; meanwhile, intra-Asia trade in intermediate goods surged, and the density and complexity of these production networks rose significantly. However, regional prosperity during this phase remained heavily reliant on extra-regional end markets like the United States, with relatively limited support from intra-regional demand.

The fourth phase, spanning the period since the 2008 global financial crisis, is characterized by the restructuring and adjustment of Asia-Pacific value chains. The crisis exposed the structural dependence of these value chains on final demand from outside the region and highlighted the vulnerabilities inherent in export-oriented division-of-labor systems. Subsequently, as economies such as China, ASEAN members, and India expanded their market sizes and enhanced their industrial capabilities, and as intra-regional linkages across production, distribution, and consumption progressively strengthened, Asia-Pacific value chains began shifting from a model driven primarily by external demand toward one that balances both internal and external economic cycles. Relying on its comprehensive manufacturing system, massive market, and capacity for regional resource allocation, China has gradually become a key hub in regional production networks, while the United States continues to exert significant influence over high-end technology, standard-setting, and critical rules. Since 2018, the United States has driven the restructuring of supply chains in highly sensitive sectors through policies such as tariffs, export controls, investment reviews, “de-risking,” and “friend-shoring.” During his first term, Donald Trump initiated a policy path of using trade restrictions, specifically “Section 301 investigations” and additional tariffs on China, to spur supply chain adjustments; his second term has further intensified the regional spillover effects of trade protectionism. Nevertheless, strong linkages remain in consumer electronics, general manufacturing, intermediate goods trade, and regional logistics. Consequently, Asia-Pacific value chains at this stage are not simply fracturing; instead, they are undergoing a process of continuous restructuring and reconfiguration.

 

(2) The new landscape of Asia-Pacific value chain restructuring

  1. A paradigm shift: from sole US traction to structural rebalancing driven by both the US and China

For a considerable period following the Cold War, the United States, leveraging its technological innovation capabilities, financial system, and consumer market scale, played a pivotal role in Asia-Pacific value chains by driving demand and providing institutional frameworks. However, as China joined the WTO and accelerated its integration into global production networks, its advantages in manufacturing capacity, industrial support ecosystems, and market scale gradually became apparent; consequently, the country evolved from a “world factory” focused primarily on final assembly into a comprehensive hub serving as a dual center for both regional production and demand. Asia-Pacific value chains have transitioned from a structure previously reliant on the United States as a singular end-market and technology hub to a dual-driver model shaped by the interplay of US advantages in technology and rules and Chinese strengths in manufacturing and market scale. The China–US relationship is no longer a simple dynamic of dominance and subordination; instead, it has evolved into a complex pattern of interaction, characterized by both complementarity and competitive rivalry, in which the two nations assume distinct functional roles across different segments of the industrial chain.

  1. Structural change: the reorganization of the regional division of labor led by the two major economies, China and the United States

In some of the supply chains led by the United States, sectors such as high-end chips, critical software, aerospace, and certain AI applications remain heavily concentrated in the United States and its technology partners. Conversely, in the supply chains led by China, industries such as consumer electronics, home appliances, automobiles, and new energy equipment make use of China’s large-scale production capabilities and supporting ecosystems to form a vast manufacturing network spanning East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. China and the United States occupy different tiers of technology and stages of production within global value chains, exhibiting structural complementarities in areas such as market size, industrial ecosystems, and capital flows, while simultaneously competing in technological innovation, rule-making, and control over critical nodes. This intertwined relationship of competition and cooperation ensures that Asia-Pacific industrial chains are both diversified and characterized by a high degree of synergy and resilience.

  1. Regional distribution: realignment of the geographical layout of Asia-Pacific value chains

With China’s rise, the distribution of industries has undergone significant changes. China’s influence has extended deeply across the Asia-Pacific region, particularly into Southeast Asia and countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative. Vietnam plays a prominent role in sectors such as electronics manufacturing and garment processing; Indonesia attracts investment in areas like new energy vehicles, batteries, and supporting manufacturing; and Laos and Myanmar serve as land-sea corridors and hubs for cross-border logistics. The signing of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area 3.0 agreement has further expanded the scope of cooperation to include the digital economy, the green economy, and supply chain connectivity, providing institutional support for the restructuring of regional industrial chains. The adjustment of geographical layout is not merely a simple relocation of industries outward; rather, it is a process of networked restructuring driven by the combined forces of external pressures and regional collaboration.

  1. Shifts in factors of production: the reallocation of technology, capital, and data within the Asia-Pacific region

As China continues to advance in areas such as R&D investment, innovation capabilities, intellectual property protection, and high-end manufacturing, and as the regional distribution of technological factors becomes increasingly diversified, it is gradually shifting its technological role within the Asia-Pacific value chain from that of a recipient to a provider and a leader in application. The rise of data as a factor of production and the advancement of artificial intelligence are further driving the reconfiguration of production factors; the structure of regional factor endowments is shifting from one driven by traditional labor and capital to a composite configuration powered by technology, data, and intelligent elements. The reallocation of technology, capital, and data is transforming the governance foundation of Asia-Pacific value chains from a model dominated by a single source to one supported by multiple sources, thereby enhancing the autonomy and resilience of regional industrial chains.

 

  1. China and the United States’ influence on Asia-Pacific value chains

Using the Asian Development Bank’s multiregional input-output database, this paper examines the influence of China and the United States across three dimensions: (1) value-added trade exports among Asia-Pacific economies; (2) the shares of Chinese and US value-added embodied in the gross trade of Asia-Pacific economies; and (3) the value chain interdependence between China and the United States on one hand and Asia-Pacific economies on the other. The first reflects regional production linkages and value chain flows, while the second captures the embedded influence of China and the United States on cross-border production involving other economies. As for the third, value chain dependency characterizes the relative positions and “stickiness” of China and the United States from both production and demand perspectives, within the context of regional structural rebalancing. Data on trade-in-value-added indicate that China’s position within regional production networks has risen significantly. Between 2000 and 2008, China’s value-added trade volume in the Asia-Pacific region rose from US$109.865 billion to US$489.106 billion, an increase of approximately 3.45-fold. While the United States and Japan led the region in value-added trade in 2000, by 2015, China had essentially completed its transformation into a supply hub for regional value chains. From 2015 to 2019, developing economies such as Cambodia, Vietnam, India, and Thailand saw significant growth in value-added trade, demonstrating that emerging market economies were also accelerating their integration into Asia-Pacific value chains. In 2021, China’s value-added exports to major Asia-Pacific economies reached US$1.270999 trillion, an increase of 17.84% over 2019, solidifying its position as the region’s largest source of value-added exports. This demonstrates that China has become a pivotal supply node within Asia-Pacific production networks, playing a crucial role in underpinning the stability of regional value chains throughout the phases of crisis and recovery.

In terms of the shares of US and Chinese value-added in total Asia-Pacific trade, the United States continues to exert greater influence than China within the region’s value chains; however, this influence followed a trajectory of rising from 2000 to 2008, declining from 2009 to 2012, and stabilizing between 2013 and 2021. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, the contraction of US consumer demand significantly weakened the regional division of labor driven by that demand, leading to a gradual decline in US influence within Asia-Pacific value chains. China’s influence is generally on the rise, gradually narrowing the gap with the United States. Leveraging its open market and comprehensive advantages in labor, capital, and technology, China is increasingly developing into a key hub for trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region, while the center of regional production and the division of labor is gradually shifting from Japan to China.

Value chain dependencies further reveal the asymmetry between China and the United States. From the production perspective, in 2021, the dependency level of China’s overall value-added generation on US end-user consumption was 3.01% (with figures of 5.61% for manufacturing and 1.96% for services), whereas the corresponding dependency level of the US on Chinese end-user consumption stood at 1.14% overall (3.97% for manufacturing and 0.82% for services). Therefore, from the production perspective, China remains more dependent on US market demand than the United States is on China, although US manufacturing has become significantly more reliant on end-user demand from China. Viewed over the long term, China’s external dependency on the production side is shifting from a pattern of concentrated reliance on a single source toward integration into a multi-node network. In 2000, China’s overall value-added generation relied on the US and Japan to the tune of 4.02% and 2.68%, respectively; by 2021, these figures had fallen to 3.01% and 0.92%. At the same time, China’s reliance on manufacturing demand from economies such as Vietnam, India, Mexico, and Australia has increased. This indicates that China is mitigating its singular dependence on a few developed economies through market diversification, shifting from vertical integration into developed-nation markets toward the horizontal expansion of regional markets.

The US production sector has undergone a distinct process of divergence and adjustment. Between 2000 and 2021, US reliance on China within value chains overall rose from 0.17% to 1.14%; specifically, reliance in the manufacturing sector increased from 0.56% to 3.97%, and in the services sector from 0.10% to 0.82%. During the same period, US reliance on certain traditional partners such as Japan and Singapore declined, while dependence on Asian economies like South Korea, India, Vietnam, and Indonesia increased; meanwhile, manufacturing ties with North American partners such as Canada and Mexico remained at a high level. This indicates that the United States has not simply withdrawn from existing production systems; rather, while its reliance on China has deepened, it has reconfigured its sources of supply within Asia. The asymmetry on the demand side is even more pronounced. In 2021, the reliance of US final consumption across the aggregate economy, manufacturing, and services, on Chinese value-added stood at 2.63%, 3.55%, and 2.14%, respectively; conversely, the reliance of US final consumption across the same sectors on Chinese value-added was 2.88%, 15.40%, and 1.11%, respectively. This is particularly true regarding final consumption of manufactured goods, where the United States’ reliance on China far exceeds China’s reliance on the United States. This implies that China has become a critical source within the US supply system for manufactured products; should the United States drastically curtail economic and trade ties with China regarding import demand, its domestic market could face the dual pressures of supply contraction and rising costs.

 

  1. Future trends in the development of Asia-Pacific value chains

(1) China–US rivalry and the divergence and rebalancing of value chains: driven by geopolitics and institutional rules

Strategic competition between China and the US has not altered the fundamental landscape of deeply intertwined value chains in the Asia-Pacific; however, it is significantly reshaping their spatial structure and institutional environment. Through measures such as technology export controls, outbound investment reviews, and supply chain “friend-shoring” and “de-risking,” the US is driving the restructuring of highly sensitive industrial chains based on security considerations. The result is not a simple fracturing of the entire value chain, but rather a reconfiguration driven by the triple constraints of political security, economic efficiency, and supply chain resilience: highly sensitive sectors may undergo restructuring centered on the United States and its allies, while sectors with low-to-medium sensitivity or high marketization will continue to operate around China and the broader Asia-Pacific network, governed by considerations of cost, market access, and production capacity.

 

(2) Technology-driven functional stratification: rebalancing within value chain restructuring

The United States retains a distinct advantage in areas such as semiconductor design, core software, aerospace, and foundational models for general-purpose artificial intelligence, while China is developing rapidly in sectors including new energy vehicles, photovoltaics and energy storage, 5G equipment, the industrial internet, and applied artificial intelligence. In the future, the United States and its allies will continue to exert significant influence at the level of upstream technologies and core standards. China, along with economies in East and Southeast Asia, will serve as the primary supply hubs for midstream large-scale manufacturing and system integration. At the level of downstream application innovation and the expansion of use cases, the United States, China, and other emerging market economies will engage in differentiated competition and cooperation driven by diverse market demands. Therefore, a functional structure characterized by “potential divergence upstream, high inter-embeddedness midstream, and diverse competition and cooperation downstream” is more likely to emerge, rather than a scenario of complete parallelization across the industrial chain.

 

(3) Regional institutional cooperation and value chain integration: regional connectivity under RCEP, CPTPP, and the Belt and Road Initiative

The RCEP fosters the integration of regional industrial chains through tariff concessions, rules of origin accumulation, improved market access for services and investment, and trade facilitation; the CPTPP sets a benchmark for rules in areas such as digital trade, competition policy, state-owned enterprises, and investment governance; and the Belt and Road Initiative strengthens spatial connectivity through infrastructure interconnectivity, cross-border logistics, and the Digital Silk Road. Overall, RCEP focuses on industrial integration, CPTPP on rule-setting, and the Belt and Road Initiative on spatial connectivity; together, they provide an institutional foundation for Asia-Pacific value chains to maintain basic connectivity and network resilience amidst pressures toward fragmentation.

 

(4) The concurrence of multipolarity and deep integration: structural rebalancing amidst shifting power dynamics between China and the United States

The United States will continue to play a pivotal role at the forefront of technology and in the shaping of rules, while China’s comprehensive advantages (technology application, large-scale manufacturing, expanding domestic demand, and institutional connectivity) will continue to underpin its status as an Asia-Pacific production and consumption hub. Economies such as Japan, South Korea, ASEAN members, India, and Australia will not simply become subordinate nodes to either side; instead, leveraging their specific industrial strengths and institutional platforms, they will assume multi-layered, multi-functional roles as intermediaries and pivotal points. Shifts in influence between China and the United States are more likely to manifest as a reconfiguration of areas of comparative advantage and a redistribution of value chain functions, rather than a simple zero-sum game of one side receding while the other advances. It is unlikely that Asia-Pacific value chains will evolve into two mutually isolated, parallel systems; instead, a dynamic structural rebalancing is more probable—one characterized by the coexistence of “localized competitive parallelism” and “overall intertwined synergy.”

 

  1. Policy recommendations

The Asia-Pacific value chain is shifting from a relatively concentrated, single-hub structure toward a networked system underpinned by multiple nodes and shaped by the dual influence of China and the United States. China faces external pressures arising from US “de-risking” strategies, competition over rules, and supply chain restructuring, yet it also possesses significant opportunities to forge a new equilibrium by deepening regional cooperation and elevating its position within the value chain division of labor. China should align with the trend of restructuring Asia-Pacific value chains, balance high-standard opening-up with the security of industrial and supply chains, deepen cooperation with regional economies, and drive the development of Asia-Pacific value chains toward greater stability, balance, and resilience.

First, we must advance the stability of Asia-Pacific value chains amidst rebalancing by fostering high-standard openness and building supply chain resilience. Leveraging multilateral and sub-regional cooperation platforms such as APEC and RCEP, we should further promote the integration of production processes, market connectivity, and technological collaboration. It is essential to strengthen coordination with economies in Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, and South Asia in terms of industrial cooperation, supply chain alignment, and logistics connectivity, thereby enhancing the regional networks’ capacity to withstand external shocks. At the same time, it is essential to maintain necessary dialogue and institutionalized communication with the United States, keep competition within controllable limits, prevent the rebalancing of value chains from being completely hijacked by security considerations, and achieve a coordinated balance between openness and security, as well as between synergy and resilience.

Second, we should proactively construct regional value chains by leveraging the RCEP and the Belt and Road Initiative. The focus should shift from a mere pursuit of export market share to prioritizing one’s position within regional networks. By capitalizing on institutional benefits, such as tariff reductions, rules of origin cumulation, and regulatory harmonization under the RCEP, a multi-tiered production and service network oriented toward ASEAN, South Asia, and Oceania should be established. This would entail maintaining domestic advantages in key segments and mid-to-high-end manufacturing while strategically relocating low-to-medium value-added segments that are suitable for transfer. Making use of the Belt and Road Initiative to advance the development of infrastructure, industrial parks, and digital platforms, we will effectively link external connectivity networks with domestic industrial upgrading, thereby enhancing China’s capacity for organization, connectivity, and resource allocation within Asia-Pacific production networks.

Third, we should proactively align with high-standard rules to enhance bargaining power and shaping capacity within the process of institutional rebalancing.

Building upon existing RCEP cooperation, efforts should be made to further advance the establishment of the China–Japan–Korea Free Trade Area and actively study high-standard rules such as those of the CPTPP. Pilot programs in areas including the digital economy, innovative technologies, trade in services, the green transition, digital trade, and cross-border data flows should be launched. Through bilateral or “minilateral” cooperation, the accumulated experience can gradually narrow institutional gaps. Leveraging external high standards to drive domestic structural reform will facilitate the alignment of domestic and international efforts toward institutional opening-up.

Fourth, we should establish a normalized prevention and control mechanism for the risks associated with China–US trade friction and conflict. Given the long-term and recurring nature of these tensions, they should be internalized as fundamental constraints within global and regional value chains. At the industrial and financial levels, key raw materials, core components, critical technologies, and vital markets should be managed through a classified and tiered approach. Meanwhile, supply chain resilience should be enhanced by diversifying markets, substituting imports with domestic products in critical areas, and establishing regional collaborative stockpiling. As for diplomatic, economic, and trade policies, it is essential to prudently balance “de-risking” with opposition to “decoupling,” uphold an open multilateral economic order, and avoid falling into a new cycle of insularity. At the same time, China should enhance its institutional appeal and cooperative ties within the multipolar Asia-Pacific network by providing regional public goods, such as trade, investment, finance, digital infrastructure, and support for green, low-carbon transition.

 

About the authors:

Cheng Xinxuan is Professor and Dean of the School of Economics, Hebei University; Song Changyu (corresponding author) is Associate Professor of the College of Economics and Management and Research Center for Rural Revitalization Strategy, Agricultural University of Hebei; email: swl402@hebau.edu.cn.

Source:

This article was originally published in Guoji jingji luntan (International Economic Review), 2026, no. 4. This is an abridged translation.

 

Translated by Thomas E. Smith