China Watch Vol. 6, No. 33, August 2026
The United States and Europe’s New Round of Investment Review Upgrades and China’s Response
Ruan Shuhui and Qi Tong
About the authors:
Ruan Shuhui is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Shanghai Research Center for Opening-up Strategy; Qi Tong is a Professor at the Institute of International Law, Wuhan University.
This article was originally published in Guoji jingji pinglun (International Economic Review), 2025(6).
Abstract:
In recent years, the United States and the European Union have advanced a new round of upgrades to their investment screening regimes. While continuing to strengthen security reviews of inbound foreign investment, they are seeking to establish mechanisms for screening outbound investment. This new round of upgrades has the following features: in terms of institutional structure, a rigorous system for controlling trade and investment, along with coordinated mechanisms, is being established by closing regulatory loopholes in outbound investment screening. As for strategic objectives, increasingly intense institutional checks and balances are being deployed against China, centered on competition over critical technologies. With regard to underlying values, the security imperatives of sovereign states are increasingly superseding the efficiency-driven logic of economic globalization, thereby impeding the free global flow of capital. As a primary target of investment screening by the US and EU, China can adopt a dual approach focusing on institutional refinement and strategic cooperation: it should continue to bolster its toolkit for legal engagement and improve its systems for foreign investment security reviews and outbound investment management; simultaneously, it should expand its circle of partners for investment and technology cooperation, strengthening ties with emerging and developing economies while collaborating with technology-neutral nations that possess high-level R&D institutions.
Key terms:
National security, key technologies, outbound investment review, foreign investment security review.
In recent years, economic and trade measures have been increasingly employed to pursue national security objectives, and investment review regimes based on national security grounds have seen a continuous trend of escalation in developed economies such as the United States and European Union. Since 2021, as technological competition among major powers has intensified, the United States and the European Union have grown increasingly anxious about maintaining their technological edge. Concerned that existing policy tools are inadequate to address the risk of technology leakage resulting from capital outflows, they have initiated a new round of upgrades to their investment review regimes, extending the scope of capital controls from inward foreign capital flows to outward domestic capital flows. The latest round of upgrades to investment screening regimes in the United States and European Union traces its origins to the US proposed “National Critical Capabilities Defense Act” of 2021. Since the successive issuance of the “Executive Order on Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern” (hereinafter referred to as the “Outbound Investment Screening Executive Order”) and the “America First Investment Policy” by two US administrations, alongside the EU’s release of the “European Economic Security Strategy” and the “European Economic Security Package,” the trajectory and characteristics of these upgrades have become increasingly clear, revealing a trend of continuous intensification.
- The path of the new round of upgrades to investment review regimes in the US and EU
Historically, the scope of investment screening in the United States and the European Union was limited to forms of foreign capital inflow, primarily cross-border mergers and acquisitions and greenfield investments by foreign investors, whereas the latest upgrades to these screening regimes not only reinforce security reviews for inbound foreign investment but also aim to close regulatory gaps regarding capital outflows. Therefore, the new round of upgrades to investment review regimes in the United States and the European Union discussed in this article refers to a comprehensive upgrading of these systems as a whole, encompassing both the strengthening of security reviews for inbound foreign investment and the closing of regulatory loopholes regarding outbound investment. Currently, the upgrading of investment review regimes in the US and the EU, which cover both capital outflows and inflows, is primarily taking place at the legislative and administrative levels.
(1) Establishing foreign investment review systems for key technology sectors
In the area of outbound investment screening, the United States initiated its legislative process earlier than the European Union, and its framework is more comprehensive and stringent. In 1923, following legislative setbacks, the US President issued rules on outbound investment screening via executive order, exercising authority granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the National Emergencies Act. To implement the “America First Investment Policy” championed by the Trump administration, the US recently incorporated a sub-act into the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, further expanding the scope of technologies subject to outbound investment screening.
Compared to the legislative initiatives in the United States, which began earlier and are broader in scope, the European Union’s legislative process for outbound investment screening started later. The 2023 “European Economic Security Strategy” proposed that, to safeguard the EU’s essential security interests, certain outbound investments need to be managed in order to address the risks of technology and knowledge leakage. The “European Economic Security Package,” released in January 2024, included a “White Paper on Outbound Investments,” initiating legislative consultations and risk assessments regarding outbound investment screening.
(2) Increasing enforcement of security reviews for foreign investment
While addressing gaps in the oversight of outbound investment, the United States and European Union are also continuing to strengthen their foreign investment security review regimes. The US comprehensively upgraded its foreign investment security review system through the 2018 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) and is currently reinforcing the Act’s implementation primarily through executive orders. Although the EU established a framework for the security screening of foreign direct investment in 2019, its screening mechanisms and powers retained a number of imperfections. Consequently, the EU is currently strengthening its existing system primarily through legislative upgrades; it proposed a draft revision to the screening framework in 2024 and formally adopted the new regulation in June 2026, transforming the original framework-style mechanism into a system characterized by greater mandatory force, consistency, scope, proactivity, and coordination.
- Characteristics of the upgraded investment review systems in the United States and European Union
The upgrades to investment review regimes currently being advanced by the United States and the European Union exhibit significant characteristics across three dimensions: institutional structure, strategic objectives, and underlying values. In terms of institutional structure, the United States and the European Union are building rigorous trade and investment control systems and coordination mechanisms by closing regulatory loopholes in foreign investment screening. As for strategic objectives, they are intensifying institutional counterbalancing against China, centering on competition in critical technologies. As for underlying values, the security imperatives of sovereign states are increasingly superseding the efficiency-driven logic of economic globalization, thereby impeding the free global flow of capital.
(1) Institutional structure: establishing rigorous control systems and coordinated mechanisms for trade and investment
First, the United States and European Union are bridging regulatory gaps in outbound investment and establishing comprehensive systems for controlling trade and investment. Both are now increasingly tightening their national security controls across the board, including trade in goods as well as investment market access and exit. In the realm of trade security, they are increasingly resorting to tariff measures to address economic security risks associated with imports, while continuously strengthening export control measures regarding exports. As for investment security, during the last round of regulatory upgrades they have essentially established national security review mechanisms for inbound investments, such as the US Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) and the EU’s Regulation 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments. In the current phase of regulatory enhancement, they continue to strengthen these review powers to prevent foreign capital from gaining control over core assets, critical technologies, and sensitive data touching on national security interests. As for outbound investment screening, they are closing regulatory gaps concerning capital outflows.
Secondly, the United States and the European Union are coordinating control of critical technologies and investments, working with allies to establish institutional checks and balances. The trade and investment control systems they have established entail not only vertical coordination of various internal measures but also horizontal coordination among the respective economies. Vertical coordination refers to the linked implementation of trade and investment control measures centering on critical technologies within each individual control system. For instance, both the US export control regime and its foreign investment security review system prioritize lists of emerging and foundational technologies as key targets for regulation and scrutiny, and these are subject to dynamic updates. “Horizontal coordination” refers to the practice where developed economies, such as the United States and the European Union, leverage their respective regulatory frameworks to establish mechanisms for institutional alignment among allies, thereby creating a system of checks and balances against key targets of scrutiny. For example, in August 2025, the United States and the European Union reached a “Framework on an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade,” agreeing to strengthen coordination on economic security, address the non-market policies of third parties through complementary actions, and cooperate on two-way investment reviews, export controls, and tax evasion issues.
Guided by the Trump administration’s “America First” policy, the United States has experienced varying degrees of tension with traditional allies such as the European Union and Canada in key trade sectors like steel and aluminum, leading to a slowdown in the pace of institutional coordination. However, regarding investment, the Trump administration has continued to show a relatively positive attitude toward attracting investment from its allies. The “America First Investment Policy” identifies strengthening investment cooperation with allies as a key policy objective and proposes a series of investment promotion measures tailored to them, such as establishing “fast-track” procedures, streamlining review processes, and dedicating more administrative resources to fostering investment with key partner nations. However, the prerequisite for US allies to benefit from preferential procedures is that they do not cooperate with “foreign adversaries” such as China. This clearly demonstrates that, in the realm of investment, the US government still seeks to coordinate with allies to establish a systemic counterweight to China and exclude the country from its investment cooperation “circle of friends.”
(2) Strategic objective: employing institutional checks and balances against China, centered on competition in key technologies
In an ideal scenario where capital flows from developed to emerging economies, developed economies establish global production networks through cross-border investment, thereby enhancing supply chain efficiency and securing high investment returns. Meanwhile, the emerging economies leverage the resulting employment opportunities, advanced technologies, and management expertise to achieve industrial upgrading and transformation, moving up to higher value-added segments of the value chain. In the other ideal scenario where capital flows from emerging economies to developed ones, emerging economies acquire mature technologies from developed economies through mergers and acquisitions, while developed economies achieve a transition from old to new growth drivers, continuously developing technologies and industries with higher added value.
However, as advanced economies increasingly feel the competitive threat posed by emerging economies, particularly in the race for key technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and advanced semiconductors, the anxiety stemming from their efforts to maintain technological dominance has evolved into serious concerns regarding national security. Consequently, they have moved to disrupt the ideal state of capital flows and technological cooperation by restricting the free movement of capital and implementing institutional countermeasures against emerging economies in the sphere of critical technology competition. The primary strategic objective behind the latest round of upgrades to investment screening regimes in the US and EU is to launch institutional checks against emerging economies, centered on competition over critical technologies.
As one of the most competitive emerging economies, China has become a primary target of investment reviews by the United States and the European Union. The “America First” investment policy designates countries such as China, Iran, and Russia as “foreign adversaries,” emphasizing the strengthening of security reviews for both inbound foreign investment and outbound investment involving these adversaries. The EU’s investment screening guidelines also reflect a strategic objective of competing with China in the realm of technology. In public remarks made in November 2023, EU leaders identified economic “de-risking” as a key instrument for both competing and cooperating with China; to this end, they emphasized the need to develop new defensive tools in specific critical sectors to ensure that the capital, expertise, and skills of EU companies are not used to bolster the military and intelligence capabilities of systemic rivals.
Currently, advanced semiconductors, quantum technology, and artificial intelligence are key areas where developed economies maintain an absolute competitive advantage. By imposing two-way investment restrictions in these critical sectors, the United States and the European Union can prevent emerging economies from acquiring cutting-edge technologies through investment and M&A, while also limiting the leakage of key technologies by their own investors during outbound investment activities, thereby curbing the rise of the emerging economies’ technological competitiveness. At the same time, establishing institutional coordination mechanisms with developed economies possessing similar technological capabilities further enhances the effectiveness of their domestic measures and strengthens institutional checks on emerging economies; this maximizes the impact of investment review regimes in curbing the technological advancement of emerging economies, thereby safeguarding their own technological competitive advantage.
(3) The pursuit of values: the security needs of sovereign states increasingly transcend the efficiency values of economic globalization
Screening cross-border investments on grounds of national security fundamentally reflects the conflict between the security logic of sovereign states and the market logic of globalization. Multinational corporations, the primary vehicles of economic globalization, lie at the heart of this tension. The essential characteristic of the relationship between multinational corporations and states is that, while the operational activities of these corporations are global in scope, their legal status is tied to specific national jurisdictions. On one hand, the essence of capital lies in the pursuit of profit, constantly seeking greater returns through expansion and accumulation. Driven by this profit motive, multinational corporations operate across national borders; using investment activities as a vehicle, they optimize the global allocation of capital, labor, and other factors of production in line with their business objectives, often disregarding the interests of the countries involved. On the other hand, the investment activities of multinational corporations can pose economic security risks to nations; consequently, these international investments must comply with the laws and regulations of the respective countries. For capital-importing nations, while attracting foreign investment can provide capital, introduce advanced technology and management expertise, create jobs, and foster economic growth, foreign capital also carries the risk of controlling the host country’s economic lifelines, leading to distorted economic development or even jeopardizing the host country’s national security and fundamental interests. For capital-exporting nations, while outward investment can expand overseas markets, leverage low-cost foreign labor and raw materials, and generate substantial profits, large-scale capital outflows may also reduce domestic employment and commodity exports, lead to technology leakage, and affect the balance of payments. Given this dual nature of international investment, some countries implement legal regulations governing the operations of multinational corporations to mitigate these negative impacts.
Currently, the United States and the European Union increasingly view critical technologies as matters of vital national security concern, defining the outflow of such technologies as a security risk and subsequently imposing legal regulations on international investments involving them. Driven by this perspective and associated practices, the economic nature of capital as a factor of production is increasingly overshadowed by the political identity of the capital controller’s home country. For multinational corporations, the pursuit of global profit is now conditional upon not jeopardizing the nation’s competitive edge in critical technologies—that is, not compromising national security interests. When the two come into conflict, the United States and other developed economies increasingly prioritize national security objectives over the efficiency goals of economic globalization; consequently, they implement trade and investment controls to restrict the free flow of capital.
- China’s response
Faced with the latest tightening of investment screening regimes by the United States and the European Union, for which China is a primary target of regulatory countermeasures, China needs to effectively address these restrictive measures on outbound investment screening and foreign investment security reviews through institutional refinement and strategic cooperation.
First, at the institutional level, China should continue to enrich its toolkit for legal engagement in foreign economic and trade relations, while refining the systems for foreign investment security reviews and outbound investment management. As for foreign investment security reviews, the scope of review should be further clarified to enhance the predictability of the investment environment. As for the outbound investment review system, the coordination and consistency of overseas investment management should be improved.
Secondly, at the strategic level, China must actively expand its circle of partners for investment and technological cooperation. In response to the new round of tightened investment screening regimes in the US and EU on critical technologies, China’s approach cannot be limited to merely refining its domestic legal toolkit; it must also adopt strategic countermeasures. This entails actively broadening its circle of investment and technology partners and strengthening cooperation with emerging and developing economies as well as technology-neutral nations.
Translated by Thomas E. Smith
