China Watch Vol. 6, No. 26, May 2026
Britain’s Role and Influence in the Reconstruction of the European Security Order
Yang Fang
Amidst a rapidly evolving global landscape, transatlantic relations deteriorated sharply during Donald Trump’s second term; from Ukraine to Greenland, European security crises have unfolded tumultuously, plunging the region into profound uncertainty and creating an urgent need to restore order. During this pivotal historical period, the government of the United Kingdom, a major European military power and diplomatic heavyweight, has demonstrated consistency and stability in its European security policy, offering a comprehensive assessment of the security threats facing Europe and the paths to address them, while also outlining preliminary proposals. The UK’s perspective on European security, along with the unique nature and limitations of its status as a non-EU state and a European member of NATO, will influence the formation and evolution of the future European security order across various dimensions, including security culture, organizational architecture, and the balance of power.
- The Starmer government’s perspective on European security
The Starmer government’s perspective on European security continues the UK’s traditional understanding of European security while also reflecting the characteristics of the current era.
(1) The “Russian threat” serves as a key starting point. There is a long-standing hostility between the UK and Russia, and Russia generally views the UK as a hostile, marginalized nation.[1] In March 2025, Russia’s foreign intelligence agency stated that the UK was once again playing the role of a “major instigator of global conflict,” with a pattern of behavior mirroring that seen on the eve of the two world wars; consequently, Russia regards the UK as its primary adversary.[2] The UK views Russia not only as its primary national security threat but also as the foremost threat to European security and the principal target of the future European security order. In 2025, the UK issued the “Strategic Defence Review” and the “National Security Strategy,” in which the two reports, mentioning Russia 29 and 37 times respectively, identify the country as posing an imminent threat to the UK.[3] Former UK National Security Adviser Sedwill also published an article urging that the UK shoulder the heavy responsibility of leading Europe in waging hybrid warfare against Russia.[4] In other words, the UK advocates long-term confrontation with Russia for the sake of European sovereignty and security, and even global stability; this serves as a key starting point for the British government’s approach to rebuilding the future European security order.
(2) The orientation of European security architecture is being shaped primarily by competition and military preparedness. Britain’s heightened security anxieties and the shift in its response paradigm have profoundly influenced its perception of the reconstruction of the European security order. Its 2025 National Security Strategy posits that the country is entering a period potentially marked by indirect or even direct confrontation, with an increased risk of war breaking out among major powers. UK Secretary of State for Defence Healey noted that the UK’s new Strategic Defence Review “signifies a landmark shift in our deterrence and defence: moving to warfighting readiness to deter threats and strengthen security in the Euro-Atlantic.”[5] Consequently, the UK advocates building a European security order characterized by heightened competition amidst an increasingly adversarial security climate. This order is also part of great-power rivalry within the broader international security framework, in which the Euro-Atlantic region is closely linked to other “theatres” such as the Middle East and the “Indo-Pacific,” and where contests between allies and non-allies play out across the realms of defence, security, diplomacy, technology, and the economy.[6]
(3) Building a European security order based on strength. During his second term, Donald Trump, as the most significant reshaper and redefiner of the post-war European security order, presented Europe with a new demand: to defend itself without US involvement. How to achieve this is clearly a pivotal issue in the reconstruction of Europe’s security order; European stakeholders have responded in various ways, offering differing answers. The British mindset is complex, yet the answer is relatively clear: to move beyond the debate over burden-sharing and shift toward a process of responsibility transfer. This entails gradually breaking free from entrenched ways of thinking and learning to view its own defence and security as a European strategic interest, rather than as a US strategic interest in Europe, thereby ceasing to center its perspective on the notion that “the US is present and always will be.” This implies that European nations, including the UK, need to strengthen their own capabilities and genuinely shoulder responsibility for future European security. It also means that the UK as a major European military power will exert strategic influence in the reconstruction of the future European security order. Significantly enhancing Europe’s own deterrence and defence capabilities while maintaining transatlantic ties constitutes a core element of the Starmer government’s vision for European security.
(4) Shifting from the “peace dividend” to the “defence dividend.” This represents a significant pivot in the Starmer government’s approach to defence and security, as well as a key focus of the UK’s role in rebuilding the European security order. Mainstream opinion in the UK holds that the European “peace dividend” has come to an end; against this backdrop, the UK can—and must—increase its defence spending.[7] Driven by this mindset, the UK government’s strategic preference is for both the expansion of domestic defence spending and investments in European security to yield tangible economic returns. This concept of a “defence dividend” is widely reflected in the UK’s response to the Ukraine crisis and its bilateral and multilateral security and defence cooperation with European nations and EU institutions, aligning with mainstream European perspectives. NATO Secretary General Rutte emphasized that increased defence and security spending by NATO nations would yield greater security, stronger economic growth, and more jobs—this is the “defence dividend.”[8]
- Britain’s role
The UK has historically played an ambivalent role in European security and defence. It is a major European military power and a key shaper of Europe’s security culture and power dynamics. While Brexit initially marginalized the UK, the Ukraine crisis and drastic shifts in transatlantic relations have brought it back to the center of the European geopolitical stage, enabling it to participate in the reconstruction of the European security order in a more multifaceted capacity.[9]
(1) A staunch supporter of Ukraine. In the historic process of rebuilding the European security order, the UK places the issue of Ukraine at the forefront, emphasizing that Ukraine stands “at the vanguard of European security” and clearly stating that British security is fundamentally linked to that of Ukraine.
The UK has also long been committed to strengthening Ukraine’s military capabilities. Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, despite multiple changes of government in the UK, its policy toward Ukraine has remained unchanged, spanning areas such as diplomacy, the military, trade, reconstruction, and legal assistance. The UK was the first developed economy to forge a close bilateral security relationship with Ukraine and, alongside the United States and Germany, is one of the country’s major donors. Beyond bilateral cooperation, the UK also promotes multilateral support for Ukraine through various channels, such as the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, the Ukraine Summit, and the “Coalition of the Willing.”
(2) A long-term shaper of the European security order. Always a core force within the European security system, the UK benefits from military strength and a unique geographical location. Apart from France, it is the only European nation possessing a nuclear delivery capability. The UK has significantly influenced Europe’s security culture, organizational architecture, development models, and power dynamics. Historical momentum has also shaped the evolution of its role within the new European security order into a multidimensional one.
First, it is a leader in European security and defence thinking. Transformations in Europe’s regional security architecture are typically driven by security crises.[10] From the post-World War II era through the Cold War to the Ukraine crisis, whenever Europe has stood at a juncture requiring the reconstruction of its security order, the UK has frequently been among the first to formulate and actively propagate ideas, acting as a pioneer of European security consensus and a shaper of European security culture.
Regarding the establishment of European security mechanisms, the creation of the “European Common Defence Committee,” the prototype of a common European defence policy, is generally credited to French Prime Minister René Pleven, yet the initial proposal for such a design actually came from the British. Following the Cold War, the UK also played a leading role during the early development stages of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).[11] The “Saint-Malo Declaration,” signed by the UK and France in 1998, is regarded as a significant milestone in the formation of the European Common Security and Defence Policy.
Following the 2016 Brexit referendum, the UK’s role in European security affairs was plunged into deep uncertainty. However, after an initial period of disarray, the UK adjusted its policies. With the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the UK regained its capacity to shape the European security order. In 2022, the Sunak government sought to participate in EU military projects. In November 2022, the UK was invited to join the “Permanent Structured Cooperation” (PESCO) project on military mobility within the EU’s defence framework. In 2023, the UK’s “Integrated Review Refresh” identified upholding Euro-Atlantic security as a priority for shaping the global strategic environment.[12] When the Labour government took office in 2024, “resetting the UK-EU relationship” became a core element of its foreign policy.[13] In May 2025, the UK and the EU held their first post-Brexit summit and signed the UK-EU Security and Defence Partnership Agreement. In addition, the UK actively developed bilateral defence and security relations with European nations such as France, Germany, and Poland.
This series of policy adjustments and resource allocations has essentially clarified the direction and pathways for the UK’s post-Brexit involvement in rebuilding the European security order. Through its actions, the British government has also demonstrated that it is reclaiming its role as a “leader in European defence and security,” working alongside European partners to stabilize and balance transatlantic security relations while mitigating “Trump risks” and threats. Following the Ukraine crisis, the UK has taken a more resolute stance amidst the “Greenland controversy.” By participating in military exercises and issuing joint statements with other European nations and NATO members, it has pushed back against Donald Trump’s tactics of “island-grabbing intimidation” and “tariff coercion” directed at Europe. Amidst the rapidly shifting European security landscape, the UK remains a staunch advocate of transatlantic cooperation, though its identity and role have undergone certain changes.
(3) NATO’s European pillar. The UK government has consistently regarded NATO as the cornerstone of British defence. Strengthening the alliance lies at the heart of Britain’s approach to addressing European security challenges; this reflects the Starmer administration’s desire to serve as both a key ally to the United States and a reliable partner to European nations, while also striving to maintain Britain’s regional and global influence. This choice is consistent with the approach taken by successive post-war British governments, yet the situation is far more urgent: Europe faces an unprecedented military threat, while the US President’s stance on European security is unpredictable and questionable.[14] Britain is not the only country seeking to keep the United States engaged in the reconstruction of the European security order; however, it is the nation that has most clearly demonstrated—through its actions—a desire to leverage NATO to retain the US presence and sustain the transatlantic security relationship. Regarded as a leader among European nations within NATO, the UK is well-positioned to play this role.
(4) An “outsider” to the “rearming Europe” initiative. In March 2025, the European Commission launched the “Rearm Europe Plan,” aiming to increase EU defence spending by €800 billion over four years. As part of the “Rearm Europe Plan/2030 Readiness Plan,” the “Security Action for Europe” (SAFE) initiative was established as a new EU financial instrument; it provides loans of up to €150 billion to member states, backed by guarantees from the EU budget. Third countries that have established security and defence partnerships with the EU are permitted to participate, though such participation is subject to conditions. Research by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) indicates that this could seriously hinder the participation of third countries.[15] The first round of negotiations between the UK and the EU failed to reach an agreement on including the UK in SAFE. European media and think tanks attribute this primarily to a failure to agree on the terms. Lord Ricketts, Chair of the UK House of Lords European Affairs Committee, believes that “some EU member states don’t want the UK in the scheme.”
- Influence on the future development of European security
Although the United Kingdom faces certain limitations regarding its perception of European security, the role it plays, and the resources it can commit, it will exert its influence across various dimensions to steer the future European security order in the following four directions.
(1) Reinforcing the strategic narrative of the standoff between Europe and Russia. The UK emphasizes that the conflict between Europe and Russia is systemic and enduring, rather than merely an issue concerning Ukraine. Britain’s stance and actions carry significant strategic implications, demonstrating strategic consistency and a long-term orientation, signaling that the country is preparing for a protracted confrontation rather than a short-term crisis, and comprehensively reinforcing this narrative across areas ranging from defence doctrine and budgetary decisions to intelligence priorities and alliance operations.[16]
(2) Maintaining the delicate balance of the transatlantic security relationship. The UK’s vision of European security is inextricably linked to transatlantic collective security, yet shifts in the transatlantic relationship introduce the greatest uncertainty regarding the reconstruction of the European security order. Robert Kagan famously remarked that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.” Former NATO Secretary General George Robertson described the division of labor this way: the US handles the “cooking” (military operations), while Europe handles the “dishwashing” (peacekeeping, stabilization, and development). Yet today, both the US and Europe must transform into “Martians”; Europe needs to be capable not only of “washing the dishes” but also of “cooking the meal.” Both sides are dissatisfied with the current state of affairs, yet unable to alter the relationship quickly. While the United Kingdom plays a role in maintaining the fragile balance of transatlantic collective security, it cannot eliminate the tensions arising from structural contradictions within the US-Europe alliance.
Faced with this strategic dilemma, some in the UK pin their hopes on fostering a relationship of strategic complementarity between the US and Europe. Taking defence manufacturing as an example, Europe would produce the bulk of the conventional strategic supplies required by both sides, while the US would continue to develop advanced “enabling technologies” in fields such as aerospace, sensing, and electronic warfare. In short, Europe would become the “arsenal,” while the US would continue to serve as the “defence laboratory.”[17]
In the long run, this could have two possible outcomes for Europe. On the one hand, it implies a continued reliance on US military and dual-use technologies, while Europe’s defence industry remains deeply mired in the “medium-tech trap,” a concept highlighted in the “Draghi Report” in connection with the EU’s economic competitiveness. On the other hand, if Europe can no longer rely on the United States for military production capacity or even security capabilities, then structural issues will resurface: Can Europe truly have strategic autonomy? As a non-EU member, the UK will be isolated from these issues to a certain extent, and its influence is actually relatively limited.
(3) Europe’s fragmenting security landscape. Shaped by an evolving transatlantic security environment, Europe faces a perilous transition—one likely to accelerate and prove divisive, costly, and fraught with risk. The UK’s deep re-engagement in European defence affairs implies that the European security order will be characterized by a diffusion of dominant power, organizational structures, and strategic priorities.
Regarding the question of leadership, if reliance on the United States can no longer be sustained, the issue arises as to who will lead the reconstruction of the European security order. A fundamental question that must first be addressed is: who should bear responsibility for European security? European security and defence have long relied on a US-led NATO, but European nations remain divided on whether responsibility for future security should rest with NATO, the European Union, or individual member states. The UK aspires to act as a “bridge” between Europe and the US—a role that might sustain the fragile balance of transatlantic relations in the short to medium term. However, as a non-EU member, its active engagement in European security affairs does not lead to greater clarity or unity regarding who holds the reins of European security.
In terms of organizational architecture, alongside traditional players like the EU and NATO, bilateral and minilateral security and defence cooperation within Europe is experiencing a resurgence. The UK exerts broad influence by relaunching security and defence cooperation with the EU, driving the development of NATO’s European pillar, strengthening bilateral ties with various European nations, and leading initiatives such as the Joint Expeditionary Force and “coalitions of the willing.” These intricate networks of European security relations will collectively shape the construction of the future European security order, yet they will not necessarily lead to the formation of a European security architecture characterized by a clear division of labor and coordinated action.
Regarding strategic priorities, European nations diverge in their security perceptions and developmental trajectories; while enhancing European defence capabilities is a formidable task, forging a common European security culture remains an even longer-term undertaking. There is a distinct regional divide in the strategic priorities of European countries: the UK focuses its strategy and influence primarily on Northern Europe and the Arctic, with an additional emphasis on Eastern Europe, creating a gap between its priorities and the needs of Western and Southern European nations, which makes achieving a unified strategic orientation for the future European security order difficult.
(4) The spillover effects from reconstructing the European security order. This process will reshape Europe’s defence industrial capacity and broader security capabilities, with impacts extending well beyond Europe and even the transatlantic region. In this context, the UK emphasizes the security linkages between the Euro-Atlantic and the Euro-Indo-Pacific, participates in the AUKUS partnership, and is collaborating with Italy and Japan on the joint development of a sixth-generation fighter jet. At a time when Trump dismisses Europe and Europe lacks the capacity for self-defence, this course of action by the UK will not only divert its limited resources and diminish its influence in Europe but also further complicate the reconstruction of a European security order that is already fragile and uncertain.
Conclusion
In the new security landscape, Europe faces a situation marked by recurring crises and the destabilization of the US security guarantee, which has been a cornerstone of its security architecture since World War II. Through policy declarations, military deployments, and diplomatic initiatives, the Starmer government has articulated a “European security vision” centered on the “Russian threat” narrative, consistently projecting a confrontational security discourse. At the same time, the UK advocates a dual-track approach driven by “capability building” and “defence dividends” to respond to the “transformation of the US” and the profound shifts in transatlantic security relations, thereby forging a new path for reconstructing a security order that links security with the economy. Taking a comprehensive view of Britain’s historical traditions, ideology, and its current situation in Europe, its identity in the European security order is multiple and contradictory: despite the dramatic changes in the attitude of the Trump administration in the United States, the United Kingdom is not only a “firm supporter” of Ukraine, but also an important maintainer of the fragile transatlantic alliance and an active participant in the reconstruction of the European security order. As a “European pillar” of NATO, it is a vital force in European collective defence, yet it has been marginalized in Europe’s rearmament initiatives. The British logic of “seeking security through strength” both aligns with and harbors structural tensions regarding the EU’s pursuit of “strategic autonomy.” The UK’s role ensures that its influence on the reconstruction of the European security order will be multidimensional; it might exacerbate the fragmentation of the European security landscape and even risk creating spillover effects beyond the immediate scope of this reconstruction. Future developments will hinge on whether the UK can strike a dynamic balance between “Europe First” and a global strategic outlook, between confrontation and cooperative construction, and between unilateral action and multilateral coordination—a challenge that serves as both a test for the UK itself and a critical factor in determining whether the reconstruction of the European security order can break free from its current impasse.
About the author: Yang Fang is a Research Fellow at the Institute of European Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). This article was originally published in Ouzhou yanjiu (Chinese Journal of European Studies), 2026.1; chief editor: Cai Yajie. This is an abridged version.
Translated by Thomas E. Smith
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[2] Daniel Hardaker, Kieran Kelly, Roland Oliphant, “Britain is world’s biggest ‘warmonger’ says Russia,” The Telegraph, 10 March 2025.
[3] Ministry of Defence, “Strategic Defence Review. Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad 2025,” 2 June 2025, 28 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-review-2025-making-britain-safer-secure-at-home-strong-abroad).
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[5] Ministry of Defence, “Strategic Defence Review. Making Britain Safer,” 16.
[6] HMG, “National Security Strategy 2025,” 16–17.
[7] Martin Wolf, “How to respond to the realities of a more dangerous world,” Financial Times, 3 March 2025 (https://www.ft.com/content/fded65a7-92e7-4a60-af48-02d33ef53ccb).
[8] Mark Rutte, “Keynote address,” NATO, 13 January 2026 (https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/events/transcripts/2026/01/13/keynote-address-by-nato-secretary-general-mark-rutte-at-the-renew-europe-global-europe-forum-2026-followed-by-qa).
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[11] Shi Zhiqin 史志钦 and Tian Yuan 田园, “Yingguo tuo Ou dui Oumeng Anquan fangwu de yingxiang” 英国脱欧对欧盟安全防务的影响 [The Impact of Brexit on EU Security and Defence], Dangdai Shijie yu shehui zhuyi [Contemporary World and Socialism], 2018.2: 105.
[12] HMG, “Integrated Review Refresh 2023.”
[13] Indre Krivaite and Pavi Prakash Nair, “Brexit, Bridges, and Barriers: Where Next for EU-UK Relations?” Carnegie Europe, 29 January 2025
(https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/01/brexit-bridges-and-barriers-where-next-for-eu-uk-relations?lang=en).
[14] Nick Whittaker, “What the UK’s ‘Nato-first’ defence approach tells us about Britain’s place in a volatile world,” The Conversation, 6 June 2025
(https://theconversation.com/what-the-uks-nato-first-defence-approach-tells-us-about-britains-place-in-a-volatile-world-258336).
[15] Ester Sabatino and Tim Lawrenson, “The SAFE Regulation and Its Implications for Non-EU Defence Suppliers,” Research Papers, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 9 December 2025 (https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2025/12/the-safe-regulation-and-its-implications-for-non-eu-defence-suppliers/).
[16] “From Partner to Principal Threat: How Russia Chose Confrontation—and What It Could Have Been,” Robert Lansing Institute, 16 December 2025 (https://lansinginstitute.org/2025/12/16/from-partner-to-principal-threat-how-russia-chose-confrontation-and-what-it-could-have-been/).
[17] Jonathan D. Caverley and Ethan B. Kapstein, “The Atlantic Alliance: Diverging Interests, Converging Policies,” Survival 67, no. 6 (December 2025–January 2026): 97–128.
