The EU’s Green Energy Strategy and China-EU Green Energy Cooperation

China Watch Vol. 6, No. 24, June 2026

 

The EU’s Green Energy Strategy and China-EU Green Energy Cooperation

Yu Hongyuan

Tenured Distinguished Professor, School of Political Science and International Relations, Tongji University

 

 

  1. Introduction

The European Union (EU), guided by the strategic framework of the “European Green Deal,” has systematically constructed a comprehensive green policy framework encompassing measures such as the European Climate Law, the Clean Industry Agreement, the “Fit for 55” package, and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), thereby embedding the philosophy of green development into both its domestic and foreign policies. Meanwhile, due to external geopolitical shocks and varying levels of green economic development among its member states, the implementation of the EU’s green energy strategy faces formidable challenges.

 

(1) The EU’s Green Energy Strategy

Since the European Green Deal was proposed in 2019, the EU’s green energy strategy has had the following features:

First, the EU has been establishing a systematic climate governance framework, reinforcing its global leadership by positioning carbon pricing as a core instrument. Guided by the 2050 climate neutrality goal enshrined in the European Climate Law, and utilizing mechanisms such as 2035 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), the Clean Industry Pact, and the Net-Zero Industry Act, the EU has built a comprehensive policy framework. This framework encompasses the setting of emission reduction targets and pathways for industrial transformation, energy security planning, and the projection of external rules and standards. Within this overarching institutional framework, the carbon pricing mechanism serves as the pivotal link: it acts both as a market-based instrument driving unified emissions reduction efforts among member states and as a key tool for the EU to shape global climate governance rules. By expanding the scope of the Emissions Trading System (ETS), advancing the implementation of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), and exploring interconnections between carbon markets, the EU demonstrates its ambition to drive the green transition; it seeks to leverage a carbon pricing system with spillover effects to enhance its normative influence in global carbon governance and further consolidate its institutional leadership.

Second, by leveraging green industrial policies, the EU’s aim is to internalize the green transition as a source of industrial competitive advantage. The “Competitiveness Compass,” released in January 2025, clearly articulates the interconnected logic between the green transition and industrial competitiveness, and it designates the “Joint Roadmap for Competitiveness and Decarbonization” as one of its three core actions. The “Clean Industrial Deal” released in February 2025, aims to bolster EU fiscal, financial, and policy support for clean-tech manufacturing. It seeks to cultivate the core competitiveness of new energy industries across member states and enhance energy autonomy. By streamlining regulatory frameworks, reducing energy costs, and fostering a more competitive investment and financing environment, the initiative aims to accelerate the large-scale industrial adoption of clean technologies and drive the transition of European manufacturing toward low-carbon, high-end operations, thereby consolidating and strengthening the EU’s global competitiveness in the green industrial sector.

Third, the EU is speeding up the transformation of both energy and industrial systems. In the energy sector, it is laying a structural foundation for comprehensive decarbonization by increasing electrification, expanding the supply of renewable energy, and strengthening circular economy systems. In the industrial sector, the EU is leveraging the circular economy to drive material reduction and reuse. The Circular Economy Act mandates unified standards for electronics recycling and promotes the use of secondary materials in manufacturing through tax incentives. Meanwhile, external regulatory instruments centered on the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism are expanding from initial pilot sectors to include downstream products such as steel, aluminum, and cement, as well as areas involving indirect emissions; the aim is to clarify corporate emission-reduction responsibilities and mitigate carbon leakage risks via price signals, thereby achieving a systemic synergy between the energy and industrial transformations.

Fourth, the EU’s green energy strategy is strengthening the autonomy of green supply chains to ensure a diversified and secure supply of critical raw materials essential for clean energy. The EU’s push for a green transition has led to a surge in demand for critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earths; the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) establishes strategic targets across the “extraction, processing, and recycling” stages, mandating that by 2030, 40% of processing and 25% of recycling for critical materials take place within Europe.

 

(2) The structural dilemmas of the EU’s green energy strategy

Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the vulnerabilities of the EU’s energy system have been increasingly exposed, while a series of policies from the Trump administration have added uncertainty to the region’s green development process. Under the impact of external geopolitical factors, internal divisions within the EU have become more apparent:

First, the foundations for the green energy transition vary across member states. For one, there are disparities in strategic objectives among EU nations. Developed economies in Northern and Western Europe view the green transition as a source of competitive advantage and tend to favor ambitious climate targets; conversely, member states in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as those reliant on high-carbon industries, fear the risk of deindustrialization and are hesitant to raise emissions reduction standards. Second, there is a disparity in implementation capacity among EU member states. While countries like France and Sweden possess advantages in nuclear or renewable energy, others such as Poland and the Czech Republic rely heavily on coal and lack the necessary technology and capital. These differences in resource endowments and energy structures create significant obstacles to the implementation of a unified carbon pricing policy in less developed regions. Third, disparities in the burden of costs have sparked anxiety regarding distribution. Rising energy prices resulting from the expansion of carbon markets hit low-income member states harder, thereby exacerbating the regional divide in energy wealth.

Second, shifts in the EU’s internal political landscape have weakened the collective resolve for the green transition. Following the 2024 European Parliament elections, the “New Right” has gained significant ground, and varying degrees of political fragmentation have emerged in key member states; this has led to internal political fragmentation and intensified partisan wrangling within the EU. New Right parties generally argue that the green transition imposes an excessive burden on farmers and industrial competitiveness, and they advocate for delaying or scaling back the more radical provisions of the European Green Deal. The EU’s fragmented political landscape renders its cooperative agenda on green energy strategies more susceptible to interference from divergent positions; meanwhile, the tendency of member states to prioritize short-term national interests has weakened both the willingness and the capacity to jointly address climate change and collaborate on new energy initiatives.

Third, geopolitical conflicts are constraining the implementation of the EU’s green energy strategy. Geopolitical shocks pose a significant challenge to the EU’s energy security and affect the pace of its transition to a green energy system. The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis exposed the EU energy system’s reliance on Russia and triggered systemic instability regarding the security of natural gas and oil imports, forcing the bloc to delay the phase-out of certain fossil fuels in the short term.

Fourth, adjustments in US policy exert institutional external pressure on the EU. Following his return to office, Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement once again, reversing the country’s climate governance agenda. The US also continues to pressure the EU to prioritize American interests regarding green standards, trade, and security; this undermines the EU’s role as a neutral coordinator and introduces uncertainty into its green development process.

 

  1. The potential of China-EU cooperation on green energy—and constraining factors

Green energy cooperation between China and the EU is not only a natural extension of shared values ​​but also a strategic choice in response to the pressures of reshaping the global green order. As the world’s largest producer of clean energy and one of the largest markets for its consumption, respectively, China and the EU play pivotal roles in global green development and the energy transition. China-EU cooperation on green energy demonstrates strong complementarity and broad prospects for development, yet it also faces profound institutional and structural challenges.

 

(1) The potential of China-EU cooperation on green energy

Currently, the global green transition has moved beyond the stage of cooperation based on initiatives and into a new phase characterized by the interplay of institutional dominance and strategic competition, with green issues becoming increasingly embedded in the geoeconomic landscape of great-power rivalry. Chinese-style modernization is characterized by the harmonious coexistence of humanity and nature. Within the framework of its “dual carbon” goals and leveraging the “1+N” policy system, China is systematically carrying out energy structure adjustments, transforming and upgrading industry, and developing a national carbon market, thereby gradually shaping a green development strategy that prioritizes independent pathways while complementing them with cooperative ones. Currently, China possesses world-leading capabilities in large-scale manufacturing and technological iteration across sectors such as photovoltaics, wind power, electric vehicles, batteries, energy storage, and green hydrogen, providing critical support for green energy cooperation between China and Europe.

First, political consensus on green energy cooperation between China and Europe has been continuously consolidated and strengthened. On May 6, 2025, President Xi Jinping exchanged congratulatory messages with European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, emphasizing the need to jointly address global challenges such as climate change. Since the establishment of the China-EU High-Level Dialogue on Environment and Climate in 2020, the cooperation agenda between the two sides has clearly deepened, evolving from initial multilateral collaboration and policy communication centered on the Paris Agreement to the alignment of systems and technologies in specific areas such as carbon market mutual recognition, the circular economy, and biodiversity. The fifth dialogue in 2024 focused on addressing complex, critical issues such as the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance; the sixth dialogue in 2025 centered on cooperation within the framework of the 30th Conference of the Parties (COP30) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, emphasizing the implementation of circular economy roadmaps. The “Joint Statement by China and the EU on Addressing Climate Change,” issued by both sides in July 2025, holds pivotal significance in bridging the past and the future; it explicitly calls for upholding the core status of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, accelerating the global deployment of renewable energy, and facilitating the flow of high-quality green technologies and products. This process of moving from broad political consensus toward concrete institutional development and the linkage of multilateral mechanisms vividly demonstrates the growing maturity of China-EU environmental and climate cooperation and the deepening of their shared understanding.

Secondly, the green industries and energy transitions of China and Europe are highly synergistic, solidifying the foundation for mutually beneficial economic cooperation. First of all, industrial cooperation between the two sides has evolved from the marginal complementarity of the past into a structural resonance within the green energy sector. As the two major economies with the most complete global green industry chains and robust manufacturing and innovation capabilities, China and Europe engage in deep interaction regarding key components and core materials for green energy—such as photovoltaics, wind power, batteries, and energy storage—thereby gradually building an efficient cooperation network that encompasses policy synergy, technological integration, industrial linkage, and market integration. This structural synergy is reflected not only in the deep coupling of supply chains but also in the interactive shaping of green governance philosophies and practical pathways. China-EU cooperation on green energy has played a pivotal role in driving the structural transformation of China’s energy system. Faced with a coal-dominated energy mix and the arduous task of transforming the power system, China and the EU explicitly pledged in the “China-EU Leaders’ Statement on Climate Change” to accelerate the global deployment of renewable energy and strengthen cooperation in areas such as energy transition, carbon markets, and green, low-carbon technologies; this provides institutional impetus and technical support for the decarbonization of China’s energy system and the improvement of its governance framework. China-Europe cooperation has not only introduced advanced technologies like high-efficiency photovoltaic modules and floating wind power equipment, but more importantly has also facilitated the adoption of carbon governance concepts and systematic pathways for emissions reduction, offering valuable experience for China as it pursues its “dual carbon” goals. Second, China plays a vital role in ensuring security and cost-effectiveness for the European Union’s green energy transition. While the EU possesses a stable and sizable market for green energy consumption, its manufacturing capacity struggles to meet the demand driven by the rapid expansion of renewable energy deployment. Through coordination in policies, standards, and supply chain management, China has provided the EU with highly reliable and cost-effective supply channels for key equipment for solar PV, wind power, and energy storage systems, thereby effectively reducing construction costs for EU clean energy projects. For instance, according to data from the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA), the total value of battery imports into the EU in 2023 was approximately €27 billion, with about 87% originating from China and other Asian countries. According to data from China’s Ministry of Commerce, Chinese solar panels accounted for as much as 98% of EU imports in this category in 2024. These figures indicate that China and the EU have developed a classic pattern of complementary structural interdependence in the field of green energy equipment. Whether at the technological level, where the frontiers of energy are constantly expanding, or at the institutional level, where green energy governance is gaining weight, cooperation in this sector has become a pivotal element for both sides in driving economic structural adjustment and unlocking the dividends of synergy.

Finally, cooperation in green energy will inject new growth momentum into the economic development of both China and Europe. First, regarding third-party markets, the two sides are generating new momentum for cross-regional synergy. In June 2025, the 16th China-Europe Entrepreneurs Summit proposed aligning the Belt and Road Initiative with the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and deepening cooperation in three key areas: the green transition (wind power, electric vehicles), the digital economy (artificial intelligence, semiconductors), and supply chain security. China holds advantages in new energy technologies and market scale, while Europe possesses expertise in green hydrogen and data regulations; cooperation between the two in third-party markets has become a new driver of economic development for both sides. Furthermore, the model of China-EU green energy cooperation is transcending traditional complementary trade, evolving into a new paradigm that is future-oriented and characterized by strategic resilience and institutional sustainability. The core characteristic of this new paradigm is a shift in the mode of cooperation from one-way dependence to two-way embeddedness: Chinese enterprises are deeply participating in reshaping the value chain of Europe’s green industries by investing in battery gigafactories, hydrogen equipment bases, and localized manufacturing systems; meanwhile, European companies are providing critical support for China’s industrial upgrading, specifically in areas such as core chips, control systems, and technology licensing, thereby fostering the optimization and evolution of China’s new energy industrial ecosystem. The two-way integration resulting from this dynamic has not only enhanced the resilience of global green supply chains but also solidified the foundation of mutual trust for both sides in their strategic deployment of green technologies. Third, cooperation in green energy is further propelling the China-EU relationship to evolve from one based on “market dependence” to one characterized by “systemic interdependence.” “Systemic integration” goes beyond simple commodity exchange; it represents a deep coupling and institutionalized collaboration among green energy production capabilities, innovation systems, and governance standards. Chinese enterprises are establishing localized production bases and R&D centers in Europe, shifting their roles from exporters to investors and co-developers of technology; meanwhile, European companies are engaging more deeply in the value chain upgrading of China’s green energy system through the supply of core components, technology certification, and the export of standards. The green energy systems of China and Europe are closely interconnected across three dimensions: technological iteration, supply chain configuration, and climate governance rules. They are thus transforming green cooperation into a structural stabilizer for the economic and social development of both sides and forging a resilient, forward-looking community of shared interests amidst global competition over the green transition.

In sum, in the context of intensifying global trade friction, supply chain fragmentation, and rising policy risks, cooperation between China and Europe in the green energy sector demonstrates an inherent stability that transcends traditional trade arrangements. Rather than relying on a single market, this cooperative model is underpinned by multiple pillars such as supply chain diversification, compliance pathways, technical validation, policy coordination, and multilateral support, thereby effectively enhancing the resilience of the China-Europe green energy cooperation system.

 

(2) The challenges to China-EU green energy cooperation

Against the backdrop of the “tariff war” initiated by the Trump administration, the European Union and China could have seized the opportunity to strengthen cooperation and hedge against the impact of US trade protectionism. However, structural contradictions and institutional differences between the two sides, combined with the EU’s strategy of signaling goodwill to the US by adopting a tough stance toward China, have strained bilateral relations and hampered cooperation in green energy.

First, the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and US trade tariff policies have become obstacles to China-EU cooperation in green energy. Cutting-edge green industries such as photovoltaics, electric vehicles, batteries, hydrogen energy, and carbon capture and storage are viewed by nations as core pillars of future strategic security and sustainable economic development; meanwhile, green energy supply chains are exhibiting clear trends of geographic clustering and tendencies toward technological blockades. Upon returning to power, Trump has imposed stricter export controls on critical technologies and equipment and advanced policies to “friend-shore,” “near-shore,” and “re-shore” supply chains, compelling certain allies and partners to include “poison pill” clauses mandating the exclusion of Chinese products in trade tariff negotiations with the United States. While facing these external pressures, China and Europe, as the leading global forces in green energy technology and industry, have felt the results of the inadequacies of their coordination mechanisms. For instance, under pressure from US-led narratives of supply chain restructuring and “de-risking,” the EU has adopted tough, unilateral measures regarding anti-subsidy investigations and tariff imposition on electric vehicles, failing to fully utilize existing consultation mechanisms with China to resolve differences. This situation indicates that green energy cooperation between China and the EU has, to a certain extent, sustained a substantial impact from US-led trade protectionism and geopolitical maneuvering.

Secondly, there are certain differences and areas of competition between China and the EU regarding the global green energy industry. The EU tends to drive climate governance through high environmental standards, legislative mandates, and compulsory carbon market mechanisms. In contrast, China emphasizes respect for differing national circumstances and a gradual transition, prioritizing a balanced approach that integrates economic adjustment, the green transition, and social stability. Leveraging its first-mover advantage in areas such as green legislation and carbon pricing, the EU continuously drives the international diffusion of frameworks like the carbon border tariff, the EU Taxonomy, and the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR), seeking to consolidate its dominant voice through institutional spillover. Meanwhile, China is more quickly refining its green policy framework, independently establishing green bond catalogs and green credit standards, to forge a development-oriented green governance path with distinctive national characteristics. However, disparities in pacing and technical friction between China and the EU regarding corporate green due diligence, carbon pricing, and carbon markets have hindered the deepening of policy coordination and the mutual recognition of rules.

Finally, the EU’s “de-risking” strategy has led to the securitization of energy issues, precipitating a crisis of trust in China-EU cooperation. Unlike challenges stemming from industrial competition or regulatory differences, the core of this issue lies in the EU’s redefinition of its reliance on China for green energy cooperation as a “security risk.” In recent years, the EU has sought to reshape bilateral relations through the lens of “de-risking,” causing the fundamental logic of China-EU green cooperation to shift from “economic complementarity” toward “security-oriented caution.” This tendency to securitize various issues manifests specifically in the EU’s use of legislation to erect defensive barriers. For instance, the EU introduced the “Clean Industrial Deal” and the “Net-Zero Industry Act” with the aim not only of boosting domestic competitiveness but also of reducing reliance on external supply chains through measures such as “Europe First” provisions in public procurement. The European Union harbors deep geopolitical anxiety regarding its over-reliance on single sources, particularly for critical raw materials, viewing the concentrated supply of resources such as rare earths, lithium, and gallium as a major security risk, and is seeking to mandate supply chain diversification through the Critical Raw Materials Act. Labeling the normal division of labor within industries as a “risk” undermines supply chain trust between China and Europe, exposing cooperation in cutting-edge sectors like hydrogen energy and smart grids to the risks of uncertain political scrutiny and compliance costs. Nevertheless, both sides have maintained channels for rational dialogue and remain committed to preventing security considerations from completely overriding development priorities, thereby safeguarding the baseline for cooperation amidst a turbulent landscape.

 

  1. Pathways for China-EU green energy cooperation

Given the profound shifts in the global climate governance landscape and intensifying geopolitical change, green energy cooperation between China and Europe serves not only as a vital pillar for upholding the Paris Agreement but also as a key vehicle for enhancing mutual trust and strengthening joint governance capabilities within multilateral frameworks. By focusing on four dimensions—institutional development, industrial synergy, standards alignment, and financial integration—the two sides can establish a systematic cooperation pathway, thereby institutionalizing political consensus, deepening economic complementarity, and ensuring the long-term sustainability of cooperation mechanisms.

First, efforts should be focused on building a long-term, stable multilateral platform to translate political consensus into sustainable institutional outcomes. Building upon the High-Level Dialogue on Environment and Climate, China and the EU should establish a regular dialogue mechanism for carbon market governance and climate finance, thereby advancing cooperation from policy communication to institutional alignment. On one hand, the two sides can forge consensus and adopt a unified stance on key issues, such as the New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance, and work together to make the allocation of global climate funds fairer and more efficient. China and Europe can leverage the experience of multilateral development institutions like the European Investment Bank to complement the “Belt and Road” green investment framework; together, they can design transparent and actionable financing mechanisms to address funding bottlenecks in the green energy transition. Furthermore, the two sides can strengthen mutual recognition of technologies in carbon market development and explore aligning their systems for carbon footprint accounting, monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV), thereby gradually establishing the technical foundation for interconnecting their respective carbon markets.

Second, by anchoring cooperation in industrial synergy and deepening the integration of industrial and innovation chains, the two sides can build a resilient and sustainable green economic community. In sectors that have already achieved significant scale, such as photovoltaics, new energy vehicles, and energy storage, China and Europe possess distinct comparative advantages regarding R&D systems, manufacturing capabilities, and market structures. By leveraging these complementary strengths, they can foster a cooperation model characterized by “joint R&D, collaborative manufacturing, and global application,” thereby avoiding homogeneous competition and redundant investment. China and Europe can achieve collaborative innovation through mechanisms such as cross-shareholding, the joint establishment of laboratories, and the creation of cross-border green technology funds. This model of shared risks and benefits not only helps overcome bottlenecks in core technologies but also transforms geopolitical uncertainty into institutional mutual trust, thereby solidifying the dual-pillar status of China and Europe within the global green industry landscape.

Third, the focus should be on aligning technical standards and mutually recognizing definitions of “green,” thereby lowering implicit barriers to cross-border business operations through “soft connectivity.” Unlike institutional dialogues at the macro level, cooperation at this level aims to address specific technical barriers to trade.

China and the EU can leverage practical experience with the Common Ground Taxonomy (CGT) to further align their green classification standards, clarify technical definitions and certification criteria for emerging energy products such as green hydrogen and green methanol, and avoid market access barriers resulting from divergent definitions of “green.” In response to the “battery passport” and ecodesign requirements introduced by the EU Battery Regulation, China and the EU could establish a dedicated technical working group to promote the mutual recognition and interoperability of supply chain traceability data and carbon footprint calculation methods, thereby preventing regulatory disparities from leading to supply chain “decoupling.” Meanwhile, China can support industry associations and think tanks in substantively participating in EU legislative consultations at the technical level; by using scientific data and technical rationality to dispel political biases and fostering collaboration within the framework of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the two sides can jointly uphold the scientific integrity and neutrality of global trade rules for green products.

Fourth, by leveraging green finance and two-way investment as links, the two sides should foster capital integration and the alignment of interests across green industry chains. China can guide enterprises to establish operations in Europe and promote integrated “product-investment-operation” development; by building industrial parks for photovoltaics, batteries, and energy storage to achieve localized production and job creation, companies can enhance their market integration and social acceptance. For its part, the European side can leverage policy incentives and risk-sharing mechanisms to encourage Chinese enterprises to participate in the long-term operation of green assets in Europe, thereby establishing a stable revenue-generating cycle. In the financial sphere, both sides should jointly refine the green finance standard system, promote the outcomes of the “Common Ground Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance,” and explore innovative financial products such as cross-border green funds and green real estate investment trusts (REITs), in order to leverage the power of capital markets in enhancing the sustainability and effectiveness of green cooperation. At the same time, pilot programs could be launched regarding carbon market credit offsets and cross-border trading mechanisms, to accumulate experience for the institutional linkage of financial and investment cooperation between China and Europe.

 

This article was originally published in Dangdai shijie (Contemporary World), 2025.12; footnotes have been omitted.

Translated by Thomas E. Smith