Monthly Briefing, Vol. 5. No. 4 (RS) May 2025
Serbia’s Troubled Road to Europe
Ivona Lađevac
Summary
Despite its longstanding ambition to join the European Union, Serbia’s progress toward full membership has stalled due to persistent democratic backsliding, failure to align with EU foreign policy, and strained regional relations. The European Parliament’s 2025 report, based on Commission evaluations from 2023 and 2024, paints a sobering picture of a candidate country struggling to fulfill its commitments. While Serbia has opened 22 out of 35 chapters in its accession negotiations, substantive progress remains elusive in crucial areas such as rule of law, media freedom, and alignment with EU values.
Introduction
On October 22 2024 at the working group of the Socialist & Democrats group of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) of the European Parliament, in Strasbourg, Member of European Parliament, Mr. Tonino Picula was appointed to three important positions, the most prominent of which is the position of rapporteur for Serbia. It is decided that within the next five years, MEP Picula will be responsible for analyzing, monitoring, and reporting to the bodies of the European Union on the situation in Serbia and its alignment with European legal acquis, fundamental values, and specific policies[1].
In compliance with its capacity and in response to the European Commission’s 2023 and 2024 progress reports, Mr. Tonino Picula, European Parliament Rapporteur for Serbia, on May 6 presented its report previously adopted by the European Parliament on April 15, 2025.[2]
European Union’s Commission Report on Serbia
European Union’s Commission Report on candidate countries, including Republic of Serba, aims to assess their progress in meeting the criteria for membership, focusing on several areas: the rule of law, economic reforms, and alignment with EU laws and standards (the acquis). These reports are important as a guidance for candidate countries’ to follow its path towards accession and also highlight areas needing further development.
Latest EU Report on Serbia, unfortunately, implies that European path is still very winding.
Democratic Erosion and Rule of Law Regression
The European Parliament report underscores a clear and troubling trend: Serbia’s democratic institutions are under increasing strain. A central area of concern is the undue political influence over the judiciary, which compromises judicial independence. Reforms aimed at reducing political interference—such as the Law on the Judicial Academy—have been delayed, with implementation often lacking transparency or credibility.
Furthermore, elections in Serbia have repeatedly failed to meet international standards. The OSCE/ODIHR’s observations of the 2023 parliamentary elections identified procedural deficiencies and media bias that overwhelmingly favored the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS)[3]. Despite establishing a working group to improve the electoral process, consensus has been elusive, and civil society actors have withdrawn in protest.
Parliamentary functioning has also been hampered by frequent early elections and the absence of key democratic mechanisms, such as regular government question times and transparent legislative procedures. This has eroded oversight and weakened the role of the legislature in holding the executive accountable.
Media Freedom and Disinformation
Serbia’s media environment remains alarmingly compromised. Regulatory institutions like the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) have failed to fulfill their legal mandates, especially during election periods. National broadcasting licenses continue to be awarded to outlets known for spreading disinformation and hate speech, while pluralistic voices are systematically marginalized.
One of the most pressing concerns is the pervasive spread of pro-Russian and anti-EU narratives, fueled by government-aligned media and amplified by foreign actors like RT and Sputnik. Serbia ranks 98th in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index[4], reflecting a severe deterioration in media independence.
The report condemns the lack of transparency in media ownership and calls for immediate action to counter hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns. Despite being a candidate for EU membership, Serbia has allowed foreign propaganda to flourish, undermining democratic discourse and public trust in EU integration.
Failure to Align with EU Foreign Policy
A cornerstone of EU accession is alignment with the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Serbia has consistently fallen short. Its CFSP alignment dropped to just 51% in 2024—far below neighboring candidates like North Macedonia and Montenegro, which achieved 100% compliance.
The report criticizes Serbia’s continued refusal to impose sanctions against Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. While Belgrade condemned the aggression in the UN, President Vučić later retracted the vote as a “mistake,” raising serious doubts about Serbia’s credibility as a strategic EU partner.
Moreover, Serbia has not aligned with EU cyber sanctions, and its Strategy for Combating Cybercrime expired without renewal. This failure to modernize and cooperate in areas critical to European security only deepens the credibility gap between Belgrade and Brussels.
Human Rights, Surveillance, and Civil Society Suppression
The treatment of civil society and protestors in Serbia has sparked international condemnation. In response to the mass student-led protests in March 2025—the largest in modern Serbian history—security services allegedly engaged in illegal surveillance, intimidation, and excessive force, including the use of non-identified sound weapon[5]. Protestors reported being attacked, unlawfully detained, and targeted by state propaganda.
Further, civil society organizations have faced increasing repression, including police raids, public smear campaigns, and funding restrictions. A controversial “foreign agents” law proposed in 2024 closely mirrors repressive Russian legislation, threatening to criminalize legitimate NGO activity.
Serbia’s use of spyware against journalists and human rights defenders, documented by Amnesty International and the SHARE Foundation, represents a grave violation of fundamental rights.[6] These actions not only undermine democratic norms but also breach Serbia’s obligations as an EU aspirant.
Ethnic Minorities and Nationalist Politics
The situation of national minorities in Serbia remains precarious. The report finds that the rights of minorities are protected only formally, with substantial gaps in representation, education, and media access. There are serious concerns about pro forma minority representation controlled by the government and targeted hate speech against specific communities.
Although Republic of Serbia, unlike other countries, even ones that already are members of the EU, nurtures friendly relations with all its neighboring countries, respecting right of own identity, culture, language, somehow the EU found as the most concerning case is the erosion of the Bulgarian minority’s identity, where the Serbian state has promoted revisionist narratives—such as the fictional “Shopi nation”—to deny historical and cultural links. Furthermore, the EU objected that Serbia has failed to provide textbooks and qualified teachers for education in minority languages, violating EU and Council of Europe standards. Speaking of this specific case, one could wonder how it is possible that, although situated in the Balkans peninsula, known after mixture of so many nations, Republic of Bulgaria doesn’t recognize to have not a single minority?![7]
However, in case of Serbia, the EU considers that its policies represent risk that contributes deepening ethnic tensions and contradict the EU’s foundational principles of inclusivity, respect for identity, and cultural diversity.
Regional Destabilization and Tensions with Kosovo
According to the European Union Commission findings, the most persistent and geopolitically dangerous misachievement on Serbia’s EU path is its failure to normalize relations with so called Kosovo. The 2025 European Parliament report reiterates that normalization is a non-negotiable precondition for both Serbia and Kosovo to advance toward EU membership. However, Serbia’s actions have repeatedly undermined progress.
Despite the 2013 Brussels[8] and Ohrid[9] Agreements, Serbia has resisted implementing key commitments, including the recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty in practice and lifting its opposition to Kosovo’s participation in regional and international organizations. Serbia’s support for the “All-Serb Assembly”[10] in June 2024, which included political figures from Republika Srpska, Montenegro, and Kosovo under the nationalist slogan “One people, one assembly,” raised alarms in Brussels about its aspirations for a pan-Serbian political identity—perceived by many as a destabilizing, irredentist move.[11]
In a particularly grave case, Serbia failed to prosecute Milan Radoičić, a key suspect in the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska, Kosovo.[12] Despite international demands, Belgrade has not held him accountable, further tarnishing its reputation as a credible partner in promoting peace and justice in the Balkans.
Corruption, Clientelism, and Rule of Law Decay
The report identifies endemic corruption as one of the most significant structural obstacles to Serbia’s EU accession. Transparency International ranked Serbia 105th in its 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index[13]—well below the EU average. While Serbia has adopted an anti-corruption strategy for 2024–2028, the action plan remains unimplemented, and enforcement is weak.
High-profile corruption cases such as Jovanjica[14], Krušik[15], Savamala[16], and Belivuk[17] remain unresolved. These scandals, involving state-linked organized crime, intelligence abuse, and police complicity, point to a deep erosion of prosecutorial independence.
The use of the term “Projects of Interest for the Republic of Serbia” to bypass procurement regulations is another serious concern. This legal loophole allows the government to allocate public contracts without competition, often to politically connected firms or foreign state-owned companies—particularly from China and Russia—compromising transparency and creating fertile ground for rent-seeking behavior.
Green Agenda Delays and Environmental Mismanagement
Despite opening all chapters in Cluster 4 on the Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity, Serbia’s environmental performance lags behind expectations. The Climate Change Adaptation Programme and the National Energy and Climate Plan remain underdeveloped, and enforcement of environmental regulations is inconsistent[18].
The report also condemns Serbia’s inaction regarding transboundary environmental damage, particularly the pollution of the Dragovishtitsa River, which affects neighboring Bulgaria. In energy, Serbia continues to rely heavily on coal and Russian gas, making only limited progress on decarbonization and energy diversification.
Although the gas interconnector with Bulgaria was completed in 2023, the delay in launching its commercial operations reflects poor implementation of energy projects. Serbia’s continued dependence on Russia’s Gazprom through Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS) undermines both its energy security and EU alignment.
Equally troubling is the lack of rigorous environmental impact assessments, especially for large infrastructure projects, some funded or executed by foreign actors with low environmental standards. These deficiencies not only violate EU norms but also threaten Serbia’s long-term sustainable development.
Opaque Governance and Misuse of EU Assistance
While Serbia continues to receive extensive EU financial assistance—over €586 million in technical and financial aid under IPA III in the last three years—the report raises questions about whether EU funds are effectively supporting reforms or being misused[19].
EU officials now call for reprogramming EU assistance to redirect funds toward judiciary reforms, independent media, and civil society, especially following the withdrawal of key U.S. donors. There is growing concern that funds are currently being used to bolster authoritarian governance rather than democratic transformation.
Furthermore, the lack of public consultation in the preparation of the Reform Agenda and the opacity in the allocation of public investment have fed public mistrust. Observers stress the need for a stronger role for the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in overseeing the use of EU funds and prosecuting misuse or fraud within Serbia.
Rise of Nationalism and Historical Revisionism
From the view point of the European Union, Serbia’s regression into historical revisionism and ethnic nationalism poses a serious ideological obstacle to EU integration. The government has supported or tolerated attempts to undermine the identity of minority communities—particularly the Bulgarian and Albanian minorities—and promoted fabricated narratives, such as the so-called “Shopi nation,” to erode legitimate cultural identities.
Additionally, the European Union blames Serbia for public denial of war crimes—including the Srebrenica genocide—and glorification of convicted war criminals remain largely unchecked in Serbia’s political discourse. The EU report calls on Serbia to criminalize such denial, open wartime archives, and respect court verdicts of international war tribunals, including the ICTY.
Equally alarming is Serbia’s continued support for Republika Srpska’s nationalist agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Participation in unconstitutional celebrations like Republika Srpska Day is seen as a direct affront to Bosnian sovereignty and the Dayton Agreement, which the EU considers fundamental to regional peace.
Public Sentiment: Growing Euroscepticism
As assessed by European Parliament, years of government-sponsored anti-EU propaganda have taken their toll on Serbian public opinion. Support for EU membership has significantly declined, while approval of Vladimir Putin and Russia’s political model has increased.
Furthermore, the EP doesn’t find it as pure coincidence but result of the Serbian government and pro-government media outlets actively cultivation a narrative of Western betrayal, portraying the EU as hypocritical and overreaching. In contrast, Russia and China are portrayed as reliable, sovereign-respecting partners—even though their investments often lack transparency, environmental safeguards, and long-term sustainability.
The report concludes that manipulation of public sentiment creates a self-reinforcing loop: growing public distrust of the EU reduces reform momentum, which in turn fuels further stagnation and disillusionment.
Serbian Strategic Choice at the Crossroads
Commenting on Serbia’s commitment to the EU accession, Mr. Picula found that, in spite Serbia’s repeatedly claims to be committed to joining the EU by 2026, it is not credible without deep reforms.
Picula’s report highlighted other major concerns as well, including to ensure the independence of key institutions, including the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM), fully implement the outstanding and the latest recommendations by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) and the Council of Europe’s bodies concerning electoral reforms, which should be applied in a transparent and inclusive process and well ahead of any new elections.
In a resolution based on the report, which was put to a vote on May 7, the European Parliament has expresses deep concern over the systemic issues revealed by the massive protests involving students and other groups in Serbia, including civil liberties, separation of powers, corruption, environmental protection, institutional and financial transparency – particularly in connection with infrastructure projects – and accountability. In his findings Mr. Picula expressed same remarks as protesters in Serbian streets: country has problem with deep rooted corruption, nepotism, politicized judiciary and obvious lack of free media. The EP confirms that the students’ demands align with the reforms expected from Serbia on its path to the Union.
The resolution calls for full and transparent legal proceedings following the investigation by competent authorities into the collapse of the railway station canopy in Novi Sad on November 1, 2024. It expresses regret over “the slow pace of the investigation and lack of transparency after the tragedy” and stresses the need for a broader inquiry into the extent to which corruption has led to lowered safety standards and contributed to this tragedy.
The EP also condemned the rhetoric used by the authorities in Serbia, inciting violence against students and other demonstrators, noting that student activists have been exposed to legal harassment, intimidation, and excessive use of force by authorities. The document calls for an impartial investigation into the claims that “illegal crowd-control technology” was used against demonstrators in Belgrade on March 15, which resulted in multiple injuries, urging Serbian prosecutors to bring charges against all individuals who physically attacked and incited violence against demonstrators. At the same time, the EP rejected accusations that the EU and some of its member states were involved in organizing the student protests with the aim of provoking a “color revolution” and, in this context, strongly condemns the unlawful arrests and deportations of EU citizens.
As report summarizes all deficiencies of Serbian political system, a logical question imposes: if Serbia still on its European path?
Conclusion
Serbia’s EU accession process is in a state of crisis, not because of external obstacles, but due to its own internal failures. From democratic erosion to foreign policy misalignment, from corruption to nationalism, Serbia has strayed far from the Copenhagen criteria that define EU membership readiness.
The 2025 European Parliament report is unusually frank in stating that Serbia’s path forward must be conditional: no progress on accession without alignment with EU values and policies, especially sanctions on Russia, judicial reform, protection of minorities, and normalization with Kosovo.
Serbia now stands at a crossroads. It can embrace the responsibilities and values of European integration—or continue down the path of authoritarianism, isolation, and foreign dependency. The choice belongs to Belgrade, but the consequences will be felt across the continent.
The EU itself faces a dilemma: how to remain engaged with Serbia without rewarding bad behavior. The reallocation of funding, greater scrutiny, and suspension of further negotiations remain on the table unless Serbia demonstrates genuine reform. This means more than just symbolic gestures. It requires a strategic realignment with Europe, underpinned by legal, institutional, and cultural transformation.
[1] European Parliament Rapporteur is a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) elected by fellow MEPs when one of the European Parliament Committees (EP Committees) is assigned to prepare a report on a legislative proposal or other European Commission document, or the EP Committee decides to prepare an own-initiative report. Once the report is adopted by the Committee, the Rapporteur presents it to the EP plenary where it is voted on.
The Rapporteur often acts as a liaison officer between the EP Committee, the EP plenary, the Council and the Commission, representing the Committee’s, and later on, the EP plenary’s position, at all stages, including both formal and informal conciliation. Other political parties will often nominate a Shadow Rapporteur, who closely follows the work of the Committee’s official Rapporteur. See more at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/parliaments-powers/legislative-powers, accessed on: 05/06/2025.
[2] Report on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia (2025/2022(INI)), Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rapporteur: Tonino Picula, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-10-2025-0072_EN.pdf, accessed on: 05/06/2025.
[3] Early Parliamentary Elections, 17 December 2023, OSCE, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/serbia/556500, accessed on: 05/06/2025.
[4] 2024 World Press Freedom Index – journalism under political pressure, Reporters without Borders, https://rsf.org/en/2024-world-press-freedom-index-journalism-under-political-pressure, accessed on: 05/06/2025.
[5] Trenutak incidenta: “Upotrebljen ‘zvučni top’, oružje koje poseduje bezbednosni sistem Srbije”, N1, 15. mart 2025, https://n1info.rs/vesti/video-trenutak-incidenta-upotrebljen-zvucni-top-oruzje-koje-poseduje-bezbednosni-sistem-srbije/, accessed on: 05/06/2025.
[6] Serbia: BIRN journalists targeted with Pegasus spyware, 27 March 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/03/serbia-birn-journalists-targeted-with-pegasus-spyware/, accessed on: 05/06/2025.
[7] Fourth Opinion on Bulgaria – adopted on 26 May 2020, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ACFC/OP/IV(2020)001Final, Council of Europe, http: coe.int/efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.rm.coe.int/4th-op-bulgaria-en/16809eb483, accessed on: 05/06/2025. accessed on: 05/06/2025.
[8] Brussels Agreement, First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations, United Nations, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/brussels20agreement.pdf, accessed on: 05/06/2025.
[9] Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue: Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia, European Union External Action, Diplomatic Service of the European Union, 27.02.2023, Brussels, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en, accessed on: 05/06/2025.
[10] Svesrpski Sabor 2024 Vučić: Postignut dogovor o srpskom jedinstvu, naši ministri će prvo ići u Banjaluku, Euronews, 8. jun 2025, https://www.euronews.rs/srbija/politika/126062/svesrpski-sabor-2024-vucic-postignut-dogovor-o-srpskom-jedinstvu-nasi-ministri-ce-prvo-ici-u-banjaluku/vest, accessed on: 05/06/2025.
[11] See, for example: Veljanovski: Svesrpski sabor malo zastrašujući, mi i Evropa kao dve planete, N1, 10. Jun 2024, https://n1info.rs/vesti/rade-veljanovski-sverspski-sabor-astrasujuci/; Veliki srpski sabor i ruska poruka Vučiću, DW, 7. jun 2024, https://www.dw.com/sr/veliki-srpski-sabor-i-ruska-poruka-vu%C4%8Di%C4%87u/a-69300623; Reakcije na Svesrpski sabor ne prestaju: Kako je “zabava za široke mase” uznemirila region, RT Balkan, 11. Jun 2024, https://lat.rt.rs/srbija-i-balkan/94804-mediji-region-reakcije-svesrpski-sabor/, etc.
[12] A Year After Banjska Attack, Kosovo Indictment Chronicles Serb ‘Land Grab Plot’, BIRN, September 24, 2024, https://balkaninsight.com/2024/09/24/a-year-after-banjska-attack-kosovo-indictment-chronicles-serb-land-grab-plot/, accessed on: 05/06/2025.
[13] Corruption Perceptions Index 2024, Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2024, accessed on: 05/06/2025.
[14] Počelo objedinjeno suđenje u slučaju „Jovanjica“, Krik, 18.09.2024, https://www.krik.rs/pocelo-objedinjeno-sudjenje-u-slucaju-jovanjica/?tztc=1, accessed on: 05/06/2025.
[15] Afera Krušik: Godinu i po dana bez epiloga, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 18. mart 2025, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/afera-kru%C5%A1ik-godinu-i-po-dana-bez-epiloga/31157691.html, accessed on: 05/06/2025.
[16] Afera Savamala – simbol bahatosti vlasti u Srbiji, 11. decembar 2016, Radio Slobodna Evropa, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/most-afera-savamala-simbol-bahatosti-vlasti-u-srbiji/28168713.html, accessed on: 05/06/2025.
[17] Srbija, kriminal i slučaj Veljko Belivuk: Pet stvari koje treba da znate, 22. jul 2021, Radio Slobodna Evropa, https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/srbija-57932803, accessed on: 05/06/2025.
[18] Government adopts Programme for Adaptation to Changed Climate Conditions with Action Plan , Government of Serbia, 23 December 2023, https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/217320/government-adopts-programme-for-adaptation-to-changed-climate-conditions-with-action-plan.php, accessed on: 05/06/2025.
[19] Report on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia (2025/2022(INI)), op. cit.