North Macedonia monthly briefing: N. Macedonia’s Strategic Partnership with the UK..

Monthly Briefing, Vol. 5. No. 4 (MK) May 2025

 

North Macedonia’s Strategic Partnership with the United Kingdom: Controversies, Geopolitical Drivers, and Consequences

Gjorgjioska M. Adela

 

 

Summary

On 22 May 2025, the UK and N. Macedonia signed a high-profile Government-to-Government (G2G) Partnership, framed as a major step forward in bilateral cooperation and economic development. With up to £5 billion in UK Export Finance on offer and ambitions to collaborate on transport, health, energy, and technology projects, the agreement has been presented as a win-win for both countries. However, beneath the diplomatic language and celebratory tone, the G2G raises significant questions. This report critically examines the agreement’s implications, arguing that the structure of the partnership may prioritize UK commercial and geopolitical interests over Macedonia’s developmental autonomy. The selection and governance of projects under this G2G remain unclear, opening space for concerns about transparency, accountability, and long-term public benefit.  With UK companies poised to benefit disproportionately, and Macedonia bearing the financial and political risks, this article interrogates whether the partnership truly represents a balanced strategic alliance – or a new form of economic and geopolitical leverage dressed in diplomatic rhetoric.

 

The Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom and Macedonia was first announced on May 16, 2025, during the European Political Community Summit in Tirana. Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski described the agreement as “historic,” claiming it would launch “an investment cycle of five billion pounds, or around six billion euros, in infrastructure, railway transport, and health care,” following his meeting with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer.[1] “This Strategic Partnership Agreement with the United Kingdom, is a privilege, because this is one of the largest superpowers in the world we are talking about,” Mickoski stated. Emphasizing the uniqueness of the deal, he added: “The UK does not have such agreements with many countries. Perhaps we are one of the few.”[2] In a post shared after the meeting, Mickoski further wrote that the agreement “represents a new chapter in the relations between the two countries.” According to sources familiar with the negotiations, the agreement is the result of months of discussions on cooperation in areas including “security, economy, investments, education, digital transformation and climate change,” and is described as “a concrete and long-term commitment to strengthening bilateral ties with the United Kingdom.”[3]

 

Just six days later, on May 22, 2025, the UK government officially signed what it termed a “Government-to-Government Partnership” (G2G) with N. Macedonia. The signing ceremony featured the UK Minister for Exports, Gareth Thomas, and Macedonia’s Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Nikoloski. British Minister Gareth Thomas declared that the agreement “opens up a new chapter in our bilateral relationship with North Macedonia,” and added that the UK “has a wealth of experience in delivering high-quality infrastructure across the world.” He expressed his hope that the partnership would “help more British businesses export to North Macedonia.”[4]  Deputy Prime Minister Nikoloski echoed the economic emphasis of the signing but presented the deal in far more transformative terms: “This is the largest agreement that the country has signed in its economic history.” He announced that three major projects were already prepared: a high-speed railway along Corridor 10, a new hospital infrastructure project, and an initiative to support medical education. Future projects, he added, would focus on energy and environmental sectors. Crucially, Nikoloski underlined the role of British expertise in shaping the process: “What is even more important for us is that we will use the experience and the best expertise from the British public administration and business sector, which will bring our own administration and business to a whole new level.”[5]

 

Behind the rhetoric: What the Agreement really entails

The full text of the agreement entered parliamentary procedure on May 27, 2025, and was scheduled for debate during the 52nd plenary session the following day.[6] The document was swiftly praised as a landmark achievement – yet its content reveals a far more controversial arrangement than suggested by the political rhetoric surrounding it. According to Article 1, the stated goal is to establish a partnership to support the implementation of infrastructure projects in the fields of healthcare, transport, technology, energy, and other “critical sectors.”[7] The text emphasizes “exchange of knowledge and practices,” relying on expertise from both the UK government and British business actors. However, the structure of the deal places the British side firmly in the lead when it comes to technical and financial design. The UK Export Finance (UKEF) instrument is mentioned as the primary channel for project funding. Article 3 confirms that UKEF may support the implementation of the projects “subject to legal, political, financial and other due diligence conditions,” while also noting that the UK’s total risk exposure may not exceed £5 billion. This conditionality not only subjects project approval to UK-side evaluation, but explicitly frames funding as contingent on commercial criteria and credit-risk thresholds, not public interest or local development needs. What is more, there has been no transparency regarding how project selection, procurement, and monitoring will be handled, nor any binding obligation that ensures public benefit or local participation. The only identified Macedonian public bodies responsible for execution are line ministries – the Ministries of Transport, Health, Digital Transformation, Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Energy – which are expected to implement and align with externally driven processes. The agreement will be in force for ten years, with the possibility of termination by either side through a written 60-day notice. However, even in the event of termination, ongoing projects will continue under existing terms – a clause that potentially locks future governments into obligations over which they had no say.[8]

 

Priority projects

The “priority projects for initial progress,” as specified in Annex A of the agreement, span four major sectors of national infrastructure. In the field of health, the agreement envisions an extensive hospital reconstruction and modernization program, targeting facilities across multiple regions – including hospitals in Štip, Kičevo, and key institutions in Skopje such as the University Clinical Center and city hospitals, as well as regional hospitals in Kumanovo, Bitola, the Tetovo-Gostivar area, and the Ohrid-Struga region. In the transport sector, the plan includes the construction of a high-speed railway along Corridor 10, intended to connect Tabanovce, Skopje, and the southern border at Gevgelija/Bogorodica, and a broader program aimed at developing Corridor 8 as a key east-west transport route. Within the technology domain, the agreement outlines a program for strengthening the country’s cyber-security infrastructure while also supporting the digital transformation of government services. The energy component, though less detailed in the agreement itself, has been explicitly linked by Prime Minister Mickoski to the long-postponed Chebren-Galište-Orlov Kamen hydropower project. With an estimated cost of €1.2 to €1.3 billion, this mega-project is framed as a cornerstone of both the country’s energy transition and its climate resilience strategy, through the creation of new water reservoirs aimed at both electricity generation and long-term irrigation needs.[9]

At least three of the priority projects listed under the agreement carry significant geopolitical and geoeconomic ramifications. The high-speed railway along Corridor 10, for instance, is not merely a transport upgrade – it is a strategic route within the broader European Belt and Road Initiative framework, linking the Port of Thessaloniki with Central and Western Europe via North Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Austria. In this context, the UK’s involvement may represent an attempt to counter or reroute Belt and Road ambitions in the region, effectively sidelining Macedonia’s role as a transit corridor by shifting influence away from Chinese infrastructural financing. Rather than reinforcing its geostrategic value, Macedonia may find itself used as a buffer against Chinese investment, with little long-term control over the outcome. Another key project, the Chebren–Galište hydropower system, also raises sovereignty concerns. Its transfer to foreign private actors under the framework of this agreement threatens to divert the economic value of Macedonia’s natural commons – rivers and reservoirs – into the hands of external corporate entities. Privatizing the construction and likely the management of such a strategic energy asset would result in the offshoring of public gains generated from natural resources.

Equally troubling is the agreement’s reference to developing Macedonia’s cybersecurity and digital infrastructure. In recent years, the UK has taken a leading role in portraying its geopolitical rivals – particularly China, Russia, and Iran – as sources of disinformation, investing heavily in programs aimed at countering their influence and shaping public perception through various propaganda campaigns. Incorporating British cyber expertise into the Macedonian state apparatus risks turning national information policy into an extension of UK strategic interests. The framing of digital security under this partnership is unlikely to be politically neutral, but rather aligned with NATO-centric threat perceptions.

Financially, the entire arrangement hinges on the UK Export Finance (UKEF) mechanism, which inherently favors UK-based contractors. This structure means that a substantial share of Macedonian public debt will be directed toward subsidizing UK companies – many of them with direct or indirect links to the British government. The promise of development is thus entangled with a model of economic dependence, in which public funds are channeled abroad through pre-structured procurement preferences. This concern is not abstract. It has already been confirmed that part of the funds from the UK credit line will be allocated to the highly controversial Bechtel-Enka motorway project.[10] As revealed by the Governor of the National Bank, Trajko Slaveski, “part of the British loan will go directly to that project.” He criticized the lack of planning, stating, “Grubi should have planned those funds before signing anything,” referring to former Deputy Prime Minister Artan Grubi, who was the project’s chief promoter. Slaveski further warned that the publicized cost of €1.3 billion is a gross underestimate: “Based on my projections, it will be two to three times higher. Yes, yes, yes… more than €5 billion.” However, the government’s continuation of the Bechtel-Enka motorway project reveals the limits of its declared commitment to strategic autonomy and fiscal prudence. In spite of previous public rhetoric harshly criticizing the former administration’s opaque signing of the contract, the new government has moved ahead with its implementation. This raises serious concerns about the continuity of political subservience when confronted with pressure from powerful foreign actors. The U.S. Embassy has been a chief promoter of the Bechtel-Enka deal from the outset, lending diplomatic weight to a project that has long been controversial due to its inflated costs, lack of transparency, and questionable strategic value.[11] This dynamic illustrates a broader pattern: when faced with geopolitical interference from the United States or the United Kingdom, the Macedonian political establishment consistently demonstrates little backbone to resist externally driven initiatives – even when these projects are fiscally burdensome and lack a compelling rationale from a domestic development perspective. What emerges, then, is a political economy of dependence in which the appearance of strategic partnership masks an underlying imbalance of power – one in which national institutions defer to foreign priorities, and public resources are redirected to satisfy external agendas.

 

Media and political response

The Strategic Partnership has been framed by pro-government officials and aligned with the media as a historic diplomatic achievement. An article in the newspaper Nova Makedonija praised the deal as proof that “Macedonia is capable of playing the diplomatic game…placing itself on the global chessboard as a small but important player,” while emphasizing that in this new order, “every country fights for its sovereign interests.” The concept of sovereignism was presented as the ideological foundation of this new foreign policy orientation—an assertive contrast to the perceived submissiveness of past international agreements such as the Prespa Agreement and the Treaty with Bulgaria.[12] Yet this framing has not gone unchallenged. Professor Biljana Vankovska, political theorist and former presidential candidate, sharply criticized the celebratory discourse by questioning the logic of debt-driven sovereignty. “Since when is being ‘neck-deep in debt’ to the British called sovereignism—and a sign of fitting into the multipolar world (while we’re both in NATO)?” she posted on social media, expressing skepticism about the nature and implications of the £5 billion credit-linked agreement. Her comment pointedly dismantled the notion that geopolitical symbolism can substitute for economic independence, challenging the very narrative promoted by the ruling party.[13]

 

In stark contrast, VMRO-DPMNE MP Mile Lefkov emphasized the UK’s global stature—“the third-largest economy in Europe, sixth in the world, a nuclear power, and a permanent member of the UN Security Council”—calling the deal “a strategic agreement of enormous significance” with “reform, economic, and geopolitical value.”[14] He insisted that British capital only enters “verified, high-profile, and well-prepared projects,” implying Macedonia had reached a new threshold of institutional credibility. Nikoloski also emphasized that the agreement would allow “over 70 percent of domestic companies to participate in infrastructure projects,” a substantial increase from past participation rates as low as 10 percent. He expressed hope that within two investment cycles, Macedonia’s construction industry would become internationally competitive, able to “go abroad, rather than watching foreign companies work here.” Echoing this ambition, Director of Macedonian Railways Infrastructure Siniša Ivanovski described the Corridor 10 project as central to economic revitalization and ecological modernization, underlining Macedonia’s “excellent infrastructural and strategic positioning” in the broader European transport network.[15]

 

Levica Stands Alone Against Record UK Loan

On May 28, 2025, the Macedonian Parliament ratified the Strategic Partnership Agreement with the United Kingdom, despite mounting concerns about transparency, financial risk, and the erosion of national sovereignty. Out of 82 MPs present, 76 voted in favor, 6 against, and none abstained. The only party to oppose the agreement was Levica, which condemned it as “the largest debt obligation in the history of Macedonia.” In a public statement, Levica denounced the government’s procedural approach, claiming the agreement was pushed through “on the sly” via a political arrangement between VMRO-DPMNE and DUI. They highlighted the sudden scheduling of the Foreign Policy Committee session – chaired by a DUI member—without due notice or respect for parliamentary deadlines, and in the absence of any substantive public or expert debate. Levica warned that the agreement lacks essential financial details such as interest rates, grace periods, or total repayment costs, creating space for manipulation and long-term fiscal irresponsibility. The party further criticized the absence of mechanisms for public oversight, legal accountability, or domestic economic protections, arguing that the deal opens the door to secretive procurement, systemic corruption, and external control of national resources.[16]

 

MP Recep Ismail, vice president of Levica, further deepened this critique during the parliamentary session by directing pointed questions to Finance Minister Gordana Kočoska, particularly regarding the UK Export Finance (UKEF) agency – the mechanism through which the entire £5 billion credit is to be disbursed.[17] To support his concerns, Ismail cited the 2003 Turning a Blind Eye report by Dr. Susan Hawley from the UK-based anti-corruption organization The Corner House, which documents nine cases of corruption-related scandals tied to UKEF in countries such as Kenya, Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Qatar, and South Africa. He also referred to findings from Spotlight on Corruption, which noted that UKEF signed contracts worth £340 million with companies like Airbus and Rolls Royce – both penalized globally for extensive bribery operations. UKEF, according to the report, waited 13 months before reporting corruption suspicions to the UK’s Serious Fraud Office and has never rejected an application on corruption grounds. “They’re not careless—they’re clever,” Ismail asserted. “You will be the ones corrupted here, and they will knowingly allow it.”

 

Ismail went further, framing the agreement not only as a financial trap but as a tool of British imperial influence. “The British Empire has never been, and never will be, a strategic partner of Macedonia—it is a strategic enemy,” he declared, referencing Britain’s role in bombing Aegean Macedonians during the Greek Civil War. He described the agreement as lacking core legal safeguards and full of vague commitments. Annex A, he noted, contains mostly programs rather than projects – meaning the country is indebting itself to pay foreign consultants to design policies, not to build tangible infrastructure. He also warned against trusting British “expertise” in the transport sector, citing the UK’s infamous HS2 high-speed rail project as a cautionary tale of mismanagement. What began as a transformative promise between London and Birmingham ballooned from a projected cost of £37.5 billion to over £67 billion for just one segment—much of it now frozen or abandoned. “A textbook case of how not to run a major public project,” Ismail said, contrasting it with China’s efficient construction of over 45,000 km of high-speed rail. His conclusion: the UK’s involvement in Macedonia’s Corridor 10 is not to build it, but to delay it. In the health sector, he was equally scathing, pointing to the crumbling state of the UK’s NHS, marked by protests, staff shortages, and years-long treatment delays. “Is this the system meant to teach us how to reform our healthcare?” he asked.[18]

 

Summarizing Levica’s position, Ismail argued that the UKEF-financed agreement enables British imperial ambitions through a “corrupt Mickoski government,” and that the financial and legal structure of the deal exposes Macedonia to significant risks. Reports show that 11 of UKEF’s 20 priority markets are in the bottom half of global corruption indexes. The agency often uses British taxpayer funds to underwrite projects in corruption-prone sectors like infrastructure and defense, especially in states with weak institutions. These projects frequently result in excessive debt, poor outcomes, and impunity for violating anti-corruption safeguards. For Levica, this is not a development agreement – it is “a contract for dependency, debt, and foreign capture of domestic governance,” masked as strategic cooperation.

Conclusion

Prime Minister Mickoski began his term signaling a geopolitical realignment – one that appeared to lean away from the European Union and toward deeper ties with the United States. Yet, in a somewhat unexpected move, his government formalized a Strategic Partnership Agreement not with Washington or Brussels, but with a third Western actor: the United Kingdom. Signed in May 2025, the agreement was immediately heralded as “historic” and transformative. But behind the grand rhetoric lies a deeply controversial set of financial and geopolitical implications – none of which have been seriously interrogated by Macedonia’s mainstream media or investigative outlets. While deals involving China are typically met with heightened journalistic scrutiny, alarmist commentary, and civil society pushback, this agreement with the UK has passed almost entirely unchecked. Not a single major outlet has questioned the legal framework of the contract, the conditionality of the loan, or the record of the UK Export Finance (UKEF) agency, despite its well-documented involvement in corruption-laden infrastructure projects across the Global South. This stark contrast exposes just how thoroughly captured Macedonia’s media and civil society have become by Western interests, unable and unwilling to critically examine Western-led arrangements with the same rigor applied to Chinese or other non-Western initiatives. By describing access to UKEF as a form of “historic investment,” rather than as a conditional, export-driven credit facility, the government and its allies have deliberately blurred the line between foreign investment and foreign contracting. In doing so, the Macedonian state positions itself less as a sovereign planner of development and more as a conduit for external economic agendas. The result is the deepening of a familiar pattern: external dependency, non-transparent governance, and asymmetrical negotiations packaged as progress and modernization. The consequences of this agreement are manifold. Strategically, it could serve to block future Chinese investments in key infrastructure corridors, further entrenching Western geopolitical influence in the Balkans. Economically, it opens the floodgates for British government-backed companies and consultants to dominate Macedonia’s public procurement landscape. Politically, it strengthens the UK’s soft power in the region at a time when it seeks new post-Brexit alliances. And fiscally, it commits Macedonian taxpayers to repay billions in loans for projects whose public utility remains vague, whose contracts are opaque, and whose benefits are likely to flow outward rather than inward.

 

 

[1] Mickoski: Strategic Partnership Agreement with UK to lead to historic investment cycle of EUR 6 billion, published on 16.05.2025, available at

https://mia.mk/en/story/mickoski-strategic-partnership-agreement-with-uk-to-lead-to-historic-investment-cycle-of-eur-6-billion? Accessed on 28.06.2025

[2] Ibid

[3] Ibid

[4] Landmark government partnership signed with North Macedonia, published on 22.05.2025, available at

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/landmark-government-partnership-signed-with-north-macedonia accessed on 28.06.2025

[5] Signed: Intergovernmental Agreement for Strategic Partnership between Macedonia and the United Kingdom, published on 22.05.2025, available at

https://mkd.mk/makedonija/potpishan-megjuvladiniot-dogovor-za-strateshko-partnerstvo-na-makedonija-i-velika-britanija/ accessed on 28.06.2025

[6] The Agreement with the United Kingdom has reached the Members of Parliament, published on 28.05.2025, available at  https://www.dw.com/mk/pred-pratenicite-stigna-dogovorot-so-obedinetoto-kralstvo/a-72693818?maca=maz-rss-maz-pol_makedonija_timemk-4727-xml-mrss accessed on 28.06.2025

[7] Draft Law for the Ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of North Macedonia and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland regarding the Partnership for the Implementation of Infrastructure Projects, published on 27.05.2025, available at https://www.sobranie.mk/preview?id=c9187413-4394-4f51-b5e8-489bf7630dd6&url=https://sp.sobranie.mk/sites/2023/materials/638839044937268882/Documents/638839767277839324.pdf&method=GetDocumentContent, accessed on 28.06.2025

[8] Ibid

[9] Ibid

[10] (Video) Part of the British loan will go to Bechtel and Enka, published on 12.06.2025, available at https://infomax.mk/%d0%b2%d0%b8%d0%b4%d0%b5%d0%be-%d0%b4%d0%b5%d0%bb-%d0%be%d0%b4-%d0%b1%d1%80%d0%b8%d1%82%d0%b0%d0%bd%d1%81%d0%ba%d0%b8%d0%be%d1%82-%d0%ba%d1%80%d0%b5%d0%b4%d0%b8%d1%82-%d1%9c%d0%b5-%d0%be%d0%b4%d0%b8/?fbclid=IwY2xjawK3dRlleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHv8mjvfTiKLAADFpolqXi73MTOFrxGMQxIX9bemOdamtaoW3xffto8cJ5Wc6_aem_mzVAnSw-6fpTD9UpOMo3Og accessed on 28.06.2025

[11] The Bechtel-Enka Affair: Amplifying Corruption within the Macedonian Political System, published in May 2023, available at  https://china-cee.eu/2023/05/12/north-macedonia-political-briefing-the-bechtel-enka-affair-amplifying-corruption-within-the-macedonian-political-system/ accessed on 28.06.2025

[12] A strategic partnership with the United Kingdom is being forged: Sovereigntism should be at the foundation of the new agreement, published on 20.05.2025, available at  https://novamakedonija.com.mk/makedonija/politika/se-kova-strategisko-partnerstvo-so-velika-britanija-suverenizmot-da-bide-vo-temelot-na-noviot-dogovor/ accessed on 28.06.2025

[13] Vankovska: Since when is getting “up to your neck” in debt to the British called sovereignism? Published on 20.05.2025, available at

https://nezavisen.mk/vankovska-od-koga-zadolzhuvanje-do-gusha-kaj-britancite-se-vika-suverenizam/ accessed on 28.06.2025

[14] Lefkov: The Strategic Partnership with the United Kingdom will enable the modernization of railway infrastructure and bring investments into the healthcare sector, published on 20.05.2025, available at

https://kurir.mk/vesti/makedonija/lefkov-strateshkoto-partnerstvo-so-obedinetoto-kralstvo-kje-ovozmozhi-modernizacija-na-zheleznichkata-infrastruktura-i-kje-donese-investicii-vo-zdravstveniot-sektor/ accessed on 28.06.2025

[15] A strategic partnership with the United Kingdom is being forged: Sovereigntism should be at the foundation of the new agreement, published on 20.05.2025, available at  https://novamakedonija.com.mk/makedonija/politika/se-kova-strategisko-partnerstvo-so-velika-britanija-suverenizmot-da-bide-vo-temelot-na-noviot-dogovor/ accessed on 28.06.2025

[16] Levica the only party against the new record debt of 6 billion euros: The government smuggles the agreement through without transparency or protection of the public interest, published on 29.05.2025, available at

https://antropol.mk/2025/05/29/levica-edinst-protiv-novo-rekord-zadolz-od-6-milj-eur-vlas-go-sverc-dog-bez-trans-i-zast-na-jav-inter/ accessed on 28.06.2025

[17] (Video) Ismail: The British Agency Financing the Loan Agreement Is Involved in Serious Corruption Scandals, published on 02.06.2025, available at https://levica.mk/pres-centar/govori-vo-parlament/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BC%D0%B0%D0%B8%D0%BB-%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0-%D0%B0%D0%B3%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0-%D0%BA%D0%BE/ accessed on 28.06.2025

[18] https://www.facebook.com/PartijaLevica/videos/727293273130914/?mibextid=rS40aB7S9Ucbxw6v