Weekly Briefing, Vol. 46. No. 3 (CZ) December 2021
Securitisation of the Social Sphere: Synchronic and Diachronic Perspective
Summary
Functioning and processes in an increasing number of fields of social life in the Czech Republic become securitised. The conceptualisation of the fields starting from national security and military, and ending with the economy, energy, telecommunication but also education, research and development is more and more permeated with an utterly political perspective based on the clash between „democracies“ and „autocracies“ as a fundamental dividing line within the global competition between major powers, first and foremost, the US and China. This politicisation entails the expansion of securitisation that imposes new limits on what is tolerated within the liberal democratic system. I will demonstrate these tendencies in a diachronic view at three levels – normative, institutional, and public – analysing the strengthening securitisation trajectory, hitherto culminating in 2021.
Introduction
The basis for partial strategies and policies in the field defining the general security paradigm is established by the Security Strategy (2015). It reproduces the tenet of Euro-Atlanticism with the membership in NATO as a cornerstone of national security. Strategic interests are security and cohesion of both NATO and the EU, as well as the deepening interconnection of these two entities or supporting democracy and rule of law, thus expressing adherence to the notorious export of democracy policy. The Security Strategy stresses the need for support of the enlargement of NATO and the EU to other European states, which is one of the foreign policy priorities declared by the Czech political elites. A major threat is seen in essential criticism of the liberal democratic model no matter if made by internal or external actors.[1] The fundamental national security document thus delegitimises internal critics that is a paradoxical result of the evolution of liberal democracy as such.
Traditional military area
The paradigm introduced by the Security Strategy is developed in the Defence Strategy (2017). It reflects both normative and practical dependence on Western patterns since it builds upon NATO´s Strategic Concept (2010) and the EU Global Strategy (2016). The principal threat to the international and national security is seen in Russia and its real or supposed power goals in Europe including the dismantling of both NATO and the EU.[2] National dependence on NATO was stated openly by the Chief of the General Staff at the Command Assembly of the Czech Armed Forces in November 2021 who declared that the security, defence and military policy of the Czech Republic are determined by principles, tasks and threats defined by NATO´s recent Warfighting Capstone Concept, and the Concept of Deterrence and Defence of Euro-Atlantic Area.[3] The alleged threat posed by Russia, Russian aggression against other states either military or hybrid, including disinformation campaigns and cyber-attacks on one hand, and the adherence to the Euro-Atlanticism, are the commonplaces of the Czech security and military discourse. The Long-Term Perspective for Defence 2035 (issued in 2019) proclaims that the Czech defence strategy is determined by the West-European security architecture, US engagement in Europe, the success of European integration and the strong transatlantic relationship.[4] Similarly, defence planning is determined by NATO´s defence planning process and EU´s security goals.[5]
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Czech authorities want to fulfil the financial obligations set by the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, according to which the member states are to reach the 2% benchmark for defence spending as well as spend at least 20% of defence expenditures on research and development (now the Czech Republic spend roughly 1.34% of the GDP on defence). In this direction, the Concept for the Build-up of the Army of the Czech Republic 2030 (approved in 2019) presupposes both qualitative and quantitative expansion of the Czech Army.[6] The debate on modernisation is typical of politicisation concerning the alleged Russian threat that puts the combat capability of the Czech Army into question, since the Army uses a lot of Soviet or Russian equipment, which has established partial dependence on Russia in the field of supplies of spare parts. Because of the pressure from NATO and domestic opponents of pragmatic cooperation with Russia, the question of modernisation has become mainly a problem of replacement of the Soviet/Russian equipment and technologies with the Western ones. This process has been completed only in the case of the fighter planes while ground or rocket forces lag considerably behind. The General Staff expects the use of the Soviet equipment until 2035.[7] The replacement problem is, of course, connected also with practical aspects of interoperability within NATO and the EU. The Czech defence and military strategies put emphasis on the need for complementarity and synergy of the armed forces within the Euro-Atlantic area.
A discourse of hybrid warfare
These conventional strategies and policies remain in the traditional framework limiting itself to the security, defence, and military fields without significant overlapping with other social domains. This situation has, nevertheless, changed in relation to the introduction of the concept of hybrid warfare that has radicalised the discourses and transformed the social sphere. The 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw contributed considerably to this trend when complementing the ground, naval and air operational domains with cyberspace. The first comprehensive Czech law on cyber security was passed already in 2014, gradually leading to institutional changes both in the civil and military sectors. In 2017, the National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NCISA), Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats (CATHT) at the Ministry of the Interior, and the Committee for Cybersecurity of the National Security Council (NSC) were established. The NCISA is the cyber security administrator and the central administrative body for this area. The agency also protects critical information infrastructure and is involved in the operation of the Galileo satellite system. The CATHT focuses on monitoring, analysing and assessment of hybrid interference, frequently criticising alternative media and criticism aimed against liberal democracy, linking them with foreign powers. The Committee for Cybersecurity of the NSC plays a coordinating role in planning policies for securing national cybersecurity. In 2019, the position of Special Representative for Resilience and New Threats was set up at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with the Cyber Forces Command that is a new military branch that was established within the Army besides land forces, air forces, special forces and territorial forces. Finally, in 2021 the post of Coordinator of the Agenda of Countering Hybrid Interference within the National Security Council was set up to coordinate information exchange and planning policies for countering hybrid threats.
These bodies form an institutional basis of the highly securitised and comprehensive discourse of hybrid warfare. The Cyber Security Strategy (2020) goes further towards cyber defence against external threats. The cyber defence system has been established and is operated by Military Intelligence in cooperation with the Cyber Forces Command of the Czech Army. The priorities set by the Strategy are as follows: developing a holistic approach to cyber security based on civilian-military cooperation; increasing the resilience of the strategic information infrastructure; increasing the resilience of the management and SCADA systems, including the Internet of Things, in the industry that is increasingly automatised and digitalised; strengthening capacities in detection, timely reaction, and establishing an attribution system, leading to a high level of deterrence effect; developing international value-based cooperation in cyber security, interconnecting civil and military sector, and establishing joint Euro-Atlantic cyberspace legal framework.[8]
The national normative framework of security policy has been complemented and finalised by the National Strategy for Countering Hybrid Interference, issued in 2021. It formulates a comprehensive policy of countering hybrid threats, radicalising the security discourse. While building upon the NATO´s and EU´s strategic documents, it postulates the indivisibility of the Czech and Euro-Atlantic security. Hence, hybrid interference is connected only with actions against liberal democracies with the aim to undermine or thwart democratic processes, rule of law and security. According to the document, the most frequently attacked areas are values of the liberal democratic system, economy, security, and defence. The very problem of such a perspective is that any kind of internal criticism can be labelled as acting in favour of external actors, which exerts strong pressure on the freedom of speech or scientific research as shown below. The 2021 Strategy aims at building resilient society, state and critical infrastructure (including the development of effective foreign investment screening mechanisms), developing the capability of adequate and timely reaction as well as a public attribution of the hybrid perpetrators, and, last but least, reducing dependency on countries with „different ideological and value systems“.[9] Such policy is linked to the EU´s concept of strategic autonomy that is also spreading into a wide array of fields.
Social implications
In 2021, the securitisation discourse started to restructure the field of education, universities, academia, and research. The Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats of the Ministry of the Interior elaborated the Guidelines to Counter Foreign Influence in the University Sector and the Financial Analytical Office of the Ministry of Finance, set up in 2017 as a financial intelligence unit, issued the Manual of Technical Assistance and Intangible Transfer of Technology. The first document is based upon the assumption that the Czech universities and academia are the targets of penetration from abroad, and that these are not protected against influence by foreign power sufficiently. Referring to the experiences from the US or Britain, the Guidelines warn against cooperation with individuals and institutions from „authoritarian“ countries, especially Russia, China and Iran while calling upon the academicians and students to report their contacts, communication or cooperation to the university administration or state security bodies.[10]
Such a perspective spreads the atmosphere of mistrust and threat, strengthening tendencies towards censorship and self-censorship, marginalisation or elimination of some topics or interpretations accompanied by penalisation of alternative views or public defamation of academicians through media campaigns. The Manual of Technical Assistance and Intangible Transfer of Technology radicalises the tendencies from the Guidelines when defining the fields that should not be allowed to be studied by foreign nationals from certain countries, the same applying to cooperation at the institutional level.[11] Paradoxically, the state authorities do not perceive such limitations on academic cooperation and research activities as breaching the academic rights and freedoms, and, at the same time, influence by a foreign power (which can be, in fact, standard cooperation with colleagues from the so-called authoritarian countries) is considered to breach the academic rights and freedoms substantially.
Conclusion
The analysis shows that the expansion of securitisation to different social domains is a long-term tendency that has accelerated in the last years, particularly in connection with the concept of hybrid warfare. The securitising logic has spilt over from the security, defence, and military area to new fields, bringing multiple political, economic, and social implications. It has manifested itself in a campaign against Huawei (2018, 2019), the introduction of foreign investment screening mechanisms (2021), exclusion of Chinese and Russian subjects from Dukovany power plant tender (2021), media campaigns against scholars and subsequent penalisations in universities and academia (2019, 2021) or introduction of the normative securitised framework for this area (2021). This tendency, moreover, is expected to deepen in the years to come.
[1] Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (2015), army.cz. Prague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic. Retrieved December 01, 2021, from https://www.army.cz/images/id_8001_9000/8503/Security_Strategy_2015.pdf.
[2] The Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic (2017), mocr.army.cz. Prague: Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic. Retrieved December 01, 2021, from https://www.mocr.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/strategy-and-doctrine/defencestrategy2017.pdf.
[3] Opata, A., Projev náčelníka GŠ na velitelském shromáždění (2021, November 23), acr.army.cz. Retrieved December 02, 2021, from https://www.acr.army.cz/assets/informacni-servis/zpravodajstvi/projev-ngs-acr-arm-gen–opata.pdf.
[4] The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2035 (2019), mocr.army.cz. Prague: Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic. Retrieved December 01, 2021, from https://www.mocr.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf.
[5] The Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic (2017), mocr.army.cz. Prague: Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic. Retrieved December 01, 2021, from https://www.mocr.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/strategy-and-doctrine/defencestrategy2017.pdf.
[6] Koncepce výstavby Armády České Republiky (2019), acr.army.cz. Prague: Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic. Retrieved December 01, 2021, from https://www.acr.army.cz/assets/technika-a-vyzbroj/modernizace/koncepce__2030.pdf.
[7] Danda, O., Sovětské zbraně v Česku skončí až v roce 2035 (2019, July 14), novinky.cz. Retrieved December 03, 2021, from https://www.novinky.cz/domaci/clanek/sovetske-zbrane-v-cesku-skonci-az-v-roce-2035-40289880.
[8] National Cyber Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (2020), dataplan.info. Prague: National Cyber and Information Security Agency. Retrieved December 05, 2021, from https://www.dataplan.info/img_upload/7bdb1584e3b8a53d337518d988763f8d/nscs_2021_2025_eng.pdf.
[9] National Strategy for Countering Hybrid Interference (2021), mocr.army.cz. Prague: Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic. Retrieved December 06, 2021, from https://www.mocr.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/national-strategy—aj-final.pdf.
[10] Protivlivový manuál pro sektor vysokých škol (2021), mvcr.cz. Prague: Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. Retrieved December 06, 2021, from https://www.mvcr.cz/cthh/clanek/protivlivovy-manual-pro-sektor-vysokych-skol.aspx.
[11] Příručka technické pomoci a nehmotného přenosu technologií (2021), financnianalytickyurad.cz. Prague: Financial Analytical Office. Retrieved December 06, 2021, from https://www.financnianalytickyurad.cz/download/downloads_files_cs/1617879009_cs_prirucka.pdf.